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ABSTRACT  
 
Traditionally, emergency response is in large part the role and responsibility of 
formal organizations. Advances in information technology enable amateurs or concerned 
publics to play a meaningful role in emergency response. Indeed, in recent catastrophic 
disasters or crises such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2011 Japan earthquake and 
nuclear crisis, participatory online groups of the general public from both across the 
globe and the affected areas made significant contributions to the effective response 
through crowdsourcing vital information and assisting with the allocation of needed 
resources. Thus, a more integrative lens is needed to understand the responses of various 
actors to catastrophic crises or disasters by taking into account not only formal 
organizations with legal responsibilities, but also volunteer-based, participatory groups 
who actively participate in emergency response. In this dissertation, I first developed an 
“event-driven” lens for integrating both formal and volunteer-based, participatory 
emergency responses on the basis of a comprehensive literature review (chapter 1). Then 
I conducted a deeper analysis of one aspect of the event-driven lens: relationships 
between participatory online groups and formal organizations in crisis or disaster 
situations. Specifically, I explored organizational and technical determinants and 
outcomes of forming such relationships (chapter 2). As a consequence, I found out three 
determinants (resource dependence, shared understanding, and information technology) 
and two outcomes (inter-organizational alignment and the effectiveness of coordinated 
emergency response) of the relationship between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations and suggested seven hypotheses. Furthermore, I empirically tested these 
hypotheses, focusing on the 2015 Nepal earthquake case (chapter 3). As a result, I found 
  ii 
empirical evidence that supports that shared understanding and information technology 
improve the development of the relationship between participatory online groups and 
formal organizations. Moreover, research findings support that the development of the 
relationship enhances inter-organizational coordination. Lastly, I provide implications for 
future research (chapter 4). This dissertation is expected to contribute to bridging the 
disconnect between the emergency management literature and the crisis informatics 
literature. The theoretical insight from inter-organizational relations (IOR) theory 
provides another contribution.  
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CHAPTER 1 
AN EVENT-DRIVEN LENS FOR ORGANIZING EMERGENCY RESPONSE  
IN THE NETWORKED AGE 
 
Technology accelerates the creation of just-in-time governance efforts while also 
lowering the barriers for joining such efforts to an increasingly diverse set of actors who 
can make a meaningful contribution. For example, large-scale crises such as natural 
disasters (earthquake and hurricane) and manmade crises (terrorism and ethnic violence) 
are extreme events that necessitate responses at multiple scales by an increasingly diverse 
set of actors. Traditionally, emergency preparedness and response are in large part the 
role and responsibility of formal organizations such as public emergency management 
agencies and police and fire departments under related laws and regulations. For instance, 
in the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible 
for developing emergency management plans, such as the National Response Framework, 
and for coordinating response to natural disasters at the federal level under the Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. State and local governments also 
have their own similar departments or agencies. In reality, it is increasingly rare for a 
single department or agency to address catastrophic disasters and crises due to a lack of 
capacities and resources to be prepared for every possible type of catastrophe. Thus, 
when a catastrophe occurs, multiple public agencies across local, state, and federal 
governments are mobilized and deployed to respond to the disaster. Also, formal 
nonprofit organizations such as the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army and for-
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profit corporations collaborate with public agencies to offer rescue and relief services to 
the affected people. 
Importantly, because of concurrent advances in a variety of technologies 
(information, communication, and artificial intelligence), communities now regularly 
emerge where amateurs or concerned publics can play a meaningful role in the response 
through crowdsourcing vital information, assisting with the allocation of needed 
resources, or other efforts that had once been led by formal organizations. In recent 
catastrophic disasters or crises such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the 2011 Japan 
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis, and the 2015 Nepal earthquake, participatory 
online groups of the general public from both across the globe and the affected areas 
made significant contributions to the effective response. As a novel phenomenon in the 
digital era, these volunteer-based, participatory groups provide a vital component of 
emergency responses. They fill information gaps on crisis or disaster conditions and the 
affected people’s needs, voluntarily mobilize, allocate, and deliver relief resources, and 
help coordinate formal organizations’ tasks and activities in complex, urgent disaster 
situations. These participatory online groups are a kind of virtual community consisting 
of digital volunteers loosely connected across the world through information and 
communication technologies (hardware devices and software applications).  
Specifically, these online groups create a reporting system through which the 
affected people can submit their requests for rescue or aid and the information of crisis or 
disaster conditions by using various technologies. These online groups also gather, verify, 
and visualize a large amount of crisis- or disaster-related data from social media, 
mainstream media, satellite imagery donated by for-profit companies, and reports from 
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the ground by using open source web platforms, crowdsourced human computation, and 
artificial intelligence. This information processed by these online groups increase 
situational awareness of the current state of crises or disasters, the affected peoples’ needs 
and requests, and which organizations were working on what and where to meet the 
unmet needs of the affected people. By providing real-time, verified, and reliable crisis or 
disaster information, these online groups enable the affected communities (local residents 
affected by crises or disasters and local community-based nonprofit organizations) to 
quickly mobilize aid resources and help the affected communities, public emergency 
management agencies and first responders to make timely and effective decisions about 
rescue missions and relief services. While once considered unique or of little 
consequence, these online groups’ efforts are now an anticipated and legitimate part of 
the overall response to catastrophes (Meier, 2015). 
In the digital age, with the emergence of participatory online groups enabled 
through information and communication technologies and advanced computing, 
emergency response systems became more complex and dynamic. Thus, a more 
integrative lens is needed to understand the responses of various actors to catastrophic 
crises or disasters by taking into account not only formal responders with legal 
responsibilities, but also volunteer-based, participatory groups who actively participate in 
emergency response. In this chapter, I first describe existing formal emergency response 
based on formal organizations and their emergency response plans, procedures, and 
policies. Then I illustrate volunteer-based, participatory emergency response, focusing on 
the roles, characteristics and contributions of participatory online groups in recent 
catastrophic crises or disasters. Finally, I suggest an “event-driven” lens for integrating 
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formal and volunteer-based, participatory responses. For this purpose, I conducted a 
comprehensive literature review on emergency management, disaster policies, 
crowdsourcing, digital humanitarianism, volunteered geographic information, and 
disaster sociology.  
The event-driven lens consists of three components: formal emergency response; 
volunteer-based, participatory emergency response; and relationships and interactions 
between institutionalized formal organizations and participatory online groups in 
response to crisis. Also, the event-driven lens is a five-phase model including 
preparedness, response I (mobilization and emergence), response II (production and 
delivery), response III (outputs and outcomes), and early recovery. Therefore, I explain 
how formal and participatory actors prepare for and respond to a crisis or a disaster in 
each of these five phases. I also suggest five propositions. 
 
Formal and Volunteer-Based, Participatory Emergency Responses 
Formal Emergency Response 
Formal emergency response is a process in which institutionalized organizations 
at all levels of government and across the public, nonprofit, and for-profit sectors conduct 
a wide range of activities and tasks to respond to a crisis or a disaster (Haddow, Bullock, 
& Coppola, 2008). Typical examples of such activities and tasks include search-and-
rescue missions, emergency medical services, and relief services (foods, water, and 
temporary shelters). Basically, formal emergency response relies on the roles and 
responsibilities of (networks of) formal organizations, and coordination among these 
organizations including public emergency management departments or agencies, fire and 
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police departments, institutionalized nonprofit organizations such as the American Red 
Cross and the Salvation Army, and for-profit corporations such as private utility 
companies, the Home Depot and Walmart. These organizations are characterized by 
formal rules and hierarchical structures. This section describes a traditional view on 
formal emergency response, focusing on the Incident Command System (ICS). Then a 
current view on formal emergency response is illustrated (i.e. a mixture of the command 
and control system and networked governance). 
Traditional view: The command-and-control system. The traditional formal 
emergency response is one type of the bureaucratic, command-and-control system. The 
key properties of the traditional emergency response are clearly determined objectives, 
policies, and procedures guiding organizational activities; formal, hierarchical 
organizational structures for decision making; and division of labor (Schneider, 1992). A 
strategic tool or mechanism for formal emergency response called the Incident Command 
System (ICS) was developed by local forest firefighting agencies in California in the 
1970s. Since the inception of an initial version of the ICS called FIRESCOPE 
(FIrefighting RESources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies), the ICS has 
spread across the United States (Buck et al., 2006; Cole, 2000; Harrald, 2006). In the 
1980s, FIRESCOPE became a standard protocol for fighting wildfires in the U.S. Forest 
Service, evolving into the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) 
(Harrald, 2006). Then, the U.S. National Park Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the 
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency adopted the ICS for their various tasks and 
deployments for emergency response. 
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Basically, the ICS is a “military-like” model for organizing and coordinating 
emergency management personnel and first responders in crisis or disaster situations. 
Also, the ICS is inherently a closed system that assumes environmental chaos rather than 
external feedback and resources from the environment for continuity and recovery of a 
system (Harrald, 2006). The ICS is based on the classical scientific management 
approach with rational bureaucratic principles. Hence, the ICS is characterized by linear, 
top-down, centralized, rule-based organizational structures and decision making 
processes (Drabek, 1985; Kettl, 2003; Schneider, 1992). According to Buck and 
colleagues, the ICS includes some of the following elements:  
standardized job descriptions with a training program for those positions; 
common terms for equipment and supplies; a structured chain of command from 
the specialist on the ground to the incident commander with unity of command 
emphasized and each person in the organization reporting to one boss; authority 
commensurate with responsibility, and task assignments made rationally to the 
person most qualified for the assignment regardless of rank in the organization; 
span of control limited to the number of people that one person can effectively 
control; [and] sectoring of work to insure efficiency, effectiveness and safety 
(2006, p. 1). 
Current view: Mixture of the command-and-control system and networked 
governance. If a crisis or a disaster (particularly, a catastrophic incident) occurs, multiple 
organizations across all levels of government and the public, for-profit and nonprofit 
sectors need to collaborate with one another to respond to a crisis or a disaster. Thus, the 
formal emergency response system becomes a large network of multiple organizations 
7 
 
(Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010; Kapucu, 2006b; Waugh, 2000). Also, an urgent, 
complex disaster requires multiple organizations involved to respond to the disaster in a 
rapid and coordinated manner (Comfort, 2007). Donald Moynihan calls this situation “a 
crisis management paradox: Crises not only require an inter-organizational response but 
also require traits unusual in networks: rapid and decisive coordinated action” (2008, p. 
206). To resolve this paradox, the ICS serves as a centralized coordination mechanism 
among multiple organizations involved, operating as an inter-organizational hierarchy.  
Over the past four decades, the Incident Command System (ICS) has evolved 
into integrative nationwide response policy tools and coordination structures including 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response 
Framework (NRF). The NIMS provides a standard template of incident management for 
all types of crises and disasters. Importantly, the two key elements of the NIMS are ICS 
for on-scene operational response and inter-organizational coordination for off-scene 
supports. For the on-scene ICS, a variety of public agencies (fire, law enforcement, and 
emergency medical services) across all levels of government, nonprofit organizations, 
and for-profit corporations are mobilized to constitute a network of responding 
organizations, mostly following predetermined agreements and procedures. These 
organizations and their personnel are assigned into command staff positions (public 
information, safety, and liaison) and general response sections in the field (operations, 
planning, logistics, and finance/administration). All of these organizations and personnel 
are controlled and coordinated by an Incident Commander. “The ICS organizational 
structure is modular, extending to incorporate all elements necessary for the type, size, 
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scope, and complexity of an incident….When the need arises,…these Sections may have 
several subordinate units” (DHS, 2008, p. 91).  
As another element of the NIMS, off-scene inter-organizational coordination 
called Multi-Agency Coordination Systems (MACS) “is to coordinate [a variety of 
supporting] activities above the field level and to prioritize the incident demands for 
critical or competing resources, thereby assisting the coordination of the operations in the 
field” (DHS, 2008, p. 64). Unlike the on-scene ICS based on unified command and 
control, the off-scene MACS is a collaborative decision making process for providing 
timely supports and assistance to first responders on the ground, mostly following 
predefined standard operating procedures and protocols.  
Another important emergency response policy tool and structure is the National 
Response Framework (NRF) that was initially created in 2008 and updated in 2013. The 
NRF is built on key concepts and principles identified in the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). Specifically, the NRF aims to align key roles, authorities, 
and responsibilities of formal organizations from the public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
sectors regarding how to mobilize and deliver specific resources and capabilities required 
to respond to a crisis or a disaster across all levels of government and the sectors (DHS, 
2013). Since the NRF is built on the NIMS, the NRF also relies on two coordination 
mechanisms among multiple organizations: The Incident Command System (ICS) and 
inter-organizational cooperation. On one hand, the NRF defines the organizational 
structures of local, state, and federal response operations based on the ICS. On the other 
hand, the NRF describes detailed procedures and coordination structures for building and 
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maintaining a wide range of partnerships and collaboration across federal departments 
and agencies, the three levels of government, and the sectors.  
An important response coordination mechanism for inter-organizational 
cooperation under the NRF is the Emergency Support Functions (ESF). Unlike the ICS, 
each organization “perform[s] the required function using their own procedures and 
resources” under the ESF agreements (Buck et al., 2006, p. 16). The federal ESFs are 
groups of formal organizations across the sectors at the federal level for bundling and 
delivering response resources and capabilities. The federal ESFs consist of 14 key 
functional areas, including mass care and emergency assistance, search and rescue, 
firefighting, public health and emergency medical services, public safety and security, 
and energy infrastructure. One or two federal departments and agencies are in charge of 
each functional area as ESF coordinators. In addition to ESF coordinators, a lot of 
organizations are involved in each functional area, serving as primary or supporting 
agencies.  
In addition to the ESFs, there are many other types of collaborative arrangements 
for formal response between neighboring jurisdictions (city, county, or state), across the 
levels of government, and across the sectors. A typical example of these collaborative 
arrangements is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). The EMAC 
is a state to state mutual aid agreement for mobilizing and delivering personnel and 
equipment to the affected areas (Kapucu & Garayev, 2011; Waugh, 2007).  
In this section, I illustrated a traditional view on formal emergency response 
based on the Incident Command System (ICS) and a current view that emphasizes both 
the ICS and collaborative governance across the levels of government and the sectors. I 
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note that both traditional and current views on formal emergency response stress the 
importance of institutionalized formal organizations (public agencies, nonprofit 
organizations, and for-profit corporations) as key responding actors in crisis or disaster 
situations. Moreover, both views rely on established laws, regulations, and procedures. 
Volunteer-Based, Participatory Emergency Response 
For the past four decades, disaster sociologists have researched volunteer-based, 
emergent groups of individuals and their behavior in response to crisis. Most prior studies 
have focused on emergent collective behavior at the local community level before, during 
and after a crisis or a disaster (Drabek & McEntire, 2003; Drabek, 1985; Helsloot & 
Ruitenberg, 2004; Kreps & Bosworth, 1993; Rodriguez, 2006; Stallings & Quarantelli, 
1985). Thus, the disaster sociology literature has provided useful knowledge on collective 
behavior and organizational structures of volunteer-based, emergent groups of 
individuals. But, most prior studies in disaster sociology have investigated relatively 
small groups of the affected people who helped each other in extreme events. Few studies 
have paid attention to large-scale collaboration enabled by information and 
communication technologies and artificial intelligence in response to crisis. 
In the fields of disaster informatics, digital humanitarianism, emergency 
communications, and computer science, many scholars and practitioners recently began 
to note the contributions and potentials of participatory online groups in crisis or disaster 
situations (e.g., Crowley, 2013; Palen et al., 2010; White, Palen, & Anderson, 2014; 
Zook, Graham, Shelton, & Gorman, 2010). Participatory online groups of individuals are 
volunteer-based, virtual communities that perform collective responses by using 
information, communication, and computational technologies. Participatory online 
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groups of publics are characterized as loosely connected, decentralized, and emergent 
communities from both across the globe and crisis- or disaster-affected areas.  
Responding activities and contributions of participatory online groups. In 
recent crisis or disaster situations, participatory online groups often times made 
significant contributions to addressing crisis or disaster situations through setting up a 
reporting system from the ground, performing crisis-mapping, disseminating crisis 
information to the affected people, creating online base maps, translating, and 
coordinating the mobilization and delivery of relief resources. 
Setting up a reporting system from the ground. Participatory online groups 
often times set up a reporting system through which local people affected by crises or 
disasters can submit their needs and requests for assistance and their testimonies on the 
current state of crises or disasters (e.g., Ushahidi-Haiti platform in the aftermath of the 
2010 Haiti earthquake). This reporting system allows for the affected people to send their 
requests and testimonies through a variety of information and communication 
technologies available to them in urgent crisis or disaster situations, including short 
message service (SMS), email, social media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, and 
Instagram), online report forms on the website, and the emergency call center. This 
reporting system aggregates and stores all the reports from different sources. As a result, 
the affected people likely play an active role in crisis or disaster situations, rather than 
passive victims or recipients of relief aid (Nelson, Sigal, & Zambrano, 2010). 
Crisis-mapping. In most cases participatory online groups perform crisis mapping 
consisting of data collection, verification, geo-location and visualization (e.g., Sinsai.info 
in the aftermath of the 2011 Japan earthquake and nuclear crisis) (Caquard, 2013; 
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Shanley, Burns, Bastian, & Robson, 2013). Participatory online groups gather and 
process a wide range of crisis or disaster data. The data includes current crisis or disaster 
conditions (e.g., the status of floods, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions), the affected 
people’ needs and requests for aid and rescue, relief resources available to those affected 
by crises or disasters (e.g., foods, water, and field medical clinics), the locations of the 
formal or informal refugee camps of people internally displaced, and who-is-doing-what-
where called 3W in humanitarian disaster response (i.e. which organizations are doing 
what, where to meet unmet needs of the affected communities?). Such information comes 
from a variety of sources: a reporting system from the ground, social media (Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, etc.), community-based communication networks (e.g., local 
community radios), mainstream media, and official situation reports. Also, participatory 
online groups verify the collected information by calling, texting, or emailing the affected 
people. To maximize the usefulness of the collected data, participatory online groups 
seek to find geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude) of the collected data. Finally, 
participatory online groups visualize and publish the data on digital base maps, such as 
Bing, Google Maps and OpenStreetMap1. Hence, the affected communities, first 
responders, emergency management agencies, and international or local humanitarian 
organizations likely recognize clearly what is going on in the field in real-time.  
Disseminating disaster information to the affected communities. In some cases, 
participatory online groups do not only gather a wide range of crisis information from the 
ground, but also return the information directly to the affected communities (e.g., 
                                                 
1 OpenStreetMap means both a global community of open-source mapping and its digital map products 
(www.openstreetmap.org) 
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QuakeMap in the aftermath of the 2015 Nepal earthquake) (Liu & Palen, 2010; Meier, 
2009). The affected people can subscribe to particular types of warnings and information 
useful “to seek shelter [or other relief resources], evacuate the area, or take other 
protective measures” (B. R. Lindsay, 2011, p. 3). Such warnings and information are 
disseminated to subscribers via automated email or short message service (SMS). 
Creating and updating digital base maps. The accurate, detailed base maps of the 
affected areas are crucial for public agencies and first responders to effectively address 
crises or disasters. In recent crises or disasters such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 
2015 Nepal earthquake, participatory online groups created the most accurate online base 
maps of the affected areas within a few weeks. Thousands of online volunteer mappers 
use collaborative mapping tools to collectively create the post-disaster maps based on 
satellite imagery donated by for-profit imagery providers or international organizations 
(Crowley & Chan, 2011; Meier, 2011; Nelson et al., 2010; Roche, Propeck-
Zimmermann, & Mericskay, 2011). Moreover, in most cases such voluntary mapping 
projects are carried out under an open source software license (e.g., the Creative 
Commons), thus the published base maps can be immediately and freely used for first 
responders’ search-and-rescue missions and other humanitarian aid purposes. 
Translating. When the affected people and international first responders use 
different languages, such language barrier is likely to seriously delay first responders’ 
rescue and relief efforts. Participatory online groups sometimes mobilize volunteer 
translators around the world and help international first responders and the affected 
people effectively communicate with each other (e.g., Mission 4636 in the aftermath of 
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the 2010 Haiti earthquake) (Hester et al., 2010; Meier & Munro, 2010; Munro, 2010; 
Sutherlin, 2013). 
Coordinating the mobilization and delivery of relief resources. In many cases 
participatory online groups make a significant contribution to the effective mobilization 
and delivery of relief resources, particularly before public emergency management 
agencies and humanitarian nonprofit organizations reach out to the affected communities 
or when these agencies and organizations lack their capacities to effectively address 
crises or disasters (e.g., community-based participatory online groups such as 311help in 
the aftermath of the 2011 Japan earthquake and nuclear crisis). Participatory online 
groups often use social networking sites (e.g., Facebook Groups) or open source online 
platforms to self-organize the mobilization and delivery of relief resources. For example, 
filling out an online form on social networking sites or online platforms, the affected 
people can submit their requests for relief, specifying the types of needs (foods, water, 
medical services, first aid kits, transportation, temporary shelters, and volunteers), their 
locations, and contact information. Local people or aid organizations also post the 
information of relief resources and services they can donate. All the information (both 
requests for help and donation lists) is published online. Thus, those in need and those 
who donate aid resources can easily reach out to each other to receive or offer aid 
resources. 
The Importance of Considering Both Formal and Volunteer-Based Participatory 
Responses 
Formal emergency response is relatively effective in dealing with small-scale or 
routine emergencies, but often severely delayed and ineffective in addressing large-scale, 
15 
 
catastrophic crises or disasters. According to Leonard and Howitt (2005), formal 
organizations and their collaborative networks “functions best when it is directed at a 
well-defined, reasonable consistent or clear prioritized set of purposes” (citied in Buck et 
al., 2006, p. 5). However, the formal emergency response systems likely operate poorly 
in large-scale crises or disasters “which often involve…multiple hazards occurring in 
close temporal and spatial succession with multiple agent-generated demands…[and] 
with…multiple responding agencies,…attempting to satisfy often conflicting goals that 
cannot be anticipated and reconciled” (Buck et al., 2006, p. 5). The formal response 
systems characterized by hierarchical decision making, standard operating procedures, 
and internal communication channels likely have difficulty responding to or fail to deal 
with catastrophic crisis or disaster situations (Crowley & Chan, 2011; Yuan, Guan, Huh, 
& Lee, 2013). Such difficulty or failure of formal organizations is caused primarily by the 
lack or absence of information on the current state of crises or disasters (e.g., fatalities, 
injuries, damages, and the needs of those affected) and on real-time response efforts (i.e. 
which organization is working on what, where). The formal emergency management 
systems often do not have open communication channels that aggregate or prioritize local 
intelligence from outside sources and share the intelligence with the affected people 
(Yuan et al., 2013). Hence, there are often disconnected communications not only within 
a network of formal organizations, but also between formal organizations and the 
affected people on the ground. Such communication problems likely result in inefficient 
coordination (e.g., the duplication of response efforts) among public agencies, first 
responders in the field, local or international nonprofit organizations, and the affected 
people on the ground (Kapucu, 2006a). 
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Indeed, these problems were apparent in recent catastrophic disasters. For 
example, during Hurricane Katrina that struck the Gulf Coast of the U.S. in 2005, a lack 
of information on the ground seriously delayed the response of emergency management 
agencies and nonprofit or for-profit organizations involved. “[D]uring Katrina, federal, 
state, and local government agencies and private organizations did not know what actions 
to take in the response, did not have any guidance on how to coordinate and interrelate 
their activities,…and had no system to track and share information” (Jaeger et al., 2007, 
p. 593). Also, when a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti in 2010, formal emergency 
management agencies including the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) collected disaster information through their 
institutionalized internal channels, while not taking into account outside information 
sources (e.g., affected Haitian people or local community leaders). As a result, those 
agencies faced information gaps that delayed emergency response (search-and-rescue 
missions and the delivery of relief resources), thus costing lives and creating security 
issues in the field (Heinzelman & Waters, 2010).  
With advances in information, communication, and computational technologies, 
the role of participatory online groups has become more important for the effective 
response to crises or disasters. These online groups successfully supplement crisis or 
disaster information gaps, improve formal organizations’ capacities to coordinate a lot of 
on-scene and off-scene activities, and help meet the affected people’s needs in an 
efficient and timely manner. It is important to note that despite their contributions and 
potentials, volunteer-based, participatory groups do not replace formal organizations, but 
complement formal organizations. It is because their responding tasks and activities focus 
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primarily on the production of crisis- or disaster-related information, and these tasks and 
activities are likely active during a relatively short period in the immediate aftermath of a 
crisis or a disaster (e.g., one or two weeks). Thus, it seems that participatory online 
groups are unable to provide a wide range of responding tasks and activities that formal 
organizations perform—including search-and-rescue operations, emergency medical 
services, and law enforcement—during an entire response phase (e.g., one or two 
months). If participatory online groups perform responding tasks and activities by 
themselves, such responding tasks and activities may be insufficient and ineffective. 
Hence, one needs “modern” emergency response systems integrating both formal and 
volunteer-based, participatory responses. That is, if the strengths of both formal and 
volunteer-based, participatory emergency responses are incorporated, the capacity to deal 
with disasters or crises may be tremendously increased. 
 
An Event-Driven Lens for Integrating Formal and Volunteered-Based, 
Participatory Emergency Responses 
Recent catastrophic events led to the emergence of participatory online groups of 
publics. One can witness that the actual emergency response systems in the networked 
age are much more complex and dynamic than the existing emergency management 
literature and disaster policies have understood, because a wide range of formal and 
voluntary actors work together or independently in response to crisis. Thus, it is 
necessary to build a novel and extended lens for integrating both formal and volunteer-
based, participatory responses. The novel lens, motivated by the current research, is 
called an event-driven lens, because crises or disasters serve as a focusing event that 
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suddenly bring about not only the activation of formal organizations and their latent 
networks across the levels of government and the sectors, but also the emergence of 
many participatory online groups from both across the globe and the affected 
communities to collectively respond to disasters or crises.  
This event-driven lens consists of three dimensions (See Figure 1.1): (1) formal 
emergency response (i.e. how do formal organizations respond to catastrophic crises or 
disasters, following predetermined policies, procedures, and related laws? And what are 
the challenges and limitations of formal emergency response to large-scale crises or 
disasters?); (2) volunteer-based, participatory emergency response (i.e. how do 
participatory online groups collectively respond to disasters?); and (3) relationships 
between formal organizations and participatory online groups (i.e. what are the types of 
relationships between formal organizations and participatory online groups? And how 
and why do formal organizations and participatory online groups cooperate with each 
other or independently perform their response activities?).  
 Also, this event-driven lens is a phase model consisting of preparedness, response 
I (mobilization and emergence), response II (production and delivery), response III 
(outputs and outcomes), and early recovery. In the emergency management literature, 
preparedness means “planning how to respond in an emergency or a disaster, and 
developing capabilities for a more effective response” mostly prior to the occurrence of 
an emergency or a disaster (Waugh, 2000, p. 49). Response is “the immediate actions to 
save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs” soon after 
crises or disasters occur (Bruce R. Lindsay, 2012, p. 3). In this event-driven lens, the 
response phase is divided into three sub-phases to help conceptually understand complex, 
19 
 
dynamic emergency response systems in the digital era: (1) mobilization and emergence 
(how are formal organizations and participatory online groups mobilized to respond to a 
crisis or a disaster according to laws and policies or spontaneously?); (2) production and 
delivery (how do formal organizations and participatory online groups create and deliver 
a variety of response services to the affected people?; and (3) outputs and outcomes (what 
are the outputs and outcomes of the response services created and delivered by formal 
organizations and participatory online groups?). Lastly, early recovery is actions intended 
“to restore essential services and repair damages caused by” a crisis or a disaster in the 
immediate aftermath of the response phase (Bruce R. Lindsay, 2012, p. 3). 
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Formal Emergency Response 
Formal emergency response is an official system consisting of institutionalized 
organizations from the public, nonprofit, and for-profit sectors, their resources and 
personnel, established policies, procedures, plans, and agreements, and inter-
organizational relationships and coordination mechanisms among these organizations. 
Preparedness. A key feature of formal emergency response is dependence on 
(networks of) formal organizations across jurisdictions and the sectors (Schroeder et al., 
2001). These formal organizations include public emergency management departments 
and agencies and other public organizations at the local, state, or federal level (the U.S. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, 
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineering), first responders (police and fire departments 
and emergency medical services), institutionalized nonprofit organizations (the American 
Red Cross, the Salvation Army, World Vision, and National Voluntary Organizations 
Active in Disaster), and private corporations (private utility companies and the Home 
Depot). 
Formal organizations create emergency response plans and frameworks under 
related laws, regulations and policies. These laws and policies determine the key 
principles and concepts of emergency management, the specific roles and responsibilities 
of each formal organization, and detailed procedures on how resources and personnel are 
mobilized, deployed and reimbursed (DHS, 2008, 2013; Kapucu & Garayev, 2011; Bruce 
R. Lindsay, 2012; Waugh, 2007). Formal organizations also build partnerships and 
collaboration for mutual aid agreement across jurisdictions and the sectors (e.g., 
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Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)). The literature calls this phase 
preparedness (Haddow et al., 2008; Kapucu & Ozerdem, 2013; Waugh, 2000). 
Response I (Mobilization and activation). Emergency response plans made in 
the preparedness phase are activated in the immediate aftermath of a crisis or a disaster. 
A variety of resources (personnel, funds, and equipment) are mobilized across the levels 
of government and the sectors according to the predetermined plans (DHS, 2013; 
Kapucu, 2009). Hence, the formal emergency response system becomes a large 
network(s) of formal organizations across jurisdictions and the sectors. The extent and 
process of the mobilization of formal organizations and their various resources are 
influenced by not only the predetermined response plans and policies, but also the 
magnitude and immediate impacts of actual or potential crises or disasters, such as 
casualties, injuries, internally displaced people, and collapsed buildings and roads (DHS, 
2013; Harrald, 2006; Quarantelli, 2005). Responses to small-scale incidents are mostly 
handled at the local level. “As incidents change in size, scope, and complexity, response 
efforts must adapt to meet evolving requirements. The number, type, and sources of 
resources must be able to expand rapidly to meet the changing needs associated with a 
given incident and its cascading effects” (DHS, 2013, p. 6). Quarantelli (2005) 
emphasizes that one needs to differentiate catastrophes from disasters. In catastrophes 
such as Hurricane Katrina “[m]ost or all of the community built structure is heavily 
impacted....Local officials are unable to undertake their usual work role” (p. 3). Also, 
support from neighboring local jurisdictions may not be provided, because nearby 
localities are also impacted. Hence, responses to catastrophes require a wider range of 
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resources and support from state and federal governments and across the public, private, 
and nonprofit sectors. 
Additionally, the mobilization and activation of formal response is shaped by the 
political dynamics of intergovernmental relations (i.e. relationships among local, state 
and federal governments). Basically, decisions about the mobilization of relief resources 
across the levels of government are made through “intergovernmental cooperation among 
the various parts of the complicated federal system by which the United States is 
governed” (Derthick, 2007, p. 37). Particularly, in large-scale crises or disasters where 
the federal government and its high-level officials are involved in making decisions about 
formal emergency response, the political dynamics related to intergovernmental relations, 
such as election cycles, the state governments’ opposition to federalizing emergency 
response, and the presidential disaster declaration, influences the mobilization and 
activation of formal emergency response (Haddow et al., 2008; Quarantelli, 2005; 
Waugh, 2006). 
Proposition 1: The mobilization of formal organizations and their 
resources across the levels of government and the sectors is determined by 
the predetermined response plans and policies made in the preparedness 
period, the magnitude and immediate impacts of actual or potential crises 
or disasters, and intergovernmental relations. 
Response II (production and delivery). Networks of formal organizations 
mobilized produce and deliver a variety of emergency response services to the affected 
people (e.g., search-and-rescue missions and emergency medical services). The 
effectiveness of networks of formal organizations in producing and delivering emergency 
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response services is influenced by cognition (timely, valid information), communication 
(information exchange and sharing), coordination (the Incident Command System or 
cooperative alignment), information technology and infrastructure (interoperability, 
decision support systems, and geographic information systems), and characteristics of 
networks of formal organizations (mutual trust, prior history of collaboration, and goal 
congruence). First, from an emergency management perspective, cognition is the capacity 
to collect, integrate, monitor, and assess timely, accurate, and valid information about 
changing crisis or disaster conditions and the status of operations at the multiple sites 
(Comfort, Oh, Ertan, & Scheinert, 2010; Comfort, 2007). Cognition is important to create 
a common knowledge base among formal organizations in crisis or disaster situations. 
Communication in emergency management is “reliable, systematic exchange of 
information within and among organizations” (Comfort, Dunn, Johnson, Skertich, & 
Zagorecki, 2004, p. 77). The concept of communication “means achieving a sufficient 
level of shared information [and meanings] among the different organizations and 
jurisdictions participating in disaster operations at different locations, so all actors readily 
understand the constraints on each and the possible combinations of collaboration and 
support among them under a given set of conditions” (Comfort, 2007, p. 191). 
Coordination is a process of “aligning one’s actions with those of other relevant 
actors and organizations to achieve a shared goal” (Comfort, 2007, p. 194). There are the 
two different types of coordination mechanism in networks of formal organizations: The 
Incident Command System (ICS) and cooperative decision making processes. The ICS 
that emphasizes unified command and control is used primarily for on-scene operational 
activities (Buck et al., 2006; Moynihan, 2008). All formal organizations and their 
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personnel involved in on-scene tactical and operational tasks perform their various 
missions under the authority of an Incident Commander. These operational activities are 
coordinated through hierarchical decision making structures, division of labor, span of 
control, and integrated communications among formal organizations. Unlike the on-scene 
operations, off-scene supporting organizations are coordinated through cooperative inter-
organizational structures and procedures based on predefined multi-agency agreements 
and related policies like the Emergency Management Assistance Compact at the state 
level and the federal emergency support functions (ESF) (DHS, 2013; Kapucu & 
Garayev, 2011; Waugh, 2007).  
Information technology and infrastructure, such as an integrative decision 
support system and geographic information system, can increase the effectiveness of 
formal organizations in dealing with a crisis or a disaster (Comfort, Sungu, Johnson, & 
Dunn, 2001; Hu & Kapucu, 2014). A well-designed, functioning information 
infrastructure enables crisis- or disaster-related data from multiple sources to 
simultaneously flow into a centralized database where the data is integrated and analyzed. 
Then, the data is transferred to relevant actors and organizations to coordinate their 
responding activities in real-time (Comfort et al., 2010). Therefore, such information 
technology and infrastructure can “enhance the capacity of multiple organisations to 
adapt their actions reciprocally to changing conditions of risk” (Comfort et al., 2004, p. 
62). Lastly, networks of formal organizations mobilized are one kind of inter-
organizational relations. Therefore, inter-organizational characteristics can influence the 
effectiveness of networks of formal organizations in dealing with a crisis or a disaster. 
According to the literature, the key characteristics of inter-organizational relations 
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include mutual trust (Emerson et al., 2012; Kapucu et al., 2013), prior history of 
collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Jap & Anderson, 2007), and goal congruence 
(Bryson et al., 2006). 
Proposition 2: The effectiveness of networks of formal organizations 
mobilized in producing and delivering emergency response services is 
determined by cognition, communication, coordination, information 
technology and infrastructure, and inter-organizational characteristics of 
formal organizations. 
Response III (Outputs and outcomes). Outputs mean a variety of emergency 
response services produced and delivered by networks of formal organizations. These 
services include public information and warning (timely, accurate, reliable information 
about threat or hazard, response operations, and aid resources available); transportation 
services to evacuate people and animals and to deliver response personnel, equipment, 
and relief resources; fatality management services (body recovery and victim 
identification); restoring critical infrastructure within the affected areas (power, roads, 
and cell towers); life-sustaining services (hydration, feeding, and sheltering); search-and-
rescue missions; on-scene security and protection through law enforcement within the 
affected areas; and public health and emergency medical services (DHS, 2013). The 
outcomes of effective formal emergency response are “to save lives, protect property and 
the environment, meet basic human needs, stabilize the incident, restore basic services 
and community functionality, and establish a safe and secure environment moving toward 
the transition to recovery” (DHS, 2013, p. i). 
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Early recovery. When response missions and activities are completed, the 
deployed personnel and resources are demobilized and reimbursed according to 
established procedures, processes, and plans (DHS, 2013; Harrald, 2006; Kapucu & 
Garayev, 2011; Waugh, 2007). During the transition to recovery, intermediate and long-
term recovery plans, such as the National Disaster Recovery Framework at the federal 
level, are activated to restore, redevelop, and revitalize social and physical infrastructure 
within the affected areas. 
Volunteer-Based, Participatory Emergency Response 
Volunteer-based, participatory emergency response is a system consisting of 
large online groups of individuals from both across the globe and the affected areas, and 
technologies, and decentralized, open adaptable organizational structures. 
Preparedness. Participatory online groups of the general public do not have 
enough time and resources to prepare for a crisis or a disaster in the same manner as 
formal organizations do before a crisis or a disaster occurs. The preparation of 
participatory online groups for a crisis or a disaster depends mostly on the characteristics 
of threats and hazards and the lifecycle of participatory online groups. If threats and 
hazards are constant (e.g., active volcanoes exist and frequently erupt), relevant 
participatory online groups are likely to prepare for a disaster in a more organized way 
(Gultom & Joyce, 2014; Motozuka & Kanki, 2013). Also, while some of participatory 
online groups are demobilized and even disappear, others are transformed into a new, 
more organized groups that prepare for other crises or disasters (Lin, 2012). These 
transformed groups likely develop their response plans and procedures. These groups also 
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train their members and build partnerships with other participatory online groups and 
institutionalized formal organizations to prepare for crises or disasters.  
Response I (Mobilization and emergence). Many participatory online groups of 
publics spontaneously emerge in the immediate aftermath of a crisis or a disaster by using 
information and communication technologies to perform voluntary, collective response. 
Some participatory online groups (e.g., the Standby Task Force2 and the Humanitarian 
OpenStreetMap Team3) that exist before a crisis or a disaster occurs and have their 
response plans activate their voluntary, collective response and mobilize various 
resources, following extant plans and procedures that are much more flexible than those 
of formal organizations. The emergence and mobilization of participatory online groups 
are influenced by the magnitude and immediate impacts of disasters, public attention, 
media coverage (mainstream media and social media), social entrepreneurs, and the 
effectiveness of formal organizations in dealing with a crisis or a disaster.  
The magnitude and immediate impacts of a crisis or a disaster that serves as 
focusing events need to be considered to understand and explain how and why volunteer-
based, participatory response to a crisis or a disaster is mobilized across the globe. A 
large-scale crisis or disaster is a typical example of a focusing event defined as a sudden, 
uncommon event that causes physical, economic, mental, and environmental harms on a 
relatively large scale (e.g., natural disasters, ethnic cleansing, and wars) (Birkland, 1997; 
Kingdon, 1995). Such a focusing event likely draws the attention of the general public to 
problematic conditions which cause or are caused by focusing events. If the harms caused 
                                                 
2 http://www.standbytaskforce.org/ 
 
3 https://hotosm.org/ 
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by focusing events “appear more obvious [with] compelling images of destroyed 
buildings, or dead wildlife, [such focusing events] have considerable power to” 
immediately increase public attention to a problematic condition (Birkland, 1998, p. 55). 
A high level of public attention across the globe to a crisis or a disaster acts as a 
key driver for the emergence and mobilization of participatory online groups. According 
to theories related to the mass media, agenda setting, and public discourse, only a few 
issues are considered as critical social issues and problems for public discourse, although 
“there is a huge “population” of potential problems” (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988, p. 57). 
That is, “public attention is a scarce resource, allocated through competition” in public 
discourse arenas (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988, p. 55). Also, a large-scale crisis or disaster 
likely receives national and international media attention. That is, a large-scale crisis or 
disaster dominates media coverage. Thus, the magnitude and immediate impacts of a 
crisis or a disaster influence public attention and media coverage and ultimately 
determine the likelihood of the emergence and mobilization of participatory online 
groups. 
Contributors of participatory online groups can be categorized into a small group 
of key contributors and a large group of micro-contributors (Howe, 2009; Shirky, 2008; 
Tapscott & Williams, 2006). In disaster or crisis situations, key contributors create online 
platforms as communication channels and collect and process a large amount of crisis- or 
disaster-related information. This small group of key contributors called social 
entrepreneurs serve as builders, processors, and facilitators of participatory online groups. 
I note the important role of a small group of key contributors in the emergence phase of 
participatory online groups. Through posting open calls for volunteering on their social 
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media accounts or by using their personal social networks (e.g., college students), these 
key contributors mobilize large groups of micro-contributors who perform small, discrete 
tasks for volunteer-based, participatory emergency response. 
Additionally, a lack of formal organizations’ effectiveness in dealing with a crisis 
or a disaster can increase the likelihood of the emergence and mobilization of 
participatory online groups. Indeed, in recent crisis or disaster situations where there was 
a vacuum of crisis- or disaster-related information and the mobilization and delivery of 
formal organizations’ relief resources were severely delayed, a lot of participatory online 
groups spontaneously emerged to supplement formal emergency response and meet the 
affected people’s unmet needs by collecting and analyzing crisis or disaster information 
and coordinating the mobilization and allocation of relief resources in a self-organized 
manner. 
Proposition 3: The emergence and mobilization of participatory online 
groups are determined by the magnitude and immediate impacts of a crisis 
or a disaster, public attention, media coverage, social entrepreneurs, and 
the effectiveness of formal organizations in dealing with a crisis or a 
disaster. 
Response II (Production). Participatory online groups create a variety of 
activities and tasks to help respond to a crisis or a disaster in a collective manner. These 
online groups integrate, verify, analyze, and visualize a wide range of crisis- or disaster-
related information from multiple sources. The effectiveness of participatory online 
groups in dealing with a crisis or a disaster may be influenced by organizational 
characteristics (openness, decentralization, diversity, adaptation, and companionship), a 
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coordination mechanism (crowdsourcing), the characteristics of networks of participatory 
online groups (trust, goal convergence, and prior history of collaboration), the use of 
information, communication, and computational technologies, and external supports and 
resources from formal organizations. 
Organizational characteristics. In many cases participatory online groups 
globally mobilize their members through open calls. Anyone who is interested in 
voluntary responding tasks and activities and have skills and resources related to the tasks 
and activities can freely participate in them. In this regard, participatory online groups are 
open systems. Also, these online groups tend to have horizontal, decentralized 
organizational structures because these online groups are one type of loose voluntary 
associations to collectively achieve common goals (Howe, 2009; Roche et al., 2011; 
Tapscott & Williams, 2006). Naturally, in most cases the decision-making power is 
distributed to members of these online groups. Without hierarchical control systems, 
members of participatory online groups tend to make decisions and behave to perform 
their voluntary tasks and activities. 
Diversity is another feature of participatory online groups. Diversity means 
pluralism and heterogeneity in ideas, knowledge, opinions, skills, and resources (Bessant, 
2005; Howe, 2009). Members of participatory online groups often times have diverse 
backgrounds regarding nationality, age, gender, race and ethnicity, education, occupation, 
and socioeconomic status. Such diverse backgrounds allow these members to bring to 
participatory online groups a variety of skills, intelligence, and resources useful to 
address a crisis or a disaster effectively. Also, in many cases participatory online groups 
are agile, fluid and flexible, not static. When participatory online groups sometimes 
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confront an unexpected problem regarding their collective response to a crisis or a 
disaster, these online groups quickly change their organizational structures and adopt new 
technical tools to resolve the problem (Crowley & Chan, 2011; Heinzelman & Waters, 
2010; Meier, 2011). 
Members of participatory online groups often share companionship and a sense of 
community (Howe, 2009; Ridings & Gefen, 2004). They enjoy working together and 
helping and learning from each other. Members of participatory online groups continue to 
improve the overall quality of other members’ work by adding useful ideas or 
information and correcting mistakes (e.g., the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap team). The 
success of participatory online groups is based on “cultivating a robust community 
composed of people with a deep and ongoing commitment to their craft and, most 
important, to one another” (Howe, 2009, p. 180). Participatory online groups usually 
have shared ownership of their products and services (Howe, 2009; Tapscott & Williams, 
2006). All the members of participatory online groups are creators and owners, although 
some would make more contributions than others would do. Their products and services 
are mostly published online under open-source licenses, such as Creative Commons4 and 
the MIT License5. Individuals or organizations can freely use the products and services 
for their own purposes. In this regard, participatory online groups create public goods. 
Coordination mechanism (Crowdsourcing and meritocracy). Participatory 
online groups are one type of crowdsourced community (Munro, 2013; Sutherlin, 2013; 
Zook et al., 2010). Crowdsourcing is a mechanism by which participatory online groups 
                                                 
4 http://creativecommons.org/ 
 
5 https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT 
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coordinate their collective action to effectively address a crisis or a disaster (Goolsby, 
2010; Meier & Munro, 2010; N. C. Roberts, 2011). Crowdsourcing refers to a process in 
which many crowds (massive networks of volunteer contributors) freely participate, 
exchange their ideas, thoughts, and resources with one another, and collectively perform 
tasks of interest to them by using information and communication technologies. Such 
dynamic interactions and exchanges driven by voluntary commitments and collaborations 
have created considerable, positive innovations across the private, nonprofit, and public 
sectors. Today, for-profit corporations, nonprofit organizations, and public agencies 
actively use crowdsourcing to gain ideas, knowledge, and opinions from users, 
customers, and citizens and co-create innovative products and services (Noveck, 2009; 
Shirky, 2008; Surowiecki, 2005; Tapscott & Williams, 2006).  
“Breaking labor into little units, or modules, is one of the hallmarks of 
crowdsourcing” (Howe, 2009, p. 49). That is, an enormous amount of work is broken into 
very small, discrete tasks and distributed to a large group of potential contributors. These 
contributors mobilized through open calls perform the tasks as much as they can do and 
want to do by using their spare cycles. In crisis or disaster situations, participatory online 
groups process a large amount of crisis- or disaster-related data from multiple sources. In 
most cases participatory online groups break such a massive amount of data-processing 
work into little units of tasks and distribute them to a large group of digital volunteers 
from both across the globe and the affected areas. For example, in the aftermath of a 
crisis or a disaster, the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap team, a global online group of 
volunteer mappers, first breaks a large amount of satellite imagery donated by formal 
organizations into little squares on a collaborative mapping platform called HOT Tasking 
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Manager6. Then a massive group of volunteer mappers across the globe collectively 
create online base maps of post-event areas. Indeed, in recent crisis or disaster situations, 
all activities and tasks of participatory online groups, including reporting disaster 
situations from the ground, crisis mapping, creating online base maps, translating, and 
mobilizing and delivering relief resources, were crowdsourced to vast groups of the 
general public. Based on their knowledge, skills, and resources, the general public 
collectively performed these activities and tasks. Also, in participatory online groups, 
their members’ ideas, resources, and contributions are often times assessed on the basis 
of quality, usefulness, and creativity, rather than the ladder of hierarchy, race, gender, and 
age (Boulos et al., 2011; Howe, 2009; J. A. Roberts et al., 2006). In this regard, 
participatory online groups are based on meritocracy. 
Characteristics of networks of participatory online groups. In crisis or disaster 
situations, participatory online groups often times build collaborative partnerships with 
other participatory online groups to increase their capacities to respond to a crisis or a 
disaster. In their partnerships, participatory online groups share financial, technical and 
human resources with each other. Such inter-organizational partnerships between 
participatory online groups are much more flexible, voluntary, and decentralized than 
those between formal organizations. Thus, such partnerships may be shaped by mutual 
trust, and goal convergence, and prior history of collaboration, rather than hierarchical 
and legal structures.  
                                                 
6 http://tasks.hotosm.org/ 
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Information, communication, and computational technologies. Participatory 
online groups rely on information and communication technologies (both hardware 
devices and software applications) and advanced computational technologies (i.e. 
artificial intelligence). First, information and communication technologies (ICTs) refer to 
“a diverse set of technological tools…used to communicate and to create, disseminate, 
store, and manage information” (Blurton, 1999, p. 46). Participatory online groups rely 
on ICTs to aggregate their members’ knowledge, skills, and resources and to coordinate 
collective action (Howe, 2009). In this regard, participatory online groups are one type of 
virtual organization. A virtual organization is defined as “a group of individuals whose 
members and resources may be dispersed geographically, but who function as a coherent 
unit through the use of cyberinfrastructure” (Marsden, 2013, p. 55). Indeed, many 
participatory online groups that responded to recent crises or disasters did not have 
physical spaces and used only computer-mediated communication tools for their 
collective action (e.g., the Standby Task Force). Importantly, advancement in ICTs (i.e. 
the emergence of the Internet, mobile devices, and open-source software) enables mass 
collaboration among thousands of digital volunteers around the world without time and 
geographic limits (N. C. Roberts, 2011; Tapscott & Williams, 2006). 
Specifically, ICTs used by participatory online groups include short message 
service (SMS) (FrontlineSMS7), local community radios, email, social media (Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, and Instagram), video chat applications (Google Hangouts and 
Skype), document collaboration tools (Google Docs), text-based chat tools (Internet 
                                                 
7 http://www.frontlinesms.com/ 
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Relay Chat8), open source crisis-mapping platforms (Ushahidi9), collaborative mapping 
tools (OpenStreetMap10), and integrative team collaboration platforms (Slack11). 
Additionally, participatory online groups sometimes utilize both advanced 
computational technologies (i.e. machine learning) for data mining and crowdsourced 
human computation for data verification and analysis. For instance, in the immediate 
aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, a participatory online group called the Standby Task Force 
(SBTF) utilized an open source, automated data mining tool called Artificial Intelligence 
for Disaster Response (AIDR) developed by the Qatar Computing Research Institute 
(QCRI). The AIDR reduced over 250,000 disaster-related tweets to about 55,000 tweets 
through an automated algorithm. Then, these filtered tweets were uploaded to a micro-
tasking platform called the Tweet Clicker. By using the micro-taking platform, a large 
group of online volunteers around the world tagged and categorized these tweets to 
identify actionable pieces of disaster-related data. 
External supports. In many cases, participatory online groups receive human, 
technical, and financial resources from institutionalized formal organizations to respond 
to a crisis or a disaster. That is, formal organizations often times act as supporting 
partners for participatory online groups. These formal organizations provide technical 
supports, expertise, and infrastructure for creating and maintaining online platforms for 
participatory online groups’ collective action. Also, these formal organizations (e.g., for-
                                                 
8 http://www.irc.org/ 
 
9 http://www.ushahidi.com/product/ushahidi/ 
 
10 http://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Main_Page 
 
11 https://slack.com/ 
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profit satellite imagery companies or public agencies responsible for geospatial data) 
donate satellite imagery to participatory online groups. Particularly, post-crisis satellite 
imagery is essential to create post-crisis online base maps of the affected areas and to 
perform crisis mapping. 
Proposition 4. The effectiveness of participatory online groups in dealing 
with a crisis or a disaster is determined by their own organizational 
characteristics, a coordination mechanism, the characteristics of networks 
of participatory online groups, the use of information, communication, and 
computational technologies, and external supports and resources from 
formal organizations. 
Response III (Outputs and outcomes). Participatory online groups create a 
wide range of information-related products and services (i.e. outputs). These products and 
services include: setting up a system to report crisis or disaster conditions from the 
ground; collecting, verifying, categorizing, geo-locating, and visualizing information 
about crisis or disaster conditions, aid resources available, the affected people’s needs 
and requests, and the current status of operations (i.e. crisis mapping); disseminating 
crisis or disaster information to the affected communities in real-time; creating and 
updating online or offline base maps of the affected areas; translating; and coordinating 
the mobilization and delivery of relief resources. Ultimately, in many cases participatory 
online groups’ voluntary, collective actions help “save lives, protect property and the 
environment, meet basic human needs, stabilize the incident, restore basic services and 
community functionality, and establish a safe and secure environment moving toward the 
transition to recovery” (DHS, 2013, p. i). 
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Early recovery. When immediate emergency response of participatory online 
groups is completed, these online groups become deactivated and finally disappear in 
some cases, because these online groups are not based on formal membership and 
organizational structures. But, in the other cases, participatory online groups are 
transformed into other forms of formal organizations (e.g., for-profit companies or 
nonprofit organizations) or loosely connected partnerships among participatory online 
groups and/or formal organizations (e.g., the Digital Humanitarian Network).  
Relationships between Formal Organizations and Participatory Online Groups 
Today, when a crisis or disaster occurs, many participatory online groups 
spontaneously emerge from both across the globe and the affected areas, while a lot of 
formal organizations are mobilized, following the predetermined response plans and 
procedures. In some cases, participatory online groups collaborate with formal 
organizations. Both parties share crisis- or disaster-related data and other resources with 
each other and coordinate their diverse response tasks and activities (Meier & Munro, 
2010). But in other cases, participatory online groups independently perform their 
voluntary response outside of networks of formal organizations (Birowo, 2010).  
Relationships and interactions between formal organizations and participatory 
online groups can be categorized into four types on the basis of whether both parties are 
aware of each other and whether there is alignment in formal and voluntary emergency 
responses (Stoll et al., 2010) (See Figure 1.2). Each type of relationships and interactions 
between both parties may lead to different outcomes of emergency response. 
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Figure 1.2. Relationships between formal organizations and participatory online groups 
The first type of relationships is that formal organizations and participatory 
online groups are aware of each other and align their various response tasks and 
activities. This type of relationships is complementary and synergic, because both parties 
supplement each other’s response efforts in a coordinated manner. For instance, 
participatory online groups collect and analyze crisis- or disaster-related information 
from multiple sources and share this information with formal organizations on the ground 
in real-time. Based on this information, formal organizations perform their response tasks 
and activities, such as search-and-rescue missions and the delivery of relief resources. 
After completing their response activities, formal organizations give participatory online 
groups an update on the current status of response operations in the field. In this 
complementary relationships, there are dynamic, rich interactions and flows of 
information and resources between formal organizations and participatory online groups. 
In this type of relationships, the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall emergency 
response system are likely to be maximized (Meier, 2015; Munro, 2013). 
The second type of relationships is that formal organizations and participatory 
online groups are not aware of each other, and both parties’ responses are additive. This 
type of relationships emerges mostly in situations where formal organizations and 
participatory online groups have different goals and target groups regarding emergency 
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response. For instance, in a large-scale natural disaster situation such as earthquakes and 
hurricanes, formal organizations tend to focus on official, large refugee camps by 
allocating and delivering relief resources to these camps. Instead, participatory online 
groups that particularly emerge from the affected areas often self-organize to meet the 
unmet needs of displaced people who stay in unofficial, small refugee camps to which 
formal organizations pay little attention. In this type of relationships, there is 
‘unintended’ alignment in formal organizations’ and participatory online groups’ 
response efforts because both parties have different goals and target groups. But both 
parties cannot coordinate their responses in a synergic manner due to the lack of 
awareness regarding the existence and response efforts of their counterparts. 
In the third type of relationships, formal organizations and participatory online 
groups are aware of their counterparts, but both parties do not reach out to and cooperate 
with each other. In this type of relationships, both parties likely have a different 
understanding of crisis or disaster conditions and of how to react (Aldrich, 2012; Birowo, 
2011). Particularly, if a disaster or a crisis becomes politically sensitive problems or 
issues and formal organizations and participatory online groups have different political 
views and aims, both parties are unlikely to collaborate with each other. In such 
situations, both parties independently perform their response efforts and even compete 
with each other. Since there is the duplication of emergency response efforts between 
formal organizations and participatory online groups, the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the overall emergency response system cannot be maximized. 
In the fourth type of relationships, formal organizations and participatory online 
groups are not aware of their counterparts. In addition, both parties’ responses are 
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inconsistent and confusing due to false, outdated, competing information on crisis or 
disaster conditions, the affected people’s needs, and the current status of response 
operations at multiple sites. Such a situation likely occurs in the immediate aftermath (24 
to 48 hours) of a crisis or a disaster, particularly when a lot of formal organizations across 
the levels of government and the sectors are suddenly mobilized and deployed to the 
affected areas and numerous participatory online groups spontaneously emerge and begin 
their voluntary response, but there is the absence of integrative, updated information 
about responding actors (both formal organizations and participatory online groups) and 
their specific tasks and activities in response to crisis (Harrald, 2006). As a result, such 
disconnected relationships and communications between formal organizations and 
participatory online groups likely lead to inefficient, uncoordinated responses to a crisis 
or a disaster.  
Proposition 5. Formal organizations and participatory online groups can 
have the four types of relationships (i.e. complementary and synergic, 
additive, ignoring, and inconsistent and confusing). When formal 
organizations and participatory online groups have complementary and 
synergic relationships, the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall 
emergency response system in dealing with a crisis or a disaster are likely 
to be maximized. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BUILDING HYPOTHESES ON RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
PARTICIPATORY ONLINE GROUPS AND FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
In the first chapter, I suggested an event-driven lens for integrating both formal 
and volunteer-based, participatory emergency responses in the networked age. The event-
driven lens consists of formal emergency response, volunteer-based, participatory 
emergency response, and relationships between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations. In this chapter, I conduct a deeper analysis of one aspect of the event-
driven lens by focusing on relationships between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations. The event-driven lens provides a conceptual typology of relationships 
between participatory online groups and formal organizations on the basis of whether 
both parties are aware of each other and whether there is alignment in formal and 
volunteer-based, participatory emergency responses (i.e. complementary and synergic, 
additive, ignoring, and inconsistent and confusing). But there are many unanswered 
research questions about key determinants to shape these inter-organizational 
relationships and the outcomes of these inter-organizational relationships. Therefore, in 
this chapter, I have the following research questions: Why do participatory online groups 
and formal organizations form inter-organizational relationships in crisis or disaster 
situations? (i.e. what are key organizational and technical determinants to form these 
relationships?) And what are the outcomes of the formation of inter-organizational 
relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations? 
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To answer these research questions, I employ the exploratory case study method 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). This case study method is 
“a research strategy that involves using one or more cases to create theoretical constructs, 
propositions and/or…theory from case-based, empirical evidence” (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007, p. 25). The exploratory case study method is most appropriate in the 
early stages of theory development, particularly in a situation where there is “the lack of 
plausible existing theory [and]…empirical evidence” regarding an important, novel 
phenomenon (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 26). Thus, this chapter aims to build from 
actual cases hypotheses to explain why participatory online groups and formal 
organizations form inter-organizational relationships and what outcomes the formation of 
the inter-organizational relationships creates. 
This research is important both theoretically and practically. First, the literature 
on participatory online groups is sharply increasing in the disciplines of computer 
science, geography, political science, public administration, media studies, and 
international development (e.g., Caquard, 2013; Crowley, 2013; Goodchild, 2007; Meier, 
2015; Munro, 2013; Nelson et al., 2010; Roberts, 2011; Roche et al., 2011; Shanley et al., 
2013; White et al., 2014). Most prior studies aimed to explore and describe key tasks and 
contributions of participatory online groups, organizational characteristics of these online 
groups, and challenges and limitations, viewing the emergence of participatory online 
groups as a novel phenomenon in the digital era. Although these prior studies provide 
useful information, knowledge, and practical expertise, there are several important 
research gaps. One of the most understudied areas in the literature is the determinants, 
processes, and outcomes of relationships between participatory online groups and formal 
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organizations. Therefore, this research can contribute to the literature by offering 
evidence-based research findings on relationships between participatory online groups 
and formal organizations. In addition, from a practical point of view, findings from this 
research can be useful for participatory online groups and formal organizations to build 
and manage partnerships and collaboration with each other to increase their capacities to 
deal with a crisis or a disaster.   
 
Research Methods: The Exploratory Case Study Method 
Epistemological Assumptions and Researcher Positioning 
This study is grounded in a realist view of knowledge. According to this 
epistemological view, the nature of the social phenomena under investigation exists 
independently of researchers’ perceptions and understandings about the phenomena. 
Hence, researchers and the social phenomena of interest are separate. And there are “the 
patterns, regularities, structures, or laws of behavior that characterize…[the world] and 
that generate the social…phenomena” (Willig, 2012, p. 11). In addition, knowledge about 
the social phenomena can be discovered and understood by skilled researchers with 
scientific methods. From this epistemological view, researchers are expected to take a 
role of an objective investigator or analyst akin to “that of a detective who uses his or her 
skills, knowledge, and experience to uncover hitherto hidden facts and who, through his 
or her labor, makes what appeared puzzling or mysterious intelligible” (Willig, 2012, p. 
11). Therefore, from this realist view, this study is discovery-oriented to thoroughly and 
objectively explore a social phenomenon of interest and obtain accurate, detailed, 
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comprehensive knowledge of the phenomenon (i.e. relationships between participatory 
online groups and formal organizations in crisis or disaster situations). 
The Exploratory Case Study Method 
This study employs the case study research. “A case study is an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 
2003, p. 13). The case study research is a comprehensive research strategy that aims to 
understand the complex dynamics of interest present within real settings (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 2003). Therefore, the case study research is often characterized by a 
combination of a wide range of research methods (i.e. multiple data collection and 
analysis techniques) (Willig, 2008). In addition, the case study research can be used for 
diverse purposes of research: to develop new theories, propositions, and hypotheses; to 
provide a detailed description of a new phenomenon; and to test empirically existing 
theories (A. L. George & Bennett, 2005). 
This research employs the exploratory case study method to develop hypotheses 
on relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations in crisis or 
disaster situations. The exploratory case study method uses one or more cases to create 
theoretical constructs or variables and hypothesized relationships between constructs or 
variables on the basis of empirical findings from the selected cases (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). The exploratory case study method is most useful in the early stages of 
theory development regarding a novel social phenomenon (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). Sometimes, one is confused about the difference between the exploratory case 
study method and grounded theory, thus it is necessary to clarify the notion of the 
exploratory case study method and differentiate it from grounded theory. Indeed, these 
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two research strategies have similarities. Both research strategies create “theory by 
observing patterns within systematically collected empirical data [through]…recursively 
iterating between (and thus constantly comparing) theory and data during analysis” 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 30). However, regarding epistemological views, the 
exploratory case study method aims to create testable hypotheses and theory that can 
generalize to other settings based on realism or positivism/post-positivism (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 2003), while grounded theory “argues that categories and theories…are 
constructed by the researcher through an interaction with the data” from interpretivist and 
social constructionist views (Willig, 2008, p. 45). Also, the exploratory case study 
method often uses both qualitative and quantitative data, but grounded theory relies 
primarily on qualitative data. 
Case selection. In case study research, the investigator purposely selects a case 
or cases in a nonrandom manner (Creswell, 2009). Such case selection method is called 
theoretical sampling through which “cases are chosen for theoretical, not statistical 
reasons” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 537). In other words, “cases are selected because they are 
particularly suitable for illuminating and extending relationships and logic among 
constructs” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 27). In this research, I take into account the 
following case selection criteria: the magnitude of a crisis or a disaster, the level of public 
attention to a crisis or a disaster, the mobilization of formal organizations, the emergence 
and contributions of participatory online groups, and the presence of secondary data. 
More specifically, I sought to select large-scale crises or disasters that received high 
levels of public attention at the national or international level. I also looked for cases in 
which large networks of formal organizations were mobilized, and participatory online 
47 
 
groups emerged and performed voluntary, collective responses. Lastly, I tried to find 
cases with sufficient secondary data from multiple sources. Based on the criterion, four 
cases were selected: the 2007-2008 Kenya post-election violence; the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake; the 2010 Indonesia volcanic eruptions; and the 2011 Japan earthquake and 
nuclear crisis. The case selection is based on the idea of the all-hazard model that 
emphasizes generic processes and activities are needed to address a variety of manmade 
crises and natural disasters (Waugh, 2000). 
Data collection. Case study research uses multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 
2003). This is one of the strengths of case study research. In this study, data comes from 
multiple secondary sources, including academic journal articles, thesis or dissertation, 
research and practical reports, news and magazine articles, and web documents (e.g., blog 
posts and online discussion forum archives). Table 2.1 illustrates specific data sources for 
each of the selected cases. 
Table 2.1 
Data Sources for Each of the Selected Cases 
 
Academic 
Article 
Thesis/ 
Dissertation 
Report 
News 
Article 
Web 
Document 
Total 
(N=106) 
2007-2008 
Kenya 
7 1 6 5 14 33 
2010 Haiti  18 0 7 6 7 38 
2010 
Indonesia 
6 1 6 0 2 15 
2011 Japan 12 1 1 1 5 20 
 
Data analysis. This research employs exploratory thematic analysis as a method 
of data analysis for developing hypotheses on relationships between participatory online 
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groups and formal organizations (Braun & Clarke, 2012; Gibson & Brown, 2009; Guest 
et al., 2012; Ryan & Bernard, 2003; Saldaña, 2013).  
Thematic analysis. In exploratory thematic analysis, I follow a streamlined 
codes-to-theory model developed by Johnny Saldaña (2013). This model consists of 
codes, categories, themes/concepts, and theory (See Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1. Streamlined codes-to-theory model (Saldaña, 2013, p. 12) 
First of all, coding is a crucial aspect of thematic analysis (Basit, 2003; Saldaña, 
2013). Coding is a process of segmenting, labeling, codifying, categorizing, and theme-
ing the data in qualitative research. The researcher first segments the data and labels 
chunks or segments of the data with a term (i.e. a code) (Braun & Clarke, 2012). A code 
in qualitative research is “a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, 
salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-
based…data” (Saldaña, 2013, p. 3). Then, the researcher “organize[s] and group[s] 
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similarly coded data into categories” and arranges the coded data in a systematic order 
(i.e. codifying and categorizing) (Saldaña, 2013, p. 8). Each category would have 
subcategories that consist of multiple, lower-level codes. After that, the researcher 
searches for themes, identifying patterned response, similarity and overlap between 
clustered codes or categories (Braun & Clarke, 2012). Compared to codes and categories, 
themes (or concepts) are “more general, higher-level, and more abstract constructs” 
(Saldaña, 2013, p. 11). Interconnecting themes is a process of exploring relationships 
between themes to develop a plausible theoretical model and hypotheses (Braun & 
Clarke, 2012; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2009; Saldaña, 2013). Also, “[a]n 
essential feature of theory building is comparison of the emergent concepts, theory, or 
hypotheses with the extant literature. This involves asking what is this similar to, what 
does it contradict, and why” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 544). Based on evidence from data and 
the literature, the researcher continues to shape and sharp a theory, “refining the 
definition of the construct…[and] discover[ing] the underlying theoretical reasons for 
why the relationship exists” (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 541–542). In reality, these steps of 
data analysis are overlapped and iterative. Therefore, the researcher needs to 
“systematically compare the emergent…[codes, categories, and themes] with the 
evidence and [the literature],” to recode and re-categorize the collected data, and to 
review potential themes (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 541). 
There are three approaches to data coding for thematic analysis: an inductive 
approach, a deductive approach, and a combination approach. The inductive approach is 
to “develop codes only on the basis of the emerging information collected” (i.e. the 
bottom-up, data-driven approach) (Creswell, 2009, p. 187). This approach is often used in 
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qualitative research based on grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Next, the 
deductive approach relies on “predetermined codes based on the theory being examined” 
(i.e. the top-down, theory-driven approach) (Creswell, 2009, p. 187). In a combination of 
both approaches, a preliminary coding scheme or codebook is developed based on the 
literature, but the researcher is allowed to change the coding scheme or codebook “based 
on the information learned during data analysis” (Creswell, 2009, pp. 187–188). 
This research uses the combination approach to data coding. More specifically, a 
preliminary coding scheme was developed from inter-organizational relations (IOR) 
theory and the data sharing literature (e.g., Ansell & Gash, 2008; Azad & Wiggins, 1995; 
Emerson, 1976; Harvey & Tulloch, 2006; Oliver, 1990; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Ring 
& Van de Ven, 1994; Wehn de Montalvo, 2003). Relationships between participatory 
online groups and formal organizations in response to crisis may be one type of inter-
organizational relationships (i.e. building and maintaining partnerships and collaboration 
between two or more parties). Although the IOR theory mostly assumes relationships 
between institutionalized organizations, this theory can provide important insights into 
relationships between institutionalized organizations and online groups. Also, I note that 
participatory online groups and formal organizations often interact with each other 
through sharing a variety of information-related products and services in crisis or disaster 
situations. Thus, in the process of developing a preliminary data coding scheme, I 
considered possible determinants and outcomes of relationships between participatory 
online groups and formal organizations on the basis of inter-organizational relations 
(IOR) theory and the data sharing literature. 
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Table 2.2 
Preliminary Data Coding Scheme 
Domain Code Description 
Determinant 
of relationship 
Awareness Whether participatory online groups and formal 
organizations are aware of their counterparts’ existence, 
response activities and resources (Stoll et al., 2010) 
Legal and 
policy context 
The context in which participatory online groups and 
formal organizations are embedded, including legislations, 
regulations, and policies, and procedures related to 
emergency management, global humanitarian assistance, 
e-government, privacy, and security, and intellectual 
property (Azad & Wiggins, 1995; Brass et al., 2004) 
Resource 
dependence 
Participatory online groups and formal organizations are 
not self-sufficient to respond to a crisis or a disaster, thus 
both parties form partnerships and collaboration to obtain 
resources essential to their own response activities (R. M. 
Emerson, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
Technology and 
information 
management 
Technical factors and capacities for converting, 
integrating, and distributing crisis- or disaster-related 
information between participatory online groups and 
formal organizations (Wehn de Montalvo, 2003a) 
Prior history of 
relationships 
Prior success or failure of partnerships and collaboration in 
response to crisis (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Ring & Van de 
Ven, 1994) 
Shared 
understanding 
Shared understanding of common problems (i.e. crisis or 
disaster) that participatory online groups and formal 
organizations and of how to address these problems 
(Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bentrup, 2001) 
Mutual trust A common belief that partners (1) are honest to others in 
inter-organizational negotiations, decision-making, and 
actions; (2) “make good-faith efforts to behave in 
accordance with any commitments both explicit and 
implicit” (as cited in Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 28); and 
(3) pursue mutual benefits instead of taking excessive 
advantage of others with opportunistic behavior (Huxham 
& Vangen, 2005; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) 
Outcomes of 
relationships 
Efficiency Increased efficiency (i.e. cost saving) owing to the 
avoidance of duplicate efforts between participatory online 
groups and formal organizations at the system level 
Effectiveness To which participatory online groups and formal 
organizations achieve aims of emergency response at the 
inter-organizational level, including saving lives, meeting 
human needs, protecting property and the environment, 
and restoring basic services and community functionality 
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Four Case Studies 
In this section, I provide detailed descriptions of the four selected cases, focusing 
on the crisis or disaster contexts, volunteer-based, participatory emergency response, 
formal emergency response, and relationships between participatory online groups and 
formal organizations. Particularly, in the first chapter, I suggested a typology of 
relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations in response to 
crisis. In this section, I apply the typology to these four case studies. That is, I categorize 
diverse relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations into 
four types of inter-organizational relationships on the basis of whether participatory 
online groups and formal organizations are aware of each other and whether there is 
alignment in formal and volunteer-based, participatory emergency responses (See Table 
2.3). This categorization is useful for understanding the determinants and outcomes of 
relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations. 
Case 1: The 2007-2008 Kenya Post-Election Violence 
Kenya’s 10th presidential election was held on December 27, 2007. On December 
30, 2007, Samuel Kivuitu, chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), 
announced that incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was the winner of the 2007 
presidential election. Soon after the announcement, President Kibaki was sworn-in. But 
domestic and international observers described the election results as fraudulent, noting 
that “Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) candidate Raila Odinaga’s lead of over one 
million votes strangely morph[ed] into a small margin of victory for the incumbent Mwai 
Kibaki” (Goldstein & Rotich, 2008, p. 4; Goldstein, 2008). Raila Odinaga and ODM 
rejected the results, strongly criticizing President Kibaki. “The public’s realization of the 
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manipulation of the election results triggered the 2007/8 violence” between people who 
supported President Kibaki and his Kikuyu tribe and others who supported Raila Odinaga 
and his Luo tribe (Babaud & Ndung’u, 2012, p. 12). The post-election violence quickly 
spread across Kenya and lasted during January and February of 2008. The post-election 
violence “left about 1,5000 dead, many more injured and over 60,000 people internally 
displaced and in need of humanitarian assistance” (Babaud & Ndung’u, 2012, pp. 12–13). 
Right after the announcement of the election results, the Minister of Internal 
Security, Hon John Michuki, ordered the immediate suspension of all live broadcasts, 
“argu[ing] false or biased reporting would result in even more ethnic-based violence” 
(Okolloh, 2009, p. 65). Under this condition, the mainstream media underreported the 
severity of the conflict owing to self-censorship and pro-government bias (Makinen & 
Kuira, 2008). As a result, there was a serious disconnect between Kenya’s media 
coverage and the actual status of the bloody post-election violence. That is, there was the 
lack of information about what was happening in the field, although the post-election 
violence, such as riots, reprisal attacks, rapes, and killings by excessive police shootings, 
became worse in both urban and rural regions of Kenya. In such an information vacuum, 
local community-based organizations and international aid organizations had difficulty 
providing relief services and addressing inter-ethnic conflicts with their peacebuilding 
efforts. 
The creation of Ushahidi. In spite of the failure of the mainstream media, 
Kenyan bloggers’ internet media served as an important information source and 
communication channel. On January 3, 2008, Ory Okolloh, a Kenyan lawyer and 
prominent blogger, posted a suggestion on her blog Kenyan Pundit (Okolloh, 2008): 
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“Google Earth supposedly shows in great detail where the damage is being done on the 
ground.…Guys looking to do something – any techies out there willing to do a mashup of 
where the violence and destruction is occurring using Google Maps?” Within a few days, 
dozens of volunteer software developers and bloggers self-organized to build the website 
Ushahidi.com. On January 9, 2008 just six days after Okolloh’s suggestion on her blog, 
Ushahidi was born, which means ‘witness’ or ‘testimony’ in Swahili. “There was no 
funding for the website at the time – everything was donated by volunteers, from 
donating server space, writing the code, donating the short code for SMS calls and 
helping gather the initial data to helping spread the world” (Okolloh, 2009, p. 66). 
How did the Ushahidi platform work? The initial Ushahidi platform was 
simple. As incidents of violence took place in the field, local witnesses submitted their 
reports via SMS or the website itself. The reports easily went live, while SMS reports 
were manually entered by Ushahidi volunteers. These volunteers “prioritize[d] urgent 
messages, fact-check[ed] and confirm[ed] each submission before posting it in near real 
time” (Tavaana, n.d.). Each report provided a brief description of incidents (e.g., the 
location, date, and time of an incident) and was categorized by the types of incidents, 
including riots, looting, or rape. These incident reports were also geo-located and 
visualized on an interactive Google map (Tavaana, n.d.). In addition, the Ushahidi 
platform “compile[d] full analytical reports…[and] a full timeline of events” as well as 
information about peacebuilding activities and internally displaced people (Tavaana, 
n.d.). To create a more accurate picture of what was going, these volunteers sought to 
verify reports by calling or emailing those who submitted the reports and comparing the 
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reports with information from other sources (Okolloh, 2009). As the reports were fact-
checked, the number of false reports for propaganda diminished. 
Relationships between Ushahidi and formal organizations. In the crisis 
situation, Ushahidi volunteers actively tried to build partnerships with Kenyan 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that had local contacts on the ground, such as 
community-based, nonprofit organizations (Zuckerman, 2008a). At that time, Kenyan 
NGOs provided trusted reports about violent incidents to Ushahidi (Zuckerman, 2008b). 
Also, by using their local knowledge, these NGOs in the field helped verify reports 
submitted to Ushahidi from the ground. Importantly, Kenyan NGOs aided in publicizing 
the existence of Ushahidi and generating reports from those who had difficulty getting 
access to the Internet (Zuckerman, 2008a). As a result, collaborating with Kenyan 
independent radio networks that “broadcast information on how to submit reports of 
violence” (Tavaana, n.d.), Kenyan NGOs helped increase the potential users of the 
Ushahidi platform from about 10 percent to 95 percent of Kenya’s population. On the 
other hand, Kenyan NGOs (e.g., MMC Outreach and Peace Caravan) actively used the 
Ushahidi platform to identify communities in need, to allocate their relief resources to 
areas where these resources were most needed and to coordinate peacebuilding efforts. 
During the crisis, the Ushahidi team (i.e. a participatory online group) and Kenyan NGOs 
(i.e. formal organizations) were aware of each other (i.e. response activities and 
resources). And when the Ushahidi team reached out to Kenyan NGOs, their partnerships 
were quickly formed in the urgent crisis situation. After building their partnerships, there 
were dynamic interactions and flows of crisis-related information between the Ushahidi 
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team and Kenyan NGOs through the platform. As a result, the Ushahidi team and Kenyan 
NGOs coordinated their crisis responses.  
Case 2: The 2010 Haiti Earthquake 
On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck the island nation of 
Haiti. The earthquake left over 200,000 people dead and another 300,000 people injured. 
Over 70 percent of buildings in Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince and its surrounding 
regions collapsed. Particularly, “[c]rucial buildings and infrastructure were heavily 
damaged or destroyed, including Haiti’s UN headquarters, the presidential palace, 
parliament building, and 28 of 29 government ministries” (Heinzelman & Waters, 2010, 
p. 2). 
Soon after the Haitian earthquake, international disaster relief and humanitarian 
assistance organizations across the world, including the United Nations Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the U.S. Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), and international non-governmental organizations, came 
to Haiti to launch their search-and-rescue missions and provide humanitarian aids to the 
affected people. But, these formal actors relied primarily on the traditional disaster-
response system that collected “information about the crisis environment and the needs of 
the affected population” through their own internal channels (Heinzelman & Waters, 
2010, p. 2). Naturally, “this system lacked the ability to aggregate and prioritize” 
intelligence from a variety of outside sources, particularly from the Haitian affected 
communities (Heinzelman & Waters, 2010, p. 3). Moreover, this system concentrated on 
standard protocols with regard to information gathering and disaster relief operations. 
Due to the standard protocols, valuable key informants, such as Haitian community 
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leaders, often failed to enter the UN Logbase where information about the current state of 
the disaster were collected and significant decisions about disaster response were made. 
As a result, these formal organizations struggled to gather and verify accurate 
information and make efficient and effective decisions about their disaster relief 
activities. Furthermore, such inaccurate and insufficient information caused the concern 
and confusion about security and “slowed emergency response costing lives and creating 
violence” on the ground (Heinzelman & Waters, 2010, p. 4). 
Ushahidi-Haiti platform. Within two hours after the devastating earthquake 
struck Haiti, the Ushahidi-Haiti platform that enabled open-source, interactive mapping 
among multiple users was set up by Patrick Meier, the Ph.D. candidate in the Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Ushahidi, Inc.12’s director of crisis 
mapping and strategic partnerships, and David Kobia, Ushahidi, Inc.’s cofounder and 
lead software developer. An initial operation center for the Ushahidi-Haiti platform was 
established in the living room of Meier’s small apartment near Tufts University located in 
Medford, MA. In that operation center, a group of volunteers (two dozen Fletcher 
students) began to collect critical information about the disaster conditions from email, 
web, “social media sources, including Twitter, Facebook, and blogs, and traditional 
media sources to identify actionable pieces of information that could be of use for 
responders on the ground” and map the information on the Ushahidi-Haiti platform 
(Heinzelman & Waters, 2010, pp. 6–7). With Meier’s urgent call for volunteers at the 
                                                 
12 The Ushahidi team (David Kobia, Ory Okolloh, Juliana Rotich, and Ethan Zuckerman) that performed 
voluntary response to the Kenya’s post-election violence established Ushahidi, Inc. as a nonprofit 
technology company in 2008. Ushahidi, Inc. develops and provides free and open source crisis mapping 
software.  
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Fletcher School, about 200 volunteer crisis mappers were mobilized. “The [volunteer] 
team developed a quick-and-dirty system for classifying, prioritizing, and geo-
locating…[the collected information,] using a mix of Google Spreadsheets, Microsoft 
Excel, and Google Maps” (Crowley & Chan, 2011, p. 27). And as web traffic to the 
Ushahidi-Haiti platform abruptly increased across the world, Ushahidi, Inc.’s developers 
provided technical monitoring and supports for several weeks to maintain the platform 
effectively and stably.  
Mission 4636 (SMS-based reporting system). The earthquake had destroyed 
about 70 percent of the cell phone towers in Port-au-Prince. But fortunately, Haitian 
telecommunications companies restored those towers within a few days after the 
earthquake. Thus, approximately over 80 percent of Haitian households were able to 
communicate with one another via cell phones at that time (Heinzelman & Waters, 2010). 
Several formal organizations across the globe (the U.S. State Department and Frontline 
SMS13), Haitian telecommunications companies (Digicel and DigiPoint), and Haitian 
NGOs worked together to launch a single, free short message service (SMS) reporting 
system from the ground called Mission 4636 within four days after the earthquake 
(Crowley & Chan, 2011; S. George, 2008). The Thomson Reuters Foundation, 
InSTEDD14, and Signal FM (Haitian radio station) aided in publicizing the short code 
4636 to disaster-affected people by using radio and other communication channels 
(Giridharadas, 2010; Hester et al., 2010). As a result, Haitians began to report their 
locations and urgent needs by using their own mobile phones on January 16, 2010. Also, 
                                                 
13 http://www.frontlinesms.com/ 
 
14 http://instedd.org/ 
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many for-profit or nonprofit technology companies (ActiveXperts, Energy for 
Opportunity, Ushahidi, Inc., and Votident) offered a variety of technical supports to flow 
the SMS data from the Haitian telecommunications companies to the reporting system. 
Unfortunately, approximately 90 percent of the messages were reported in Haitian 
Creole, although most international responders were using English or French. To deal 
with this challenge, Rob Munro, a computational linguist at Stanford University, called 
for volunteer translators in collaboration with Haitian communities. Within a week after 
the earthquake, over 1,000 volunteer translators were mobilized from the Haitian 
Diaspora across 49 countries, mostly through social media (Facebook) (Marsden, 2013; 
Munro, 2010). Moreover, Brian Herbert, Ushahidi, Inc.’s software developer, set up 
micro-tasking platforms (i.e. online open chat rooms) that enabled these volunteers across 
the world to share their geographic and linguistic knowledge with one another. By using 
the open chat rooms, these volunteers translated messages to and from Haitian Creole, 
English, and French and classified them (Corbane, Lemoine, & Kauffmann, 2012, p. 
256). The volunteers also geo-tagged the messages, finding specific GPS coordinates.  
A week after the earthquake, the Mission 4636 reporting system and the 
Ushahidi-Haiti platform were integrated to process disaster-related information more 
effectively (Crowley & Chan, 2011). Ushahidi, Inc.’s engineers developed an RSS feed 
that enabled international formal responders (particularly, the U.S. Marine Corps and the 
U.S. Coast Guard) to retrieve urgent disaster conditions and immediate needs and 
requests of the affected people. As a result, “[a] team of four to eight Coast Guard 
responders retrieved the information and disseminated it to forces on the ground for 
search-and-rescue operations. The Tufts support team worked directly with a Coast 
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Guard dispatcher to ensure that emergency reports were processed in a timely manner” 
(Nelson et al., 2010, p. 13).  
Surprisingly, the average turnaround time from a Creole message submitted to 
Mission 4636 being translated, classified, geo-tagged on the Ushahidi-Haiti platform, and 
reported to first responders on the ground was less than 10 minutes. In addition to the 
U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Coast Guard, many other formal response organizations 
recognized the efforts of two participatory online groups, used real-time disaster data 
processed by these online groups, and established direct communication lines with these 
online groups for their response activities. Formal response organizations that 
collaborated with these online groups include the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Medical Corps, the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), and the World Food Program (WFP). During the period between January 12 
and the end of March 2010, over 20,000 messages were sent to the Mission 4636 system 
and about 3,600 reports were mapped on the Ushahidi-Haiti platform (Corbane et al., 
2012). 
OpenStreetMap (OSM). The devastating earthquake destroyed most of roads, 
bridges, and buildings in Port-au-Prince and its surrounding regions, and numerous 
camps for displaced Haitians and other humanitarian aid facilities (e.g., emergency 
medical centers) were set up rapidly across Haiti. In this situation, the existing maps of 
transportation and infrastructure systems in Haiti were useless. Naturally, a precise map 
of post-earthquake Haiti was necessary to both Haitian people in need and formal 
response organizations. Also, the map of post-earthquake Haiti was also essential for 
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participatory online groups (Mission 4636 and the Tufts support team) to geo-locate 
reports sent to their systems. 
OpenStreetMap (OSM), sometimes called a Wikipedia for maps, is a 
collaborative project in which approximately 150,000 volunteer mappers aim to create a 
free, editable, and open map of the world. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, 
OSM mobilized over 600 volunteer mappers around the world to create a map of post-
earthquake Haiti. These volunteer mappers first scanned offline atlases and maps and 
rectified and “traced roads, bridges, and buildings into the OpenStreetMap geospatial 
wiki” (Crowley & Chan, 2011, p. 30). Importantly, in the immediate aftermath of the 
disaster, DigitalGlobe, a for-profit satellite imagery company, GeoEye, another for-profit 
imagery company, and the Disaster Risk Management group at World Bank donated 
high-resolution satellite imagery of post-disaster Haiti (Heinzelman & Waters, 2010). 
Based on the donated imagery, the OSM volunteers collectively created the most accurate 
map of Haiti within two weeks. By mid-March 2010, international governmental 
organizations (the United Nations), international non-governmental humanitarian 
organizations, and other participatory online groups (Mission 4636 and the Tufts support 
team) used the OSM as the de facto source for Haiti map data (Crowley & Chan, 2011). 
Relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations. 
The Haiti earthquake response system was a large network of collaborative networks 
between participatory online groups and formal organizations. Such a large network 
among many formal organizations and participatory online groups was quickly formed in 
the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Specifically, the U.S. State Department and 
FrontlineSMS contributed to the design and development of the SMS-based reporting 
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system in collaboration with Haitian telecommunications companies (Digicel and 
DigiPoint). The Thomson Reuters Foundation, InSTEDD, and Signal FM helped 
publicize the existence of the short code and how to submit reports to the affected 
communities. Three large groups of volunteers across the globe (i.e. the Tufts support 
team, Mission 4636’s volunteer translators, and OSM volunteer mappers) collected, 
verified, translated, and geo-located disaster data from multiple sources and created 
digital base maps of post-disaster Haiti. These three participatory online groups were 
interconnected to one another during the Haiti earthquake response. Also, many for-profit 
or nonprofit technology organizations, such as ActiveXperts, Energy for Opportunity, 
Ushahidi, Inc., and Votident, helped set up integrative disaster information systems and 
provided technical advice and supports during the response period. Ultimately, actionable 
pieces of data processed by participatory online groups (e.g. urgent requests for rescue) 
were sent to first responders (e.g., the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Coast Guard) on 
the ground in a timely manner and helped these first responders effectively coordinate 
their response activities. Hence, participatory online groups and formal organizations 
were not only aware of each other, but also quickly formed and expanded their 
collaborative networks within a few days. At that time, there was alignment in formal and 
volunteer-based, participatory emergency responses. During the earthquake response 
period, there were dynamic, rich interactions between participatory online groups and 
formal organizations (i.e. flows of information and resources). Each member of the large 
collaborative network contributed to the effective response by offering their expertise and 
resources to other members. 
Case 3: The 2010 Indonesia Volcanic Eruption 
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Mount Merapi in Indonesia is one of the most active volcanos around the world. 
Recently, two big eruptions occurred in 2006 and 2010. Particularly, the 2010 eruption 
was the greatest eruption in 140 years and caused over 350 deaths and 400,000 people 
internally displaced. At that time, approximately, 70,000 people lived on the slopes of 
Merapi, which were considered as regions most vulnerable to volcanic eruptions. But 
they did not want to leave the slope regions due to environmental, economic, and cultural 
benefits, such as soil fertility, water availability, touristic areas, and shared tribal culture 
(Mei et al., 2013).  
Despite ongoing hazards, Indonesian formal emergency management agencies 
seriously lacked their capacity to deal with natural disasters. Specifically, the formal 
agencies failed to set up an effective emergency information and communication system 
to gather the changing state of emergencies and disasters on the ground and disseminate 
the collected information to the public in real-time (Gultom & Joyce, 2014). As a result, 
local residents had difficulty receiving important disaster information and communicating 
with the agencies. The agencies were also characterized by closed, hierarchical decision 
making processes and structures, following their emergency management regulations and 
laws (Motozuka & Kanki, 2013). Local residents’ needs, knowledge, and opinions were 
not reflected in the emergency management decision making process (Birowo, 2010).  
Furthermore, during the 2010 eruption of Mount Merapi, the mainstream mass 
media, particularly television stations, failed to provide the affected people with accurate, 
objective, and useful information on disaster situations. Rather the mass media focused 
on sensational issues. The mass media obtained the information mostly from the formal 
agencies and did not represent the affected people’s true concerns and reality (Saputro, 
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2014; Tanesia & Habibi, 2011). The formal agencies’ lack of capacity and the 
mainstream media’s failure motivated local residents of Mount Merapi and community-
based organizations to create their own information network to address natural disasters. 
 JALIN Merapi. JALIN Merapi is a community-based, participatory online 
group. After the 2006 eruption, this online group was established and has been managed 
by Indonesian three community radios located on the slopes of Mount Merapi, including 
Lintas Merapi FM in Klaten, MMC FM in Boyolali, and K FM in Dukun-Magelang. 
Hundreds of local volunteers work with this online group and several Indonesian non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), including COMBINE Resource Institution (a local 
NGO to build community-based information systems), the Indonesian Forum for 
Environment (an environmental advocacy NGO), and KOMPIP (a local NGO advocating 
for deliberative democracy), have supported JALIN Merapi by offering a variety of 
expertise and financial and technical resources. 
Basically, JALIN Merapi aims to provide accurately and quickly local residents 
with information of the volcano’s activities, serving as a community-based risk reduction 
system (Nugroho & Syarief, 2012). Dozens of observation posts surrounding the three 
community radio studios were built to visually monitor the activities of the volcano. 
Volunteers in charge of the observation posts regularly reported the volcano’s activities 
and emergencies to the radio studios through walkie talkies. The community radios 
broadcasted the information collected from the observation posts as well as 
seismographic data from formal emergency management agencies (Birowo, 2010). At the 
end of November, 2010, JALIN Merapi also installed closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs) 
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to monitor the volcano’s activities and lava15 and lahar16 flows (Motozuka & Kanki, 
2013). All information was integrated and published on JALIN Merapi’s website 
(http://merapi.combine.or.id/). Since its establishment in 2006, JALIN Merapi has served 
as a community-based, reliable information provider for residents surrounding Mount 
Merapi 
Community-based response to Mount Merapi’s eruptions. The 2010 
eruptions of Mount Merapi forced those who lived within a 12 mile radius of the top of 
Merapi to evacuate to refugee camps. Within 2 weeks after the eruptions, the number of 
people internally displaced was increased to approximately 400,000 and over 600 refugee 
camps arose abruptly, spanning 7 districts surrounding Mount Merapi. However, the 
mainstream media paid attention only to a few major official refugee camps, ignoring 
many other camps that were geographically dispersed and were not easily accessible. 
More importantly, due to the lack of information on what was going in the field and 
capacity to deal with disasters, Indonesian formal emergency management agencies were 
inefficient in allocating and delivering relief resources for refugees (Saputro, 2014). To 
help resolve the problems, JALIN Merapi used a variety of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) including radio streaming, walkie talkies, field 
information posts, short message service (SMS), instant messenger (e.g., shoutbox), 
                                                 
15 Hot and molten rock flowing from a volcano 
 
16 Debris flows from a volcano 
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email, Twitter17, Facebook18, Google Docs, and the website19. JALIN Merapi tried to use 
both traditional and new communication tools because users and audience have their own 
media preferences at the different levels of technology adoption (Gultom & Joyce, 2014). 
Also, JALIN Merapi used Twitter to mobilize about 2,000 volunteers and coordinated 
their work through Facebook Groups. JALIN Merapi deployed volunteers at or close to 
refugee camps that were ignored by the mainstream media and did not received 
government aid, and the volunteers reported refugees’ status and needs through walkie 
talkies or SMS. The affected people on the ground were also able to submit their 
information (e.g., camp location and the number of refugees) and requests for aid through 
SMS, instant messenger, or other communication tools. All sources of information from 
the ground were integrated on the website and were quickly transferred from one medium 
to others to reach out to the wider users and audience in Indonesia and across the globe. 
JALIN Merapi was efficient in mobilizing humanitarian aid from Indonesian 
people and international aid organizations and in distributing the aid to the affected 
people in need. JALIN Merapi did not act as an intermediary of aid mobilization and 
distribution just like existing formal aid organizations did (e.g., the Red Cross or 
government agencies for humanitarian aid). Instead, JALIN Merapi made a direct 
connection between those who wanted to donate in-kind resources or money and the 
affected people in need by posting, verifying, and updating refugees’ needs and status on 
Twitter and Google Docs (Saputro, 2014). The affected people submitted their requests 
                                                 
17 https://twitter.com/jalinmerapi and https://twitter.com/jalinmerapi_en 
 
18 https://www.facebook.com/pages/Jalin-Merapi/115264988544379 
 
19 http://merapi.combine.or.id/?lang=id 
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for assistance through SMS, instant messenger, email, or Twitter. Importantly, those who 
submitted requests for aid were required to include their contact information, such as 
telephone number. Therefore, volunteers in charge of data verification contacted those 
who submitted the requests to ascertain whether the information was accurate and 
reliable. Sometimes, volunteers in the field visited those who submitted the requests for 
the purpose of data verification. “Keeping the accuracy of information was one of the 
most determining factors in drawing and maintaining attention and aid from the general 
public” (Nugroho & Syarief, 2012, p. 92). Along with data verification, volunteers in 
JALIN Merapi’s media center located at COMBINE Resource Institution’s office 
constantly uploaded and updated the information on Twitter in near real-time. Based on 
the information, Indonesian people and Indonesian or international aid organizations 
were able to identify which areas were lacking which goods and services. Such accurate 
and reliable information enabled Indonesian people and formal aid organizations to 
effectively allocate their resources to meet refugees’ unmet needs. 
Secondary disaster: Cold lava floods. After passing the emergency phase of 
Mount Merapi’s eruptions, those who live along the rivers with upstream on the slopes of 
Mount Merapi were exposed to a secondary natural disaster (i.e. cold lava floods). The 
2010 eruption made a large amount of cold volcanic materials (approximately 40 billion 
gallons). The volcanic materials are extremely dangerous in rainy season. When raining, 
the materials like big stones are mixed with water and are easily carried away along the 
rivers. Cold lava floods often destroy bridges and villages close to the rivers, thus 
resulting in thousands of people displaced (Tanesia & Habibi, 2011). In addition, many 
people who live along the rivers dig sand and stones in the rivers and sell them for their 
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living. Therefore, the condition of the rivers is important to those people’s safety and 
livelihood. 
As heavy rain and flooding begin, JALIN Merapi broadcasts real-time reports on 
the current status of rainfall, the rivers, and nearby roads. JALIN Merapi receives the 
information through walkie talkies from field volunteers who monitor the status at 
observation spots located along the rivers. The information is quickly disseminated to 
local residents who live along the rivers through radio streaming. The information is also 
posted and updated on Twitter, Facebook, and the website. In addition, JALIN Merapi 
provides early warnings and emergency information about evacuation paths and refugee 
camps (Birowo, 2010). Therefore, JALIN Merapi plays a crucial role of a community-
based emergency information network for those who are vulnerable to cold lava floods. 
Relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations. 
Since its establishment in 2006, JALIN Merapi consisting of three community radios and 
their local volunteers have built and maintained collaborative partnerships with several 
Indonesian NGOs, including KOMPIP, the Indonesian Forum for Environment, and 
COMBINE Resource Institution (Motozuka & Kanki, 2013; Tanesia & Habibi, 2011). 
These NGOs have offered a variety of administrative, technical, financial supports to 
JALIN Merapi (Birowo, 2011). Particularly, COMBINE Resource Institution is an 
invaluable resource for JALIN Merapi. This NGO helped JALIN Merapi effectively 
mobilize and coordinate over 2,000 volunteers through social networking sites (Facebook 
Groups and Twitter) during the volcanic eruption response (Nugroho, 2011). This NGO 
built an integrative information system that enabled JALIN Merapi’s volunteers to collate 
and process disaster data from multiple sources. This NGO also helped check the 
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accuracy of disaster data from the ground and publish the data on the website 
(http://merapi.combine.or.id). Thus, JALIN Merapi and Indonesian NGOs (particularly, 
COMBINE Resource Institution) were aware of one another and maintained robust 
collaborative relationships for the effective response to the volcanic eruption. 
In contrast, JALIN Merapi and Indonesian formal emergency management 
agencies did not collaborate with each other, although both parties were aware of each 
other. Specifically, both JALIN Merapi and the formal agencies created data about 
disaster conditions and the affected people’s needs. But the data was not shared with each 
other in a coordinated manner.  
Case 4: The 2011 Japan Earthquake and Nuclear Crisis 
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck Japan. The earthquake 
also resulted in massive tsunamis with a maximum height of about 130 feet, which hit the 
pacific coast of the Japanese mainland called Honshu. The earthquake and tsunamis 
critically damaged the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, thus enormous amounts 
of radiation were leaked into the environment. In turn, the 2011 Japan disaster caused 
20,000 deaths and destroyed numerous buildings, roads, rail lines, and other physical 
infrastructure. The total cost of the damage was over $235 billion (Aldrich, 2012; Arase, 
2012). In the early days and weeks, the Japanese local and central governments had 
serious difficulty communicating with the affected communities. As a result, it was hard 
for the governments to collect and update information on what was happening in the 
field. The lack or absence of such information caused the governments’ responses to the 
disaster to be severely delayed. In such a situation, many participatory online groups 
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emerged rapidly to collate and publish disaster-related information and to coordinate the 
mobilization and delivery of relief resources. 
Information aggregation and self-organizations for relief. Participatory online 
groups for disaster information aggregation and aid mobilization and delivery include (1) 
jishinhelp.com20, (2) anpi report21, and (3) shinsai.info22. The first two online groups used 
Twitter data since Twitter was most popular at that time in Japan among social 
networking sites. Tweets on Twitter can be tagged with certain words “to link them to 
others of a similar theme through a function called “hashtags,” a label that users put on 
their own tweets to associate information with certain keywords” (Slater et al., 2012, p. 
100). In the disaster situation, Twitter users used the following keywords as hastags to 
request relief services and share individual safety and evacuation information: 
#j_j_helpme23, #anpi24, or #hinan25. Tweets with such hashtags were consolidated on 
jishinhelp.com and anpi report. Particularly, jishinhelp.com provided a search engine to 
help users to easily and effectively look for information they needed. While 
jishinhelp.com aimed to provide a wide range of information of safety, evacuation, and 
requests for help, anpi report focused on individual safety issues, reporting the names and 
addresses of missing people. 
                                                 
20 http://jishinhelp.com/ (The site is now closed.) 
 
21 The site is now closed. 
 
22 http://www.sinsai.info/ 
 
23 The first j stands for Japan and the second j for jishin that means earthquake in Japanese.  
 
24 Safety information 
 
25 Evacuation information 
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Additionally, the Japanese OpenStreetMap (OSM) community created 
shinsai.info to integrate disaster-related information from multiple sources in 
collaboration with other OSM volunteer mappers from both across the globe 
(particularly, Japanese students who studied in the United States) and Japan. The 
Japanese OSM community “received support from large corporations such as Amazon, 
Yahoo Japan, Glee, Heart Beats, NTT [(the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone 
Corporation)], and E5Gamers” (Hong, 2014, p. 15). Shinsai.info enabled people in the 
affected areas to submit their urgent requests for help by email and online forms on the 
website or by posting tweets with hashtags on Twitter. On shinsai.info, over 12,000 
requests for rescue or aid were submitted from the ground. Shinsai.info also provided 
information about a variety of relief resources, including the locations of shelters and 
clinics, official announcements from the government, and related news articles. All the 
information and requests from ground were geo-located with GPS coordinates and 
visualized on shinsai.info. Over 200 volunteers both from across the globe and the 
affected areas participated in this crisis mapping project. In addition, over 500 OSM 
volunteer mappers both from around the world and Japan took part in creating post-
disaster digital maps of the affected areas in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. 
The OSM volunteer mappers draw and edited over 500,000 streets and roads within the 
two months after the disaster.  
Also, many smaller, community-based, and action-oriented online networks 
arose by using social media and other online platforms. These online networks focused 
on particular issues and geographic regions (e.g., saving pets or mobilizing relief 
resources for local school students). These online networks enabled “the exchange of 
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needs and relief, ranging from the very small scale (“I have some clothes to donate – can 
anyone who is going up north take them?” or “We need interpreters who can speak 
Chinese to help local workers”) to the larger (“Second Harvest Japan is brining five 
trucks to Ishinomaki and we need help unloading them”)” (Slater et al., 2012, p. 100). 
One example of the community-based online networks is “311help,” established by a 
local school in Tohoku, the northeastern region of the Japanese mainland. After the Japan 
disaster occurred, the school’s students stayed in local shelters. The school posted the 
students’ needs on 311help. Through 311help, local residents were able to recognize and 
provide requested items. Once the students’ needs were satisfied, the items for the 
students was marked as complete. Like this, many local communities successfully self-
organized and coordinated their local relief efforts in a decentralized way through simple 
online platforms. 
Dealing with radiation issues: Safecast as a citizen-led sensor network. The 
3/11 earthquake and tsunamis severely damaged the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plant. As a result, hydrogen explosions occurred on March 12 and 14, thus releasing 
massive radiation to the environment. Right after that, local residents were evacuated 
from 12 miles around the nuclear power plant. More importantly, the Fukushima local 
authority responsible for nuclear facilities and the central government had serious 
difficulty measuring radiation levels, although the information of radiation levels was 
crucial for determining evacuation zones and dealing with the nuclear crisis. Actually, all 
of 24 fixed radiation monitoring sensors in Fukushima did not work in the early days of 
the disaster, because the fixed sensors were damaged by tsunamis or ran out of fuel 
(Hemmi & Graham, 2014). The Fukushima local authority had also mobile monitoring 
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cars, but the monitoring cars failed to measure radiation levels and send the data because 
the mobile network was damaged and owing to lack of fuel. Moreover, since the 
Fukushima radioactivity data center was located within the evacuation zone, the data 
center was abandoned. The absence or lack of information on radiation levels made 
Japanese extremely concerned about their health and safety. But, Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (TEPCO), the operator of the nuclear power plant, and the central government 
downplayed the disaster’s severity. Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology (MEXT) responsible for monitoring radiation delayed in 
mapping and publishing radiation data online (Abe, 2014, p. 2). Also, official radiation 
data published by MEXT was too technical and did not cover enough locations, and the 
collection methodology of radiation data was opaque (Kera, et al., 2013). The 
government’s nontransparent and inappropriate responses to the nuclear crisis led to 
Japanese citizens’ mistrust in the government’s capacity to address the nuclear crisis.  
In such a situation, a participatory online group called Safecast emerged to help 
resolve the nuclear crisis. Right after the 3/11 earthquake, the three key founding 
members of Safecast, including Sean Bonner, a Los Angeles-based technology 
entrepreneur, journalist, and activist, Joi Ito, the Japanese director of the MIT Media Lab 
based in Boston, and Pieter Franken, the Dutch CTO of a Japanese financial institution, 
began talking about how to deal with the nuclear crisis regarding a lack of radiation data 
through email and Skype. Many other people, including Dan Sythe, the CEO of 
International Medcom, Inc.26, Andrew Huang, Singapore-based American hacker and 
                                                 
26 Produces radiation detection instruments and systems (https://medcom.com/)  
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hardware engineer, and Ray Ozzie, an American technology entrepreneur and the CTO of 
Microsoft, also involved the conversation. And these people who participated in the 
discussion determined to develop a new, low-cost radiation monitoring device. For that 
purpose, they worked with computer programmers, engineers, scientists, and designers at 
the Tokyo Hackerspace27. As a result, radiation monitoring devices called bGeigie Nano 
Kit was developed and supplied. In this regard, Safecast received funds from a variety of 
sources, such as the Kickstarter crowdfunding campaign ($36,900)28, the John S. and 
James L. Knight Foundation ($2.2 million)29, and other private donations. 
Moreover, Joi Ito was introduced by Aaron Huslage, an open-source hardware 
designer and crisis response specialist to Marcellino Alvarez, the CEO of Uncorked 
Studios, a design and engineering firm based in Portland, OR30. Soon after the 3/11 
disaster occurred, Alvarez created and was operating a website called RDTN.org. The 
site aimed to aggregate and map radiation data from the official public agencies and the 
general public who owned personal Geiger counters. Alvarez decided to collaborate with 
Safecast to help address the nuclear crisis. As a result, Safecast was able to use the newly 
developed radiation monitoring devices and the website to measure, map, and publish 
radiation data (Hemmi & Graham, 2014). 
                                                 
27 Common workspace in which people with common interests in technology, science, and art meet 
together to socialize, develop a new device, and carry out their other collaborative projects 
(http://tokyohackerspace.org/)  
 
28 One of funding platforms for creative projects (https://www.kickstarter.com/) 
 
29 http://www.knightfoundation.org/ 
 
30 http://uncorkedstudios.com/us 
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With the help of International Medcom, Inc., a producer of radiation detection 
instruments and systems, Safecast deployed over 800 mobile or static radiation 
monitoring devices and systems across Japan. As of May 2014, radiation data were 
collected from approximately 18,000,000 data points. The collected radiation data also 
include geo-location information (i.e. GPS coordinates of data points) and time 
information (i.e. when radiation data was measured). With the belief that data must be 
freely available and more data is better, the collected information was published on the 
website (http://blog.safecast.org/data/) under the Creative Commons public domain 
designation31. Thus, anyone could freely download the radiation dataset from the website 
and use the dataset for his or her various purposes. This radiation data project was also 
crowdsourced to the general public. Hence, people who had their own Geiger counters 
could upload their radiation data to the website. Safecast also provided their Application 
Programming Interface (API). By using the API, users could easily access, query, and 
add other data to the Safecast raw radiation dataset. 
Furthermore, Safecast visualized the radiation data by providing a variety of maps 
on the website to help people recognize radiation levels. For example, the Safecast map32 
showed the radiation levels of over 18,000,000 data points collected by the Safecast team 
(i.e. both mobile or fixed censors), while the fusion map33 and interpolation map34 
                                                 
31 http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ 
 
32 http://safecast.org/tilemap/ 
 
33 http://gamma.tar.bz/maps/main/ 
 
34 http://gamma.tar.bz/maps/static/ 
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depicted only the Safecast mobile data. And another map called the failed robot map35 
visualized the aggregated radiation data from different sources, including crowdsourced 
individual Geiger counters, the Safecast fixed sensor network, and government sensor 
networks. 
All projects of Safecast were conducted by approximately 100 enthusiastic 
volunteers both from across the globe and Japan. The Safecast team worked together to 
develop radiation sensors, maintain and update the website, and collect, publish, and 
visualize radiation data. Over the first year, Safecast had no physical office space36, so 
that the Safecast team used social media, Skype, and email to communicate with one 
another and coordinate their projects. That is, online chat rooms were their virtual 
headquarter. Information and communication technology is very crucial for not only their 
project coordination, but also communication between Safecast and the general public in 
Japan and across the world. Safecast used social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
Google+, to keep people posted on their projects. In addition, through social media, 
particularly Google+, Safecast openly discussed on their projects with a wider 
community, including ordinary people, journalists, and nuclear experts. The open 
discussion helped address criticisms from radiation specialists, for example, regarding 
mobile sensors’ data collection procedures, thereby improving the scientific credibility of 
the projects. 
Relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations. 
In the case of the Japan earthquake and nuclear crisis, participatory online groups (both 
                                                 
35 http://japan.failedrobot.com/ 
 
36 Safecast has now a fixed location in Tokyo. 
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the Japanese OpenStreetMap community and Safecast) had collaborative relationships 
with many for-profit corporations and nonprofit foundations. In partnerships with such 
formal organizations, participatory online groups received a variety of financial and 
technical supports essential to their voluntary, collective responses to the disaster. 
Specifically, Safecast collaborated with Keio University, International Medcom, 
Uncorked Studious, and the MacArthur Foundation (Abe, 2013, 2014; Bonner, 2012; 
Kera et al., 2013). These organizations offered expertise on interpolation and geographic 
data visualization, helped design and produce a low-cost Geiger counter called bGeigie 
Nano Kit, and provided funding for the volunteer-based radiation data project. In other 
words, these organizations acted as supporting partners for participatory online groups. 
Also, the Japanese government recognized participatory online groups’ efforts 
for addressing the earthquake and nuclear crisis (Aldrich, 2012; Appleby, 2012). The 
Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology responsible for 
monitoring radiation told reporters, “Citizen’s groups have played a very important role 
in examining their neighbors closely. I really appreciate their contribution, as it’s most 
important to eliminate as many hot spots as possible” (Aldrich, 2012, pp. 8–9). The 
Fukushima prefectural government used Safecast’s data to create their world radiation 
map (Abe, 2013). Sinsai.info created by another participatory online group “was also 
recognized by the Japanese government, and the crisis map was embedded in the official 
website of the Japanese cabinet during the response period” (Hong, 2014, p. 15). 
Moreover, the post-earthquake online map of the affected areas created by 
OpenStreetMap volunteers “was shared on the National Research Institute for Earth 
Science and Disaster Prevention’s website, All311” (Appleby, 2012, p. 36).  
78 
 
Despite such data sharing, more importantly, it is unclear whether participatory 
online groups and the Japanese government collaborated with each other in a coordinated 
manner to collectively respond to the disaster (Appleby, 2012). For example, the Safecast 
team did not directly work with the Japanese government because they wanted to be 
independent of and uninfluenced by the nuclear power debate in politics and owing to a 
lack of the government’s transparency of data collection methodology (Abe, 2013, 2014). 
Thus, based on their own procedures and methodologies, Safecast and Japan’s Ministry 
of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) collected, visualized, 
and published radiation data, respectively. In this regard, there was no alignment or 
coordination in formal and volunteer-based, participatory emergency responses. Also, 
although participatory online groups created and updated useful disaster information in 
real-time (i.e. the crisis map (sinshai.info) and the post-earthquake digital map of the 
affected areas (OpenStreetMap)), there is little evidence that formal response 
organizations used such disaster information on the ground for their response activities, 
such as search-and-rescue operations and the delivery of relief resources (Appleby, 
2012). Thus, it seems that participatory online groups were disconnected to formal 
response organizations in the field during the response period. 
 
Building Hypotheses on Relationships 
between Participatory Online Groups and Formal Organizations 
In the above four cases, there were different types of relationships between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations in crisis or disaster situations. These 
inter-organizational relationships fall mostly into two types of relationships: 
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complementary or ignoring (See Table 2.3). In this section, based on the results of the 
four case studies and the literature, I explore the determinants to form relationships 
between participatory online groups and formal organizations and how the formation of 
these inter-organizational relationships influence the outcomes of the responses to crises 
or disasters, thus developing hypotheses (See Figure 2.2).  
Table 2.3 
Typology of Relationships between Participatory Online Groups and Formal Organizations 
  Awareness 
  + - 
Alignment 
+ 
Type 1 (Complementary and 
synergic) 
- Kenya: The Ushahidi team and 
Kenyan NGOs 
- Haiti: The Tufts support team 
and international first 
responders 
- Haiti: Humanitarian 
OpenStreetMap Team, for-
profit satellite imagery 
companies, and international 
first responders 
- Haiti: The Mission 4636 team, 
Haitian Telecommunication 
companies, nonprofit 
technology companies, and 
international first responders 
- Indonesia: JALIN Merapi and 
Indonesian NGOs  
Type 2 (Additive) 
- Indonesia: JALIN Merapi 
and the Indonesian 
government regarding the 
mobilization and delivery of 
relief resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
Type 3 (Ignoring and 
uncooperative) 
- Indonesia: JALIN Merapi and 
the Indonesian government 
- Japan: The Japanese 
OpenStreetMap community and 
the Japanese government 
- Japan: The Safecast team and 
the Japanese government 
Type 4 (Inconsistent and 
confusing) 
- Kenya: The Ushahidi team 
and Kenyan NGOs in the 
immediate aftermath of the 
crisis 
- Haiti: The Tufts support team 
and international first 
responders in the immediate 
aftermath of the earthquake 
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Precondition for Building Relationships: Inter-Organizational Awareness 
 Inter-organizational awareness acts as a main precondition for building 
relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations in crisis or 
disaster situations. Inter-organizational awareness means that participatory online groups 
and formal organizations recognize other actors’ existence, aims, activities, and resources 
related to the response to crises or disasters (Stoll et al., 2010; Thellufsen et al., 2009). 
For example, in the Haiti case, the Tufts support team and international first responders, 
such as the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Coast Guard, first needed to recognize each 
other to initiate collaborative relationships during the earthquake response. Particularly, I 
note that many participatory online groups emerged globally and a lot of formal response 
organizations both from across the globe and the affected countries were mobilized and 
deployed in recent large-scale crises or disasters, such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake. In 
such situations, inter-organizational awareness is more important to develop relationships 
between participatory online groups and formal organizations, because without inter-
organizational awareness, both actors cannot reach out to each other and form their 
collaborative relationships.  
 More importantly, I note that inter-organizational awareness is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for building relationships between participatory online groups and 
formal organizations. It was apparent in both the Indonesia case and the Japan case. 
Specifically, JALIN Merapi and the Indonesian emergency management agencies 
recognized each other’s existence and response tasks and activities in the case of the 2010 
volcanic eruption. But both parties did not collaborate with each other in a coordinated 
manner to effectively respond to the volcanic eruption. In addition, the Japanese 
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government agencies such as the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and 
Technology (MEXT) were aware of participatory online groups (i.e. the Japanese 
OpenStreetMap community and Safecast). But these government agencies did not 
coordinate their responses in collaboration with participatory online groups during the 
2011 earthquake response period. Participatory online groups (particularly, Safecast) also 
were aware of the government agencies, but unwilling to reach out to the agencies to be 
independent of the nuclear power debate in politics (Abe, 2013, 2014; Appleby, 2012). 
 
Figure 2.2. Conceptual framework of inter-organizational relationships between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations 
Key Determinants of Inter-Organizational Relationships 
 I found out from four cases three key determinants of building relationships 
between participatory online groups and formal organizations in crisis or disaster 
situations: resource dependence; shared understanding; and information technology.  
Resource dependence. Resource dependence was a key determinant to form 
collaborative relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations. 
Resource dependence means that participatory online groups and formal organizations 
rely on each other to create and deliver a variety of tasks and activities in response to 
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crisis. First, in the Kenya case, the Ushahidi team and Kenyan NGOs were 
interdependent. Kenyan NGOs provided trusted reports on crisis conditions to the 
Ushahidi team, helped verify reports from multiple sources, and made a significant 
contribution to publicizing the existence of the Ushahidi platform and how to submit 
reports across Kenya. On the other hand, the Ushahidi team offered real-time information 
about crisis conditions and peacebuilding efforts to Kenyan NGOs. These NGOs used 
this information to coordinate their response tasks and activities in an efficient and 
effective manner.  
Additionally, in the Haiti case, participatory online groups (the Tufts support 
team, the Mission 4636 team, and the OpenStreetMap team) and a large group of formal 
organizations mobilized and deployed were reliant on each other for the effective 
collective response to the devastating earthquake. On one hand, formal organizations 
provided a variety of resources to participatory online networks during the earthquake 
response period. Specifically, for-profit satellite imagery companies donated their 
satellite imagery of post-earthquake Haiti to the OpenStreetMap (OSM) team. Based on 
the donated satellite imagery, the OSM volunteers were able to quickly create digital base 
maps of post-earthquake Haiti. Also, Haitian telecommunications companies (Digicel and 
Digipoint) enabled the affected people on the ground to submit free text messages (e.g., 
requests for rescue and aid) to the SMS-based reporting system called Mission 4636. 
Many for-profit or nonprofit technology companies helped the Mission 4636 team and 
the Tufts support team integrate disaster-related data from multiple sources by providing 
technical advice and supports.  
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On the other hand, verified, translated, geo-coded disaster information created by 
participatory online groups (the Tufts support team and the Mission 4636 team) was 
directly sent to formal organizations, particularly international first responders in the 
field, such as the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Marine Corps. International first 
responders used this information to coordinate their search-and-rescue operations. Also 
these first responders relied on digital base maps of post-earthquake Haiti, which were 
created by the OpenStreetMap volunteers, to coordinate and the allocation and delivery 
of relief resources in a just-in-time manner.  
In the literature, resource dependence is regarded as an important factor to 
determine inter-organizational relations and data sharing behavior (R. M. Emerson, 1976; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Wehn de Montalvo, 2003a). 
According to the literature, organizations are not self-sufficient, thus organizations form 
inter-organizational relationships to obtain resources essential for their survival from 
external entities. There are two different perspectives: power and resource dependence 
theory (Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and social exchange theory 
(Cropanzano, 2005; R. M. Emerson, 1976). According to power theories and resource 
dependence theory that view inter-organizational relationships as political or negotiated 
dynamics, there are asymmetries in resources between organizations. Such asymmetries 
in resources “prompts organizations to attempt to exert power, influence, or control over 
organizations that possess the required scarce resources” (Oliver, 1990, pp. 243–244). In 
contrast, social exchange theorists contend that resource scarcity leads to inter-
organizational cooperation and collaboration (Oliver, 1990). But an important thing that 
both perspectives have in common is that resource scarcity or dependence generates the 
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formation of inter-organizational relationships to gain access to a required resources 
(Barringer, 2000). 
Hypothesis 1. When participatory online groups and formal organizations 
are more interdependent on each other in crisis or disaster situations, 
participatory online groups and formal organizations are more likely to 
build collaborative inter-organizational relationships. 
Shared understanding. A shared understanding was an important factor to 
develop collaborative relationships between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations across all the four cases. A shared understanding can be subdivided into 
two sub-concepts: common problems and strategies. A shared understanding of common 
problems means that participatory online groups and formal organizations agree with 
each other on crisis or disaster situations (i.e. causes and impacts of crises or disasters 
and the current status of crisis or disaster conditions). A shared understanding of 
strategies means that participatory online groups and formal organizations reach a 
consensus on how to resolve common problems that they face in crisis or disaster 
situations. First, in the Kenya case, the Ushahidi team and Kenyan NGOs reached a 
consensus on the lack of crisis information as a common problem (i.e. the current state of 
post-election violence) caused by the Kenyan government’s suspension of all live 
broadcasts and the mainstream media’ self-censorship. Also, the Ushahidi team and 
Kenyan NGOs had the shared understanding of the Ushahidi platform’s usefulness to 
address such a lack of crisis information. So, the Ushahidi team and Kenyan NGOs 
collaborated with each other to collect, verify, and publicize crisis information.  
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In the Haiti case, both formal organizations (the U.S. State Department, 
FrontlineSMS, the Thomson Reuters Foundation, and Energy for Opportunity, and 
Ushahidi, Inc., and Haitian communications companies) and participatory online groups 
(the Mission 4636 team and the Tufts support team) recognized the importance of 
verified, timely disaster information, thus formal organizations and participatory online 
groups helped each other to set up and manage an integrative disaster information system 
that was considered as a key strategy for resolving the devastating earthquake. In the 
Indonesia case, JALIN Merapi’s volunteers and Indonesian NGOs agreed that the 
Indonesian government did not have sufficient capacities to address the volcanic 
eruptions of Mount Merapi and the affected people’s needs and concerns were often 
times overlooked by the government and the mainstream media (Saputro, 2014). Based 
on this consensus, JALIN Merapi’s volunteers and Indonesian NGOs took collective 
action to build a community-based disaster information system to collect, verify, and 
publicize timely information about volcanic activities and the affected people’s needs and 
requests for aid.  
In contrast, in the Japan case, I note that the lack of a shared understanding of 
crisis or disaster conditions and of how to deal with crises or disasters decreased the 
likelihood of forming collaborative relationships between participatory online groups and 
the Japanese government. Specifically, the Safecast team (i.e. a participatory online 
group) paid attention to the severity of the nuclear crisis and considered the lack of 
radiation data as a main problem of the nuclear crisis. Thus, the Safecast team sought to 
help fill the gap by developing a Geiger counter and measuring and mapping radiation 
across Japan. Also, the Safecast team published how to measure radiation on the website 
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and social networking sites (Facebook, Twitter, and Google+) and openly discussed 
about their projects to receive feedback and expertise from a wider online community 
including ordinary Japanese, engineers, and nuclear experts. The Safecast team also 
uploaded the radiation data to their website under an open-source license called Creative 
Commons. So, anyone or any organization could download, modify, and share the data 
for free. That is, openness and transparency were key features of the Safecast team’s 
strategy for resolving the nuclear crisis. In contrast, the Japanese government and Tokyo 
Electronic Power Company (TEPCO), the operator of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant, downplayed the severity of the nuclear crisis and delayed in publishing 
radiation data. Also, the Japanese government provided radiation data in a nontransparent 
way. Importantly, such a lack of the common understanding of crisis conditions and how 
to resolve the crisis obstructed the formation of collaborative relationships between the 
Safecast team and the Japanese government.  
In the literature, shared understanding is considered as a key factor to determine 
inter-organizational relationships (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bentrup, 2001; K. Emerson et 
al., 2012). According to the literature, it is essential to reach a consensus on problems and 
how to address these problems to build collaborative inter-organizational relationships 
(Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bentrup, 2001). 
Hypothesis 2. When participatory online groups and formal organizations 
reach a shared understanding of crisis or disaster situations, participatory 
online groups and formal organizations are more likely to build 
collaborative inter-organizational relationships. 
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Hypothesis 3. When participatory online groups and formal organizations 
reach a shared understanding of how to address crises or disasters, 
participatory online groups and formal organizations are more likely to 
build collaborative inter-organizational relationships. 
Information technology. Information technology can influence the formation of 
collaborative organizational relationships between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations. Information technology consists of two sub-concepts: the adoption of 
technologies (both hardware and software) and technical management capacities. 
Participatory online groups and formal organizations adopted a variety of information 
and communication technologies (ICTs), including short message service (SMS), email, 
social networking sites (e.g., Facebook and Twitter), text or video chat applications (e.g., 
Skype), document collaboration tools (e.g., Google Docs), open-source crisis mapping 
platforms (e.g., Ushahidi), and collaborative mapping tools (e.g., OpenStreetMap). These 
ICTs were used for participatory online groups and formal organizations to communicate 
and collaborate with each other in response to crisis. In the Haiti case, over a dozen 
formal organizations and participatory online groups used open chat rooms to design and 
implement the SMS-based reporting system (i.e. Mission 4636) (Meier & Munro, 2010). 
By using these open chat rooms, participatory online groups and formal organizations 
quickly made decisions and built the reporting system within a few days. Indeed, these 
open chat rooms were the virtual headquarters of Mission 4636 during the earthquake 
response period. Also, participatory online groups, such as the Tufts support team and the 
OSM team, used open-source software and licenses for their voluntary collective action. 
Such an adoption of open-source software and licenses enabled formal organizations to 
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easily get access to data products created by participatory online groups and facilitated 
collaboration between participatory online groups and formal organizations for the Haiti 
earthquake response. 
In addition to the adoption of technologies, I note the importance of technical 
management capacities, which are defined as information management skills and 
expertise for converting, updating, integrating, and distributing data from different 
sources. In the Haiti case, both participatory online groups and formal organizations had 
technical management capacities to collate and process disaster data from different 
sources and integrate the data with their own information systems and infrastructure. For 
participatory online groups, the OpenStreetMap volunteers had a geographic data 
management capacity to quickly process and geo-reference satellite imagery donated by 
for-profit satellite imagery companies such as GeoEye and DigitalGlobe. On the other 
hand, during the Haiti earthquake response period, formal organizations were also good 
at processing, converting, and integrating disaster data from participatory online groups. 
For example, international first responders like the U.S. Marine Corps had technical 
management capacities to retrieve and integrate disaster-related information (e.g., 
requests for rescue and aid) from the Ushahidi-Haiti platform (Nelson et al., 2010).  
In contrast, in the Indonesia case, the Indonesian local government (particularly, 
emergency management agencies) did not adopted new media technologies such as the 
Internet and social networking sites, although a participatory online group called JALIN 
Merapi adopted a variety of information and communication technologies, including 
SMS, Twitter, Facebook, email, and the website, to communicate with the affected 
people and coordinate their volunteers (Nugroho & Syarief, 2012). Moreover, the 
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emergency management agencies did not have technical management capacities to 
integrate disaster-related information from multiple sources and to effectively operate the 
official disaster information system, although JALIN Merapi set up and managed the 
community-based, disaster information system by updating and integrating disaster data 
from the ground in near real-time (COMDEV, n.d.; Nugroho & Syarief, 2012). Thus, 
such differences in technology adoption and technical management capacities acted as a 
barrier to the development of collaborative relationships between JALIN Merapi and the 
emergency management agencies. 
In the literature, the adoption of technologies (both hardware and software) and 
technical management capacities are considered as an important factor to determine inter-
organizational relationships (Stoll et al., 2010; Wehn de Montalvo, 2003b). Particularly, 
these technical and information management factors are more important when the aim of 
inter-organizational relationships is the collection and sharing of data, such as geographic 
data, crisis data, or health data. In the data sharing context, integrating data from 
participatory online groups into formal organizations’ database is not a trivial matter. It 
requires information technology and management skills and expertise (N. C. Roberts, 
2011). In this regard, for formal organizations and participatory online groups to 
collaborate with each other, it is necessary for developing common standards of data 
management, similar or same data representation formats, and interoperable platforms 
and applications that enable both actors to collect, process and share data from diverse 
sources (Gao, Barbier, Goolsby, & Zeng, 2011; Wehn de Montalvo, 2003a). Thus, these 
technologies and information management capacities are important factors to determine 
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relationships and interactions between formal organizations and participatory online 
groups in crisis or disaster situations. 
Hypothesis 4. Differences between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations in information technology adoption are negatively related to 
the likelihood of the formation of collaborative inter-organizational 
relationships between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations.   
Hypothesis 5. When participatory online groups and formal organizations 
have higher technical management capacities, participatory online groups 
and formal organizations are more likely to build collaborative inter-
organizational relationships.  
The Formation of Inter-Organizational Relationships and Its Outcomes 
 The formation of inter-organizational relationships between participatory online 
groups and formal organizations created two key outcomes: inter-organizational 
alignment in emergency response and the effectiveness of emergency response. 
Inter-organizational alignment. In large-scale crisis or disaster situations where 
numerous participatory online groups spontaneously emerge and a lot of formal response 
organizations are mobilized and deployed from both around the world and the affected 
countries, one of key problems related to emergency responses is a lack of timely 
information about the status of response tasks and activities (i.e. which organizations are 
doing what, where?) and the duplication of response tasks and activities. For example, in 
the immediate aftermath of a crisis or a disaster, participatory information groups and 
formal organizations often separately conduct their own crisis or disaster assessments 
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without sharing related information with each other, thus wasting time, human and 
financial resources. However, when participatory online groups and formal organizations 
formed collaborative relationships, inter-organizational alignment in response tasks and 
activities was achieved across the four cases. Inter-organizational alignment is defined as 
the coordination of a wide range of response tasks and activities (both onsite operations 
and offsite strategic decisions and supports) across participatory online groups and formal 
organizations that have collaborative relationships (Kathuria et al., 2007). It also means 
that response tasks and activities of participatory online groups and formal organizations 
complement and support one another (Kathuria et al., 2007).  
In the Kenya case, the Ushahidi volunteers developed an online crisis reporting 
system and collected, processed, and visualized crisis data from multiple sources. Kenyan 
NGOs helped publicize the existence of the reporting system and verify reports from the 
ground. Also, these NGOs used the crisis data to effectively offer peacebuilding efforts 
and relief resources to the affected people. Thus, the response tasks and activities of the 
Ushahidi volunteers and Kenyan NGOs supplemented each other in a coordinated 
manner. In the Haiti case, inter-organizational alignment among a large network of 
participatory online groups and formal organizations was achieved. For-profit satellite 
imagery companies donated satellite imagery of post-earthquake Haiti to the 
OpenStreetMap (OSM) team. Based on the donated imagery, the OSM team collectively 
created digital base maps of post-earthquake Haiti and provided these maps to other 
participatory online groups and formal organizations. The Tufts support team collected, 
verified, and visualized actionable pieces of disaster information and directly sent this 
information to international first responders in the field. Also, in partnerships with 
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Haitian communications companies, the U.S. State Department and FrontlineSMS 
designed and set up the SMS-based reporting system called Mission 4636 by which the 
affected people on the ground submitted their requests for rescue and aid. Thousands of 
Mission 4636’s volunteers processed, verified, translated and geocoded SMS reports. 
These reports were also used by international first responders to perform their search-
and-rescue operations and allocate and deliver relief resources. As stated above, 
participatory online groups and formal organizations conducted a wide range of response 
tasks and activities that supplemented and supported one another.  
In the Indonesia case, the volunteers of a community-based, participatory online 
group called JALIN Merapi collected, processed, and publicized information about 
volcanic activities, the affected people’s needs and requests, and relief resources 
available. Several Indonesian NGOs provided administrative, technical, and financial 
supports to JALIN Merapi. These NGOs helped coordinate over 2,000 volunteers of 
JALIN Merapi and build an integrative disaster information system in which these 
volunteers processed and verified disaster information in real-time. JALIN Merapi and 
these NGOs developed and improved collaborative relationships between them and 
coordinated their response tasks and activities. In the Japan case, the Japanese 
OpenStreetMap community created digital base maps of post-earthquake Japan and 
collected, verified, and visualized disaster information in collaboration with Japanese 
students who studied abroad. Also, Safecast’s volunteers developed a Geiger counter and 
measured and published radiation data. These participatory online groups conducted their 
diverse response tasks and activities in partnerships with many formal organizations, such 
as Keio University, International Medcom, Uncorked Studios, and the MacArthur 
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Foundation (Abe, 2014; Kera et al., 2013). These formal organizations provided a variety 
of technical and financial supports to participatory online groups. At that time, 
participatory online groups and formal organizations aligned their resources and efforts 
for the effective response to the earthquake and nuclear crisis. 
Hypothesis 6. The formation of collaborative relationships between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations improves inter-
organizational alignment in emergency response. 
Effectiveness. Inter-organizational alignment (i.e. coordination of emergency 
response across participatory online groups and formal organizations) likely improves the 
effectiveness of emergency response. From a program evaluation perspective, the 
effectiveness of emergency response is the extent to which emergency response achieves 
its final goals and objectives. The key goals and objectives of emergency response are “to 
save lives, protect property and the environment, meet basic human needs, stabilize the 
incident, restore basic services and community functionality, and establish a safe and 
secure environment moving toward the transition to recovery” (DHS, 2013, p. i). Based 
on the four cases, I note that inter-organizational alignment contributes to saving lives 
and meeting the affected people’s needs during the response period. 
Saving lives. It is difficult to quantitatively assess how many people were saved 
as a result of inter-organizational coordination between participatory online groups and 
formal organizations. But it was clear across the cases that coordinated emergency 
response between participatory online groups and formal organizations saved numerous 
lives. Particularly, in the Haiti case, participatory online groups (the Tufts support team, 
Mission 4636, and OpenStreetMap) provided international first responders on the ground, 
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such as the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Marine Corps, with digital base maps of post-
earthquake Haiti and timely, verified information about requests for rescue. Based on the 
base maps and the information, international first responders were able to effectively 
coordinate their search-and-rescue missions. As a result, these first responders rescued a 
lot of lives. For example, “a seven-year-old girl and two women were pulled from the 
rubble of a collapsed supermarket by an American search-and-rescue team after they sent 
a text message calling for help” (Meier, 2010). Also, according to the U.S. Marine Corps 
(Meier, 2010),  
“Based off some information that we received from [the] Ushahidi[-Haiti platform], 
we inserted the recon platoon this morning to check out a remote village that was 
listed in some of the blogs. We are now in the process of medevacing two local 
nationals who would not have received medical treatment in time for life or limb 
had we not found them.” 
Additionally, Craig Clark, a civilian analyst for the U.S. Marine Corps, 
summarized coordinated efforts between participatory online groups and their rescue-
and-search teams as follows: “I say with confidence that there are 100s of these kinds of 
[success] stories” (Meier, 2011, p. 1245).  
Meeting the affected people’s needs. Coordinated efforts between participatory 
online groups and formal organizations were effective in meeting the affected people’s 
needs. In the Indonesia case, JALIN Merapi’s volunteers and an Indonesian NGO aligned 
their response tasks and activities in a coordinated manner and created an integrative 
disaster and relief information system. By using this information system, JALIN 
Merapi’s volunteers collected and processed information about both the affected people’s 
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requests for assistance and relief resources donated by the general public. The Indonesian 
NGO helped verify this information and offered technical supports for the information 
system. Such coordinated efforts made an important contribution to matching those in 
need to those who donated relief resources. In the Haiti case, formal organizations, such 
as the Red Cross and the World Food Program, used timely information that participatory 
online groups created about the affected people’s requests for aid to effectively allocate 
and deliver diverse relief resources (drinking water, food, and medical supplies). For 
example, according to Patrick Meier, a key coordinator of the Tufts support team for the 
Ushahidi-Haiti platform, “the Red Cross took just 20 minutes to respond to a post about a 
need for fuel for a generator at a health clinic….[Also,] the World Food Program 
delivered food to an informal camp of 2500 people, having yet to receive food or water, 
in Diquini to a location that…[the Tufts support team] had identified for them” (Meier, 
2010). 
Hypothesis 7. Inter-organizational alignment in emergency response 
improves the effectiveness of emergency response. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I focused on one aspect of the event-driven lens developed in the 
first chapter of this dissertation. It is the formation of relationships between participatory 
online groups and formal organizations in crisis or disaster situations. More specifically, I 
aimed to explore key determinants and outcomes of forming relationships between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations. For that purpose, I employed the 
exploratory case study method and conducted four case studies including the 2007-2008 
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Kenya post-election violence, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the 2010 Indonesia volcanic 
eruption, and the 2011 Japan earthquake and nuclear crisis. Based on the findings from 
these four case studies, I found out three key factors and their sub-factors to influence the 
formation of relationships between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations—including resource dependence, shared understanding (common problems 
and strategies), and information technology (adoption of technologies and technical 
management capacities). I also found out two outcomes of forming relationships between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations in crisis or disaster situations. These 
outcomes are inter-organizational alignment and the effectiveness of coordinated 
responding efforts. Finally, I developed seven hypotheses. 
This research may have limitations. First, this research is based on secondary 
data. Although I collected data from multiple sources including academic journal articles, 
practical reports, news articles, and web documents, such secondary data may not provide 
sufficient, detailed descriptions and explanations regarding the formation of relationships 
between participatory online groups and formal organizations. Moreover, I did not fully 
consider a variety of political and social factors that may be associated with the formation 
of relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations (e.g., social 
capital and trust in government). 
Despite these limitations, this research is expected to contribute to the literature. 
Specifically, the findings of this research may contribute to bridging the disconnect 
between the emergency management literature that stresses formal emergency response 
and the crisis informatics literature that focuses on volunteer-based, participatory 
emergency response in the digital era, suggesting key factors to form relationships 
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between participatory online groups and formal organizations and the outcomes of the 
formation of such relationships. Furthermore, this research may contribute to the inter-
organizational relations (IOR) theory, indicating how volunteer-based online 
communities and institutionalized formal organizations form loosely connected, inter-
organizational relationships in crisis or disaster situations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TESTING HYPOTHESES ON RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PARTICIPATORY 
ONLINE GROUPS AND FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
In the second chapter, I developed seven hypotheses on the determinants and 
outcomes of forming inter-organizational relationships between participatory online 
groups and formal organizations in crisis or disaster situations. Based on the results of 
four case studies, I found out three key determinants to form the inter-organizational 
relationships—including resource dependence, shared understanding, and information 
technology. I also identified two outcomes of forming the inter-organizational 
relationships (i.e. inter-organizational alignment and the effectiveness of emergency 
response). In this chapter, I aim to empirically test hypothesized relationships developed 
from four case studies in the second chapter. Specifically, for this purpose, this research 
employs the explanatory case study method, focusing on the 2015 Nepal earthquake. 
 
Extended Conceptual Model: The Developmental Phases  
of Inter-Organizational Relationships 
A conceptual model developed in the second chapter is based on the formation of 
inter-organizational relationships between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations during the emergency response period (i.e. whether inter-organizational 
relationships exist or not). However, I note that inter-organizational relationships may 
dynamically change over time (Imperial et al., 2016; Jap & Anderson, 2007). The 
literature indicates that there are the developmental phases (or processes) of inter-
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organizational relationships: awareness and exploration; expansion and maturity; and 
decline and dissolution (Dwyer et al., 1987; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). The first phase 
(awareness and exploration) is the search and trial phase. In that phase, potential 
collaboration partners are aware of each other and evaluate “obligations, benefits and 
burdens, and the possibility of cooperative relationships” (Dwyer et al., 1987, p. 16). In 
most cases, inter-organizational relationships “emerge incrementally and begin with 
small, informal deals that initially require little reliance on trust” (Ring & Van de Ven, 
1994, p. 101). In that phase, inter-organizational relationships tend to be fragile and can 
be easily terminated. 
In the second phase (expansion and maturity), collaboration partners achieve “the 
continual increase in benefits…[and] interdependence” (Dwyer et al., 1987, p. 18). 
Naturally, the levels of shared understanding and mutual trust likely improve. This phase 
is the most advanced developmental phase of inter-organizational relationships. But, in 
some cases, inter-organizational relationships reach the decline and dissolution phase. 
That is, there is always the possibility of withdrawal or disengagement due to violations 
of trust, changes in the legal and policy environment, or the presence of alternative 
collaboration partners (Dwyer et al., 1987; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Thus, in this 
chapter, based on the literature, I consider the developmental phases of inter-
organizational relationships between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations, rather than considering only the formation of inter-organizational 
relationships. 
The developmental phases of inter-organizational relationships are defined as (or 
measured by) the intensity of interaction between participatory online groups and formal 
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organizations in crisis or disaster situations. In other words, that participatory online 
groups and formal organizations reach a higher-level developmental phase of inter-
organizational relationships means that there are rich, dynamic, and constant exchanges 
of information and resources between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations (Dwyer et al., 1987). Sometimes, in the literature, the developmental 
phases of inter-organizational relationships are defined as the level of institutionalization 
or formalization of inter-organizational relationships (e.g., a written contract and a formal 
agreement) (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). However, I note that in most cases, participatory 
online groups and formal organizations collaborate with each other in an informal, 
voluntary manner. Thus, it would be inappropriate to define the developmental phases of 
inter-organizational relationships as the level of formalization.  
Furthermore, I note that relationships between participatory online groups and 
formal organizations quickly evolve in an urgent crisis or disaster situation. It means that 
it would be possible for participatory online groups and formal organizations to reach a 
higher-level developmental phase of inter-organizational relationships during a relatively 
short period in crisis or disaster situations.  
Figure 3.1 indicates the extended conceptual model of inter-organizational 
relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations. Specifically, 
I examine how resource dependence, shared understanding, and information technology 
influence the level of inter-organizational relationship development (that is, the intensity 
of interaction) and ultimately how the level of the relationship development influences 
the outcomes of emergency response. 
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Figure 3.1. Extended conceptual model 
Based on the conceptual model, this research tested the following hypotheses: 
H1: When participatory online groups and formal organizations are more dependent on 
each other in crisis or disaster situations, participatory online groups and formal 
organizations are likely to have a higher level of maturity in inter-organizational 
relationships. 
H2: When participatory online groups and formal organizations reach a higher level of a 
shared understanding of crisis or disaster situations, participatory online groups and 
formal organizations are likely to have a higher level of maturity in inter-
organizational relationships. 
H3: When participatory online groups and formal organizations reach a higher level of a 
shared understanding of how to address crises or disasters, participatory online 
groups and formal organizations are likely to have a higher level of maturity in 
inter-organizational relationships. 
H4: Differences between participatory online groups and formal organizations in 
information technology adoption are negatively related to the level of maturity in 
inter-organizational relationships. 
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H5: When participatory online groups and formal organizations have higher technical 
management capacities, participatory online groups and formal organizations are 
more likely to have a higher level of maturity in inter-organizational relationships. 
H6: When participatory online groups and formal organizations have a higher level of 
maturity in inter-organizational relationships, inter-organizational alignment in 
emergency response likely increases. 
H7: Inter-organizational alignment between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations in emergency response likely improves the effectiveness of emergency 
response. 
 
Research Methods: The Explanatory Case Study Method 
 This research employs the explanatory case study method. The explanatory case 
study method is an empirical inquiry that aims to test constructs (or variables) of interest 
within the real-life context (Yin, 2003). This research method allows the researcher to 
conduct in-depth analysis on how constructs (or variables) influence other constructs with 
multiple sources of evidence. This research focuses on the 2015 Nepal earthquake to 
investigate how resource dependence, shared understanding, and information technology 
shape the developmental phases of inter-organizational relationships and how the level of 
inter-organizational relationship development impacts inter-organizational coordination 
and the effectiveness of emergency response. 
Case Selection 
In this research, I employed theoretical sampling, which the researcher purposely 
selects a case or cases considered as suitable for illuminating relationships among 
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constructs (or variables) (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
Specifically, I used the following case selection criteria: the magnitude of a crisis or a 
disaster, the level of public attention to a crisis or a disaster, the mobilization of formal 
organizations, the emergence and contributions of participatory online groups, and 
advances in technologies.  
Based on the criteria, the 2015 Nepal earthquake case was selected for this study. 
The Nepal earthquake was one of the most catastrophic earthquakes regarding magnitude 
and fatality. On April 25, 2015, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal, followed by 
another 7.3 magnitude earthquake on May 12, 2015. These earthquakes caused 
approximately 9,000 deaths and injured over 100,000 people (UNOCHA, 2015a). Also, 
such magnitudes and fatalities of the earthquakes suddenly drew the attention of Nepalese 
people and the Nepalese government, the general public across the world, other 
governments, and international organizations to the catastrophic event. Naturally, 
approximately five hundred institutionalized formal organizations—including the United 
Nations, the Nepalese Government, Oxfam, and the Red Cross—participated in the 
earthquake response. Furthermore, many participatory online groups emerged from both 
across the globe and the affected regions and took voluntary, collective action to respond 
to the devastating earthquake by using information and communication technologies. 
Lastly, I note that various new technologies, such as artificial intelligence and drones, 
were used for the Nepal earthquake response. 
Data Collection  
One of key strengths that the case study method has is to use multiple sources of 
evidence (i.e. data triangulation) (Yin, 2003). In this study, data comes from diverse 
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sources including individual interviews, web documentation, mainstream media 
coverage, and activity logs and the content on an online platform.  
Individual interviews. I conducted individual interviews with 15 people who 
participated in the Nepal earthquake response and have expertise on relationships and 
interactions between participatory online groups and formal organizations. 8 interviewees 
come from institutionalized formal organizations including the Canadian Disaster 
Assistance Response Team (DART), Humanity Road, MapAction, the U.N. Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the U.N. Volunteers (UNV) 
Program, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Other 7 
interviewees are members of participatory online groups including the Kathmandu Living 
Labs (KLL), the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT), and the Standby Task 
Force (SBTF). These interviewees were selected because over the past 5 years, most of 
these interviewees have worked together to build collaborative initiatives between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations for emergency preparedness and 
response (e.g., the Digital Humanitarian Network37 and Crisis Mappers Net38). Moreover, 
all the interviewees participated in the Nepal earthquake response (i.e. on-scene 
operations in the field or off-scene assistance), communicating and collaborating with 
one another. 
In this study I conducted semi-structured interviews which have a preliminary 
framework of interview questions or themes, but allow for new questions or themes to 
                                                 
37 http://digitalhumanitarians.com/ 
 
38 http://crisismappers.net/ 
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emerge during the interview (Kvale, 1996). I developed preliminary semi-structured 
interview questions based on the findings of the earlier four case studies and the literature 
(See Appendices I and II for specific interview questions). I used a live video chat 
application (Skype or Zoom39) to conduct individual interviews because the selected 
interviewees live in different countries, such as Germany, Nepal, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and Switzerland. I conducted one video interview for each interviewee. 
Each video interview approximately took one hour. I also videotaped (or audiotaped) and 
transcribed the interviews to maintain the accuracy of the interview data. After the 
individual interviews, I conducted one or two follow-up interviews by using email and 
Google Forms and archived the follow-up interview data (See Appendices III and IV for 
specific follow-up interview questions). 
Secondary data. I collected secondary data from multiple sources including 
documentation, mainstream media coverage, and activity logs and the content on an 
online platform. First, documentation includes blog posts, situation reports, after-action 
evaluations, and other administrative records (over 500 documents in total). Also, I 
collected media coverage such as newspapers and magazines during the 2015 Nepal 
earthquake response (approximately 50 news articles). Lastly, I collected activity logs 
and the content from an online platform (QuakeMap) used for the Nepal earthquake 
response.  
Data Analysis  
                                                 
39 https://zoom.us/ 
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The hypothesis-testing process in this research is based on four general principles 
of the explanatory case study (Yin, 2003). The first principle is reliance on theoretical 
propositions or hypotheses. The explanatory case study aims to examine the causal 
relationships between constructs or variables of interest. In the explanatory case study, 
theoretical propositions or hypotheses guide the researcher “to focus attention on certain 
data [related to the propositions or hypotheses] and to ignore other data[,] [to select 
appropriate analytical methods,] and to define alternative explanations to be examined” 
(Yin, 2003, p. 112). Hence, I focused on constructs and the proposed relationships 
between constructs (i.e. hypotheses) developed from multiple case studies in the second 
chapter.  
The second principle is taking rival explanations into account. That is, the 
researcher “tries to define and test rival explanations” in the explanatory case study (Yin, 
2003, p. 112). In reality, human and organizational behavior and social phenomena occur 
in an extremely complex situations surrounded by various causes and effects. Thus, it is 
difficult to determine the causal relationships between constructs or variables of interest. 
Sometimes, although the researcher finds empirical evidence to support theoretical 
propositions (or hypotheses), there would be many moderators, mediators, or 
confounders that the researcher did not fully address. To deal with this issue, the 
researcher needs to take into consideration possible “other influences” (Yin, 2003). 
Typical examples of rival explanations include maturation, social trends, regression 
artifact, and selection bias (Bingham & Felbinger, 2002; Yin, 2003).  
The third principle is the use of both qualitative and quantitative data (Yin, 
2003). Although qualitative data is a primary source of evidence, the case of the Nepal 
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earthquake response offers a relatively large amount of quantitative data, particularly 
activity logs (e.g., how many reports were submitted from the ground? And how many 
reports were processed by participatory online groups and sent to first responders in the 
field to perform search-and-rescue operations?). Particularly, such quantitative data is 
useful to analyze the outcomes of emergency response activities. In this chapter, I 
conducted descriptive analysis of quantitative data. Results from the descriptive analysis 
of quantitative data was used to complement and support findings from qualitative data 
analysis. In other words, “smaller quantitative study helps evaluate and interpret results 
from a principally qualitative study” (Guest et al., 2012, p. 192).  
The forth principle is focusing on both “whether” questions and “how” and 
“why” questions. This explanatory case study does not just aim to examine whether 
constructs are (positively or negatively) related to each other, searching for qualitative 
and/or quantitative evidence to support or reject hypotheses. But, this study also aims to 
investigate how and why constructs are related to each other in which contexts. Indeed, 
the case study is appropriate for answering “how” and “why” research questions, 
providing detailed, in-depth explanations on a phenomenon of interest (Yin, 2003). 
Specific analytical approach. In this study, I use confirmatory or hypothesis-
driven thematic analysis as a specific analytical approach (Guest et al., 2012; Saldaña, 
2013). Unlike exploratory thematic analysis employed in the second chapter for 
hypothesis-building, confirmatory thematic analysis predetermines a specific coding 
scheme in which codes (or sub-codes) are directly developed from hypotheses (i.e. a 
deductive approach or top-down approach to data coding). Then, the researcher 
empirically assesses and confirms (or disconfirm) hypotheses, as coding and categorizing 
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actual data on the basis of the predetermined coding scheme. Thus, in this research, I first 
finalized the coding scheme for qualitative data analysis (See Table 3.1). After that, based 
on the coding scheme, I coded and categorized qualitative data from multiple sources 
(e.g., interviews, web documents, social media, mainstream media coverage, etc.) to 
examine whether hypotheses are confirmed or rejected and to assess how and why 
constructs are related (or unrelated) to each other. In this thematic analysis, I used a 
computer software program for qualitative analysis called MAXQDA. 
Furthermore, to support and complement qualitative analysis findings, I 
conducted descriptive analysis of quantitative data. A separate table was created to 
provide evidence to support or reject each hypothesis (See Table 3.2). 
Table 3.1 
Deductive Data Coding Scheme 
Domain Code Description 
Determinants of 
inter-organizational 
relationships  
Resource dependence 
Participatory online groups and 
formal organizations rely on other 
parties to create and deliver 
responding tasks and activities (e.g., 
financial, human, and information 
resources) 
Shared understanding of 
common problems 
A consensus between participatory 
online groups and formal 
organizations on crisis or disaster 
situations (i.e. the causes and 
impacts of crises or disasters and the 
current status and conditions of crisis 
or disasters) 
Shared understanding of 
strategies 
A consensus between participatory 
online groups and formal 
organizations on how to resolve 
crisis or disaster situations 
Adoption of technologies 
Information and communication 
technologies adopted by 
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participatory online groups and 
formal organizations to collaborate 
and communicate with each other 
Technical management 
capacity 
A capacity for converting, 
integrating, distributing crisis- or 
disaster-related information between 
participatory online groups and 
formal organizations 
Level of maturity 
in inter-
organizational 
relationships 
Intensity of interaction 
Rich, dynamic, and constant 
exchanges of information and 
resources between participatory 
online groups and formal 
organizations 
Outcomes 
Inter-organizational 
alignment 
Coordination of a wide range of 
responding tasks and activities (both 
onsite operations and offsite strategic 
decision-making and supports) 
between participatory online groups 
and formal organizations 
Effectiveness of 
emergency response 
Whether responding tasks and 
activities achieve final goals of 
emergency response, particularly 
saving lives and meeting human 
basic needs 
 
Analysis and Results 
Testing Hypothesis 1: Resource Dependence 
 In this research, I found mixed results on how resource dependence is associated 
with the development of inter-organizational relationships between participatory online 
groups and formal organizations in crisis or disaster situations. On one hand, resource 
dependence likely strengthens the development of collaborative relationships between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations. In the immediate aftermath of the 
Nepal earthquake, over 8,000 digital volunteer mappers of the Humanitarian 
OpenStreetMap Team (HOT) from both around the world and the affected areas 
collectively created and updated online base maps and offline mobile or printable maps 
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of post-earthquake Nepal within a few weeks. Because these maps were open source 
products, any individual or any organization was able to download and use these maps 
for free. Particularly, these post-earthquake maps were essential for formal organizations, 
such as international first responders on the ground, to perform their search-and-rescue 
operations and deliver relief resources. 
 
Figure 3.2. Screenshot of an offline mobile map created by HOT40  
A member of HOT stressed that “[m]any disasters response organizations rely on 
data generated by HOT volunteer mappers. This dependence often means we are in direct 
                                                 
40 Figure 3.2 is a cropped image of the entire screenshot at 
http://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/2015_Nepal_earthquake under Creative Commons Attribution-
ShareAlike 2.0 Generic license. 
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discussions with humanitarian response organizations who request our data.”41 According 
to another member of HOT, “[t]here was a high level of interaction [between HOT and 
formal response organizations]. I would even say [that the relationship was] ‘inter-
dependent’…. [For example,] [t]he Canadian [Armed] Forces [deployed to Nepal] needed 
maps. [The Armed Forces’] [s]taff printed those maps right on site at Kathmandu Living 
Labs using OSM datasets.”42 
Another evidence that resource dependence may improve interactions between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations comes from collaboration between 
the Kathmandu Living Labs (KLL) and Humanity Road (HR). The Kathmandu Living 
Labs (KLL) is a Nepal-based, nonprofit organization that is “dedicated to the co-creation 
and implementation of mobile and internet-based technology solutions to enhance urban 
resilience and…civic innovation” (Kathmandu Living Labs, n.d.). Particularly, as a 
pioneer of the crowdsourced, global OpenStreetMap movement in Nepal, the KLL 
attempts to use and promote citizen-engaged, open-source, collaborative mapping to 
solve various social and environmental problems that Nepalese people face. The KLL 
made an important contribution to the Nepal earthquake response. In the immediate 
aftermath of the earthquake, the KLL launched a disaster reporting system called 
QuakeMap. Dozens of volunteers from the affected areas and many international online 
volunteers who worked remotely joined and collaborated with the KLL to operate the 
reporting system. The affected people could submit their requests for rescue and aid 
through the reporting system via email, SMS, and social media, or phone. The KLL 
                                                 
41 Author’s interview with a member of HOT, Participant 6 
 
42 Author’s interview with a member of HOT, Participant 11 
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volunteers collected, verified, and mapped the reports from the ground. Thus, the KLL 
was transformed into a quite large group of volunteers during the Nepal earthquake 
response and served as a coordination hub for collating and processing disaster-related 
information on the ground. 
Humanity Road, a U.S. nonprofit organization under category 501(c)(3), is a 
formal response organization specialized in emergency communications and online 
emergency response and is an official partner for civilian and military communications 
exercises (e.g., the U.S. Pacific Command). Particularly, a main responding task and 
activity of Humanity Road is to publish timely situation reports and other related 
information. In the immediate aftermath of the Nepal earthquake, Humanity Road aimed 
to produce and share situation reports and disaster-related information with other 
responding organizations. For this purpose, Humanity Road needed information about 
disaster conditions, the current status of disaster response efforts, and the affected 
people’s requests for rescue and aid. On the other hand, during the Nepal earthquake 
response period, the KLL needed technical and operational support for the reporting 
system (QuakeMap) and human resources for overnight processing. In such conditions, 
the KLL and Humanity Road shared necessary resources with each other. The KLL 
provided real-time, verified disaster-related information from the ground to Humanity 
Road that worked remotely in the U.S., while Humanity Road offered “surge support for 
overnight processing…[,] support for incident process…[, and] operational advice and 
lessons learned from previous crisis mapping projects” (Humanity Road, 2015, p. 3). 
Indeed, such interdependence quickly created a high level of collaborative relationship. 
According to an emergency communications expert of Humanity Road, 
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Mutual dependence was…relevant with Kathmandu Living Labs, for their staff 
when we were at the coordination, at the hand-off point. Daily when they would 
come on for the morning, for having their breakfast, their morning coffee, we 
would brief them over what happened in the afternoon or the evening…. [O]ften 
there were a lot of questions that needed to be answered for us, for our team to 
continue the following evening, so we had a mutual dependence to be able to 
communicate in a timely fashion in a way that we can understand each other…. 
[M]utual dependence [between Humanity Road and the KLL] … spurred on the 
development on the relationship because it opened up channels of 
communication.43 
However, I note that there is critical evidence that resource dependence may not 
be a key determinant to develop interactions and relationships between participatory 
online groups and formal organizations. I found this evidence from relationships between 
the Standby Task Force (SBTF) and the U.N. Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). In the immediate aftermath of the Nepal earthquake, 
the Standby Task Force (SBTF), a global online group of volunteer crisis mappers, 
mobilized over 400 online volunteers from both across the globe and Nepal. Their 
responding tasks and activities were to collate, verify, and visualize disaster-related text 
and images from multiple sources (the news media and social media). Their tasks and 
activities created comprehensive ‘3W’ (Who does What Where)44 reports that included 
                                                 
43 Author’s interview with an emergency communications expert of Humanity Road, Participant 10 
 
44 3W reports provide information about “who is responding, where and what they plan to do” to help 
formal and informal responders coordinate their tasks and activities (SBTF, 2015, p. 3). 
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information about over 500 formal organizations and volunteer groups that responded to 
the Nepal earthquake. Also, SBTF searched for and geo-located disaster-related data 
regarding the specific locations of the affected areas and the urgent needs of the affected 
people. All the data fed to approximately 30 formal organizations including the U.N. 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the U.N. Development 
Program (UNDP), and the World Food Program (WFP).  
UNOCHA as the part of the U.N. Secretariat is responsible for mobilizing and 
coordinating formal organizations across the globe to effectively prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from crises and disasters. Specifically, in crisis or disaster situations, 
UNOCHA conducts disaster assessments by collecting and analyzing related information 
from multiple sources to improve situational awareness on crises and disasters. 
UNOCHA also manages an Emergency Response Roster and “carries out its coordination 
function primarily through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which includes 
UN agencies, NGOs and other humanitarian organizations” (UNOCHA, 2015b, p. 5). 
Importantly, over the past five years, UNOCHA and SBTF have developed and 
maintained collaborative relationships (i.e. there has been a high level of dynamic 
communications and interactions between UNOCHA and SBTF since the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake). Indeed, UNOCHA and SBTF worked together to respond to several crises 
and disasters, such as the 2011 Libya crisis and the 2013 Typhoon Hainan. During the 
Nepal earthquake response, UNOCHA and SBTF actively communicated and 
collaborated with each other to collect and analyze disaster-related data.  
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However, despite a relatively high level of interaction between UNOCHA and 
SBTF (i.e. a high level of inter-organizational relationship development), both UNOCHA 
and SBTF reported that they were not reliant on each other. 
According to a member of SBTF, “[w]e are totally dependent on our resources: 
Zero money, but heaps of information, connections and the ability to move between 
them….[SBTF works] with volunteers on the ground, ad hoc groups or civil society 
groups, and stuff like that. To be able to do what we do, we are not dependent on 
OCHA.”45 The interviewee also mentioned as follows: 
I'm not sure if they [(UNOCHA)] would ever say that they are dependent on the 
work that we do. They would never admit that. I don't think so. They would try 
to create the same kind of things as we do, situational awareness, 3W charts, 
who's doing what where. They would try to find this information and to create 
this information with the resources at hand. When there is an online community 
who can do this and who are experienced in doing this, that is very convenient. 
I'm actually uncertain if they would say that they are dependent on us. 
Furthermore, an information management officer of UNOCHA was of the same 
opinion as follows:  
The exchange was quite dynamic or high intensity [between UNOCHA and 
SBTF] around the given projects on which we were collaborating. However, I 
am not sure if that reflects a dependency or more of a reflection on the nature of 
work (remote, digital collection of online info, etc). Having said that, none of the 
                                                 
45 Author’s interview with a member of SBTF, Participant 1 
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projects were “dependent” on the work that the participatory groups were doing 
for us. Their work was viewed as a “augmentation” of what we were getting 
through traditional approaches.46 
 Finally, these mixed findings do not support that resource dependence leads to the 
development of inter-organizational relationships between participatory online groups 
and formal organizations. 
Testing Hypotheses 2 and 3: Shared Understanding 
Shared understanding of common problems (H2). The findings from this case 
study research indicate that when participatory online groups and formal organizations 
reach a shared understanding of crisis or disaster situations (particularly, the severity of 
impacts that a crisis or a disaster has), such shared understanding likely leads to the 
development of inter-organizational relationships between participatory online groups 
and formal organizations. The participants of this study emphasized that participatory 
online groups and formal organizations had a consensus on the severity of the Nepal 
earthquake (i.e. a large-scale catastrophic disaster). According to a volunteer coordinator 
of the Kathmandu Living Labs, “I don’t think we [(participatory online groups and 
formal organizations)] had a huge disjunct[ion] in sort of the severity of the crisis…. I 
think we had a somewhat shared understanding of what was going on, of what the 
situation was.”47 Also, an information management officer of UNOCHA reported that 
“there was a very good shared understanding of the common problems related to the 
                                                 
46 Author’s interview with an information management officer of UNOCHA, Participant 4 
 
47 Author’s interview with a volunteer coordinator of the Kathmandu Living Labs, Participant 2 
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emergency.”48 Importantly, the information management officer stressed that “that sort of 
shared understanding…improves the level of the relation[ship] [between participatory 
online groups and formal organizations].”49 Furthermore, a member of the Humanitarian 
OpenStreetMap Team was of the same opinion: “when we both agreed an event had a 
moderate to major impact, there was higher interaction [between participatory online 
groups and formal organizations].”50 According to another information management 
officer of UNOCHA, “In Nepal it was very easy. Everybody was mobilizing in the same 
direction [due to a shared understanding of disaster conditions]….[T]he more difficult 
areas are [crisis situations] where there..[are] differences…[in] shared understanding 
particularly relate[d] to warring conflict zones….It’s definitely those more ethical 
situations where there is limited understanding between formal organizations and online 
organizations.”51 These findings support that a shared understanding of crisis or disaster 
situations likely improves the interaction between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations. 
Shared understanding of strategies (H3). Participatory online groups and 
formal organizations have different strategies for dealing with a crisis or a disaster on the 
basis of their own expertise, experience and resources. In most cases, participatory online 
groups’ strategies are much less formalized and standardized (and flexible and agile) than 
those of formal organizations (Capelo et al., 2012). That participatory online groups and 
                                                 
48 Author’s interview with an information management officer of UNOCHA, Participant 4 
 
49 Author’s interview with an information management officer of UNOCHA, Participant 4 
 
50 Author’s interview with a member of HOT, Participant 6 
 
51 Author’s interview with an information management officer of UNOCHA, Participant 3 
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formal organizations have a shared understanding of strategies (i.e. how to address a 
crisis or a disaster) indicates that both actors understand what each other’s different 
strategies are, how useful and important each other’s strategies are, and how each other’s 
strategies can be incorporated to resolve the common problem (i.e. a crisis or a disaster).  
In this case study research, I found out that when participatory online groups and 
formal organizations have a higher level of a shared understanding of strategies for 
resolving crises or disasters, participatory online groups and formal organizations likely 
have a higher level of the development of inter-organizational relationships (i.e. more 
dynamic interactions). 
A volunteer coordinator of the Kathmandu Living Labs reported that during the 
Nepal earthquake response period, he recognized the existence of different strategies 
between their participatory online group and formal response organizations, but he tried 
to understand formal organizations’ strategies and performed their voluntary emergency 
response, taking formal organizations’ strategies into consideration.  
Because we [Nepalese volunteers at the Kathmandu Living Labs] had never 
been in a crisis before, there were certain things that we did not know about that 
were very important to these [formal response] organizations. So one thing's just 
simply how the [U.N.] Cluster system52 is organized... Before I got there, there 
were all of these categories in there, and I just organized the volunteers to 
                                                 
52 The U.N. clusters are a key element of the U.N. emergency management system to effectively coordinate 
a wider range of tasks and activities across the phases of emergency management including prevention, 
mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, and reconstruction. There are 11 clusters in the U.N. clusters: 
sanitation, water, and hygiene; education; early recovery, emergency telecommunication; food security; 
protection; health; camp management and coordination; emergency shelter; nutrition; and logistics. Each 
cluster is coordinated by cluster leads (U.N. agencies and international humanitarian organizations). For 
example, UNICEF is the cluster lead of sanitation, water and hygiene (UNOCHA, n.d.).  
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process information according to these categories…. I think the informal groups 
were focused on going as quickly as possible and they were more flexible, and 
the formal organizations had these standard procedures that they were going 
through that were important for what they were doing, but then took some more 
time than the informal organizations were really comfortable with [formal 
response organizations’ emergency response strategies and procedures].53 
A member of the Standby Task Force (SBTF) stressed that “[a shared] 
understanding [of strategies] is relatively well established between the formal responders 
and … [participatory online groups] like ours.”54 It is because “this joint understanding 
has been developed over many years, since [the] Haiti [earthquake]. For Standby Task 
Force part, on one side we have gained experience with how OCHA works, how the 
relief operations work with the different [U.N.] clusters, and how information is 
organized and grouped and all these things…. Also UNOCHA understands how Standby 
Task Force operates.”55 Regarding the Nepal earthquake response, the interviewee 
mentioned that “[d]ifferent strategies were visible during the Nepal earthquake response. 
High-profile, expensive international teams came with their rescue strategies, and local 
community groups, cheap, agile and with high local knowledge became visible and 
interacted in the online space. A shared understanding of the different strategies in play is 
essential for the intensity of the interaction.”56 
                                                 
53 Author’s interview with a volunteer coordinator of the Kathmandu Living Labs, Participant 2 
 
54 Author’s interview with a member of the Standby Task Force, Participant 1 
 
55 Author’s interview with a member of the Standby Task Force, Participant 1 
 
56 Author’s interview with a member of the Standby Task Force, Participant 1 
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Furthermore, it is crucial for participatory online groups and formal organizations 
to have a shared understanding of not only what each other’s emergency response 
strategies are, but also how useful and important these strategies are to each other. Such 
shared understanding is an important factor to develop relationships between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations. According to a volunteer mapper of 
the OpenStreetMap Team (HOT), 
I think as well as people like OCHA and the Red Crosses and MSF57 and World 
Food Program and anybody who's in the OCHA logistics cluster, I think we all 
have a very good shared understanding of how important the data [created by the 
HOT volunteer mappers] is. I think that shared understanding is there. Like I 
said, that's leading to us further maturing, further developing our…relationships 
[with formal organizations] so that…they recognize how important what we do 
is.58 
An information management officer of UNOCHA also agreed that a shared 
understanding of strategies is an important factor to determine the development of 
relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations. Particularly, 
regarding a relationship with the Kathmandu Living Labs (KLL), she reported that in the 
immediate aftermath of the Nepal earthquake, UNOCHA and related stakeholders 
recognized KLL’s emergency response strategies based on their expertise on a 
geographic information system (GIS) and “knew how to work with them, and how to 
                                                 
57 Médecins Sans Frontières (or Doctors Without Borders) is “an international, independent, medical 
humanitarian organization that delivers emergency aid to people affected by armed conflict, epidemics, 
natural disasters and exclusion from healthcare” (MSF, n.d.).  
 
58 Author’s interview with a member of the HOT, Participant 7 
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better support their work because…we [(i.e. UNOCHA and related stakeholders)] were 
all leveraging the same tool, we were all using the HOT tasking platform59….Kathmandu 
Living Labs is a brand new organization to us. We’ve never worked in Nepal before, 
however because of that shared knowledge and that shared understanding, …we were 
able to form partnerships relatively fast, and help them quickly”.60 Thus, these findings 
support that a shared understanding of strategies likely enhances the development of 
inter-organizational relationships between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations. 
Testing Hypotheses 4 and 5: Information Technology 
Information technology adoption (H4). In crisis or disaster situations, 
participatory online groups and formal organizations adopt a variety of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) (i.e. hardware devices, online platforms, and 
software applications). ICTs refer to “a diverse set of technological tools…used to 
communicate and to create, disseminate, store, and manage information” (Blurton, 1999, 
p. 46). I note that during the Nepal earthquake response, participatory online groups and 
formal organizations adopted and used Skype, Google Docs, the Humanitarian Data 
Exchange (open data sharing platform), and geographic information system (GIS) 
mapping tools. The adoption of such applications and tools facilitated dynamic 
interactions between participatory online groups and formal organizations. Particularly, 
an information management officer of UNOCHA stressed that “there was not a major 
difference in technologies used or understood [during the Nepal earthquake response]. 
                                                 
59 HOT Tasking Manager (http://tasks.hotosm.org/) is an open source collaborative mapping tool. 
 
60 Author’s interview with an information management officer, Participant 3 
122 
 
This made collaboration much easier for both sides [(i.e. participatory online groups and 
formal organizations)]”.61 
Most participants in this study emphasized the importance of Skype that allowed 
participatory online groups and formal organizations to effectively communicate and 
collaborate with each other in response to the Nepal earthquake. According to a GIS 
analyst of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “Skype groups for 
the aid were a very active form of communication technology that was used to coordinate 
between formal and informal members of the participants in the response. That was the 
primary one that I…used [during the Nepal earthquake response].”62 A volunteer member 
of the Standby Task Force (SBTF) reported that “[d]uring [the] Nepal [earthquake 
response], it was still Skype that was the major communication tool. We were running, as 
I said, maybe twenty different chat rooms in Skype to collaborate with various groups of 
people.”63 Furthermore, the volunteer member stressed that “[r]esponders who are not 
used to online chats or webinars are losing the ability to gain …shared information and 
interaction with the [participatory] online community at all. We [(SBTF)] have noticed 
that those who are able to talk, ask questions or share information in such channels are 
getting into intense interactions with valuable partners [(participatory online groups and 
formal responders)]64. 
                                                 
61 Author’s interview with an information management officer of UNOCHA, Participant 4 
 
62 Author’s interview with a GIS analyst of USAID, Participant 12 
 
63 Author’s interview with a member of SBTF, Participant 1 
 
64 Author’s interview with a member of SBTF, Participant 1 
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 Open collaboration tools (particularly, Google Docs) are another important means 
to facilitate interactions between participatory online groups and formal organizations in 
crisis or disaster situations. Google Docs enabled participatory online groups and formal 
organizations to easily share disaster-related data in real-time. According to a social 
media expert of Humanity Road, “Google Docs is one of the single most impactful 
software that can create multi-functional, cross-functional teams into one unity quickly”65 
Also, according to a member of SBTF, “Google Docs and Google Sheets have become 
very central parts of what we do. Everybody knows how to enter a Google Sheet, and 
enter information into that format.”66 
Most importantly, participatory online groups and formal organizations sought to 
adopt communication and collaboration tools that they could leverage in crisis or disaster 
situations with low bandwidth and a power blackout. 
[W]e were interested in the minimum, like what are the minimum technologies 
that we can leverage in the field as to effectively share the information we need. 
These minimum technologies tend to be Skype; they tend to be Google sheets 
and Google documents. We have people conversing and both working on the 
same reports. For us it’s really important to figure out like what is the base like 
what is the minimum thing we can use, especially some things as simple as 
Google documents and Google sheets enable offline editing. That’s super 
important, when you lose power or when you lose internet access.67 
                                                 
65 Author’s interview with a social media expert of Humanity Road, Participant 10 
 
66 Author’s interview with a member of SBTF, Participant 1 
 
67 Author’s interview with an information management officer of UNOCHA, Participant 3 
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 Furthermore, recent advances in information technology enabled more actors 
(individuals and organizations) to engage in the creation of crisis- or disaster-related data. 
But these actors often times created the data by using different data formats and 
standards. Moreover, there was a lack of awareness among these actors on the existence 
of the data created by other actors. Such different data formats and standards and lack of 
awareness hindered the sharing of data and the coordination of multiple actors’ response 
efforts in many cases. To address these issues, UNOCHA launched an open platform for 
sharing data called the Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX)68 in July 2014 and requested 
participatory online groups and formal organizations to upload disaster-related data to the 
platform to facilitate data sharing in the immediate aftermath of the Nepal earthquake. As 
a consequence, many participatory online groups (SBTF, HOT, and Himalayan Disaster 
Relief Volunteer Group) and formal organizations (the World Food Program, OCHA 
Nepal, and the U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency) quickly adopted the open 
data platform as a data sharing means and began to upload a wide range of data including 
casualties and damage, geospatial map data, the locations of earthquake-induced 
landslide, health infrastructure, and the locations of refugee camps, and the status of relief 
efforts. All the data was used for disaster assessments, the coordination of onsite response 
operations, and strategic decision-making to effectively address the Nepal earthquake. 
Thus, the adoption of the HDX led to the data sharing between participatory online 
groups and formal organizations. Particularly, regarding participatory online groups’ 
adoption of the HDX, an information management officer of UNOCHA reported that 
                                                 
68 https://data.humdata.org/ 
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“[T]hey were really open towards integrating this new products and tools…. We’re 
leveraging technology in the tech tools that we have available to us at that moment…. 
[I]t’s really nice to have partners who are able to move so fast in their ability to adopt and 
maneuver and collect and try new things.”69 
 In addition, I found out that when participatory online groups and formal 
organizations adopt the same GIS mapping tools and software, such technology adoption 
improved the interaction between participatory online groups and formal organizations. 
According to a member of the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT),  
HOT…produce[s] map data and provide[s] our technology platform like the 
Tasking Manager or the OpenStreetMap Export Tool, those things we provide 
free of charge to other organizations so the more an organization leverages those 
tools and that data, the relationship between us and that organization would 
become more mature just because they often have to come to us for questions, 
for support, and it means that we're communicating more and we're talking more 
[with that organization].70 
Thus, these findings from the Nepal case study support that when participatory 
online groups and formal organizations adopt same information and communication 
technologies, such adoptions of technologies likely lead to more dynamic interactions 
between participatory online groups and formal organizations. 
Technical management capacity (H5). A technical management capacity is 
defined as data management skills for converting, integrating, and distributing crisis- or 
                                                 
69 Author’s interview with an information management officer of UNOCHA, Participant 3 
 
70 Author’s interview with a member of the HOT, Participant 6 
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disaster-related information in a timely manner. Due to a lack of data standards, on one 
hand, participatory online groups and formal organizations as data users are often times 
required to process data from other online groups and formal organizations by converting 
it from one format to another and then integrating the converted data into their own 
datasets. On the other hand, participatory online groups and formal organizations as data 
producers need to create and publish final data products that other online groups and 
formal organizations can easily convert and integrate for their own purposes. The 
participants of this study agreed that such technical capacity is a key factor to improve 
relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations.  
 In this research, I found important evidence from the Humanitarian 
OpenStreetMap Team and the Kathmandu Living Labs. For the Humanitarian 
OpenStreetMap Team (HOT), when the Nepal earthquake occurred, digital satellite 
imagery providers—including Airbus Defense and Space71, DigitalGlobe72, Google Crisis 
Response73, and Microsoft Bing74—donated the post-event satellite imagery of the 
affected regions to the HOT. After receiving the imagery, the HOT volunteers first began 
to process the imagery by removing duplicates and the clouds and dividing it into little 
squares, and then the post-event imagery was integrated into a collaborative mapping 
platform called HOT Tasking Manager75 that crowdsourced mapping projects to 
                                                 
71 https://airbusdefenceandspace.com/newsroom/news-and-features/kathmandu-viewed-by-pleiades-
satellites-before-and-after-the-earthquake/ 
 
72 https://twitter.com/DigitalGlobe/status/592690978210873347 
 
73 http://www.google.org/crisismap/2015-nepal-earthquake 
 
74 https://giovand.cartodb.com/viz/26477a94-eb6b-11e4-afd0-0e853d047bba/public_map 
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volunteer mappers across the globe. I note that the HOT volunteers (particularly, 
members of an imagery coordination group) had the capacity to process, convert, and 
integrate geospatial data (i.e. satellite imagery) from multiple sources during the Nepal 
earthquake response.  
Furthermore, the HOT volunteers had a capacity to collectively produce and 
publish online and offline maps of various formats including an open-source 
OpenStreetMap format, a shapefile format for proprietary GIS software, and offline 
navigation formats for Android and iOS devices (HOT, 2015). Even the HOT offered 
printable maps of the affected areas in various sizes. According to a member of the HOT, 
Whatever GIS software they [(i.e. other participatory online groups or formal 
organizations)] are using, if they are proprietary solutions like Esri, ArcGIS, 
they can get data in ArcGIS shapefile formats. They can [get] data in formats 
that will work with OpenStreetMap editors, with free and open source GIS 
software and like UGIS, so we try to produce tools that let people get the 
information in a way that is useful to them. Everyone wants a different format, 
everyone needs something different, but we try to at least provide tools that 
allow them to get the data and use it in a way that is useful for their 
organization.76 
The capacity of the HOT to produce a variety of online, offline, printable maps 
enabled formal organizations (particularly, first responders on the ground) to easily 
export and use these various maps for their emergency response purposes and led to 
                                                 
75 http://tasks.hotosm.org/  
 
76 Author’s interview with a member of the HOT, Participant 6 
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dynamic interactions and communications between the HOT and formal organizations 
during the Nepal earthquake response. A GIS analyst of USAID who used online maps of 
the HOT during the Nepal earthquake response reported: 
[F]or OpenStreetMap now it is pretty easy to get data off OpenStreetMap and 
convert it to…a shape file or something I could bring into ArcGIS to make a 
map…. I think technical fluency…. I think having integral capacity…very much 
helps to increase the ties between the [formal] organization and participatory 
online map [communities]…. The more technical capacity there is at an 
organization, I think the easier it is to form those relationships.77 
Another evidence that a technical management capacity improves interactions 
between participatory online groups and formal organizations comes from the 
Kathmandu Living Labs (KLL). Soon after the Nepal earthquake occurred, the KLL 
volunteers in the field started collecting, verifying, geocoding, and visualizing reports 
from the ground regarding disaster conditions, the affected people’s needs and requests 
for rescue and aid, and the status of relief efforts. Just like the HOT volunteers did, the 
KLL volunteers had a technical management capacity to convert, integrate, and distribute 
these reports in a timely manner. Specifically, the KLL volunteers initially planned to 
geocode the reports from the ground by using GPS coordinates. However, they 
recognized that formal organizations (particularly, the U.N. agencies and international aid 
organizations) were using a p-code system created by UNOCHA, UNHCR78, and the 
                                                 
77 Author’s interview with a GIS analyst of USAID, Participant 12 
 
78 The U.N. Refugee Agency (http://www.unhcr.org/en-us) 
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International Center for Remote Sensing Education79. P-codes (or Place-codes) are 
“unique geographic (geo) identification codes, represented by combination of letters 
and/or numbers to identify a specific location or feature on a map” on the basis of the 
levels of administrative boundaries (UNOCHA, 2011, p. 5). After recognizing this fact, 
the KLL developers quickly created a way to filter the reports by the administrative 
boundaries of Nepal (i.e. districts and municipalities). Such filtering solution was helpful 
for formal response organizations to more easily and efficiently use and integrate 
disaster-related information processed by the KLL volunteers into their information 
management systems based on the p-codes.  
Further, the KLL volunteers developed an export reports feature. By using this 
feature, formal response organizations could download a list of the reports in an Excel 
CSV format (comma-delimited text file). This feature allowed the Nepal Army (a key 
formal response organization during the Nepal earthquake response) to efficiently assess 
the status of requests for rescue or aid and coordinate their operations. According to a 
volunteer coordinator of the KLL, “I think a very important component was the export 
reports feature, we added that [to QuakeMap]. So that's how we got all of our reports 
over to the [Nepal] army…. What they did is they took full export on a periodic basis, 
then filtered it according to their own criteria.”80 In this regard, the KLL volunteers also 
developed the print reports feature for responders on the ground to easily print out a list 
of the reports. The volunteer coordinator stressed that “[by using] … the print reports 
                                                 
79 A US-based not-for-profit corporation (http://www.icrsed.org/) 
 
80 Author’s interview with a volunteer coordinator of the KLL, Participant 2 
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feature… they [(i.e. responders on the ground)] could very easily get a list of...contacts in 
a certain location. So they could go there, they'd have a list of who needed what, or who'd 
report that they needed something in a given…district and they'd have numbers to call. 
That was how we were trying to interact with both informal and formal responders.”81  
Lastly, the KLL offered the emergency alert system. If a report related to 
earthquake damages and relief needs was submitted to the KLL within a radius of 20 
kilometers (approximately 12.4 miles) of a specific location that an alert subscriber 
selected, emergency alerts were sent to the subscriber via mobile phone or email. At that 
time, approximately 500 formal organizations or individuals affected by the earthquake 
subscribed to the alert system to receive timely disaster information82. Therefore, such 
technical management capacity of the KLL improved interactions with formal 
organizations by sharing disaster-related information with these organizations in real-
time. Therefore, these findings from the Nepal earthquake response support that a 
technical management capacity is a key factor to improve the interaction between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations.  
Testing Hypothesis 6: Inter-organizational Alignment (Coordination) 
 I hypothesized that the level of inter-organizational relationship development (i.e. 
intensity of interaction) between participatory online groups and formal organizations 
influences inter-organizational alignment in responding tasks and activities. Inter-
organizational alignment is defined as the coordination of responding efforts between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations (Kathuria et al., 2007). The findings 
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82 Author’s interview with a volunteer coordinator of the KLL, Participant 2 
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from the Nepal case study provide empirical evidence that when participatory online 
groups and formal organizations have more dynamic interactions with each other 
(particularly, timely communications and the sharing of disaster-related data), a wide 
range of responding tasks and activities that participatory online groups and formal 
organizations perform are more efficiently coordinated by avoiding duplication of efforts. 
 Soon after the Nepal earthquake occurred, a quite large network of participatory 
online groups and formal organizations was formed and these online groups and formal 
organizations quickly developed their inter-organizational relationships, thereby 
improving the coordination of responding efforts. There were rich, dynamic 
communications between these online groups and formal organizations on Skype or 
online platforms. A variety of information and resources were mobilized and shared by 
these online groups and formal organizations. Specifically, the Qatar Computing 
Research Institute (QCRI), a nonprofit computing research institute based in Doha, Qatar, 
developed the Artificial Intelligence for Disaster Response (AIDR) that automatically 
identifies and collects life-saving and actionable content on Twitter (Meier, 2013). In the 
immediate aftermath of the Nepal earthquake, the QCRI allowed the Standby Task Force 
(SBTF) to get access to the AIDR for free. By using this artificial intelligence tool, the 
SBTF was able to quickly filter informative content on Twitter (e.g., “Pray for Nepal” 
messages)83. Moreover, the GDELT Project, which “monitors the world’s news 
media…in print, broadcast, and web formats,” gave the SBTF a aggregated feed from 
news media regarding the Nepal earthquake (The GDELT Project, n.d.).  
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Based on such a large amount of disaster-related information provided by the 
QCRI and the GDELT Project, over 400 online volunteers of the SBTF performed their 
collective response to the Nepal earthquake. Specifically, these volunteers created 
comprehensive 3W reports (i.e. which organizations were doing what and where?) 
regarding the current status of responding efforts and such data fed to approximately 30 
formal organizations that responded to the earthquake—including UNOCHA, the U.N. 
refugee agency (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), Amnesty International, and 
Mercy Corps. The SBTF also created a Google Sheet collecting urgent needs of 
individuals affected by the earthquake and shared this Google Sheet with the Kathmandu 
Living Labs (KLL) on the ground. Importantly, the U.N. Volunteer (UNV) Program, 
which mobilizes online volunteers across the globe and matches the volunteers to 
nonprofit or public organizations that need the volunteers, helped the SBTF mobilize 14 
“volunteers with knowledge of Nepal, the local languages and…GIS expertise.”84 These 
volunteers aided the SBTF in conducting social media analysis and geocoding disaster-
related data on the digital maps (UNV, 2015).  
 Furthermore, many for-profit corporations—including Airbus Defense and Space, 
Microsoft Bing, Google Crisis Response, DigitalGlobe, and Mapbox—donated the 
satellite imagery of post-earthquake Nepal. Based on the imagery, over 8,000 online 
volunteer mappers of the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT) from both around 
the world and Nepal collectively created digital base maps, offline navigation maps, and 
paper maps of post-earthquake Nepal within a few weeks. During the Nepal earthquake 
                                                 
84 Author’s interview with an officer of the UNV Program, Participant 13 
133 
 
response, these maps were used by international formal responders (the American Red 
Cross, Canadian Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), UNOCHA, and USAID), 
the Nepalese Army (a main responding organization of the Nepalese Government), and 
other participatory online groups (the SBTF and the KLL). In addition to creating post-
disaster base maps, the HOT conducted the rapid identification of settlements in the 
mountainous areas, internally displaced people (IDP) camps, and landslide areas85. These 
tasks were essential for disaster assessment and the allocation and delivery of relief 
resources. Such information was shared with the Kathmandu Living Labs in a timely 
manner that worked with the Nepalese Army, Nepalese volunteer groups, and 
international responders on the ground. 
 Most importantly, the Kathmandu Living Labs (KLL) acted as a local 
coordination hub during the Nepal earthquake response. All the disaster-related 
information processed by other participatory online groups such as the SBTF and the 
HOT was integrated into the disaster data management system of the KLL (i.e. 
QuakeMap) that collated, verified, geocoded, and visualized the reports from the ground 
including the affected people’s needs and requests, earthquake conditions, and the relief 
efforts of formal and informal responders. Such data was directly shared with both formal 
responders (particularly, the Nepalese Army and Canadian Disaster Assistance Response 
Team) that conducted search-and-rescue operations and delivered relief services and 
informal, volunteer-based responders (Himalayan Disaster Relief Volunteer Group) that 
emerged spontaneously in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. By using real-time 
                                                 
85 Author’s interview with a member of the HOT, Participant 7 
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disaster information produced by the KLL, these formal and informal responders 
effectively coordinated a wide range of responding tasks and activities. However, 
according to a volunteer coordinator of the KLL, there were many other international first 
responders such as the U.N. Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) and the 
U.S. Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) that did not have interactions with the 
KLL during the Nepal earthquake response, although these formal responders might use 
the disaster data created by the KLL due to its openness.86 In such cases, the KLL and 
these responders did not coordinate their responding tasks and activities because of a lack 
of the development of the inter-organizational relationships. 
As stated above, there was a quite large network consisting of many participatory 
online groups and formal organizations during the Nepal earthquake response. These 
online groups and formal organizations dynamically communicated and interacted with 
one another and aided one another in assessing disaster situations and producing and 
delivering diverse responding services. As a consequence, the effective coordination of 
responding efforts was achieved in the network of participatory online groups and formal 
organizations. 
Testing Hypothesis 7: The Effectiveness of Inter-Organizational Alignment 
 I hypothesized that inter-organizational alignment between participatory online 
groups and formal organizations in emergency response likely improves the effectiveness 
of emergency response. Particularly, I define (and measure) the effectiveness of 
coordinated emergency response between participatory online groups and formal 
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organizations as the extent to which the coordinated emergency response has an impact 
on saving lives and meeting human basic needs (e.g., water, foods, shelters, and 
emergency medical services).  
The findings from this Nepal case study may not provide enough empirical 
evidence to support the hypothesis that inter-organizational alignment increases the 
effectiveness of emergency response. On one hand, a few participants of this study 
stressed that the coordinated efforts between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations had a positive impact on the effectiveness of emergency response during 
the Nepal earthquake response. A volunteer coordinator of the Kathmandu Living Labs 
reported that “within…first 72 hours people were able to just go to OpenStreetMap and 
get it…. I’m sure, … the DART team was using that [map] a lot…. The early responders, 
the ones that are rescuing people out of trapped buildings.”87 Moreover, a GIS specialist 
of the Canadian Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) who participated in the 
Nepal earthquake response emphasized that “if they [(participatory online groups and 
formal responders)] are connected together and they work together. Then there is a better 
outcome”.88  
 However, other participants of this study reported that indeed it is extremely 
difficult to evaluate the relationship between inter-organizational alignment and the 
effectiveness of coordinated emergency response. Specifically, to determine such 
relationship, it is needed to examine how information-related products created by 
participatory online groups such as a Google Sheet of real-time disaster reports and the 
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digital base maps of post-disaster areas are used by formal organizations to conduct their 
responding tasks and activities including search-and-rescue missions and the delivery of 
relief resources and ultimately how these information-related products contribute to 
saving the lives of disaster-affected people and meeting their basic needs. In this regard, a 
member of the Standby Task Force (SBTF) noted that there is “little systematic 
knowledge of the influence of our efforts apart from individual statements or anecdotes 
from the field.”89 According to another member of the SBTF, 
We provide the [disaster] data to the decision makers of the [formal] response 
organizations. They choose how to respond. We struggle to get feedback from 
these organizations to determine how our data was used or how much it 
influenced their response…. [W]e do not have the specific numbers that says, we 
helped this amount of people because we are not the ones who are directly 
helping them. What our purpose is…to provide situation awareness to the 
decision makers of those organizations that are traveling to the site and are going 
to be helping a certain amount of people.90  
 An information management officer of UNOCHA also agreed that there is a lack 
of evidence on the relationship between inter-organizational alignment and its 
effectiveness.  
Maybe it isn't easily measurable, like to say yes because you got me extra things 
on Twitter, we saved 10,000 more people. I cannot say that. If we say that we 
saved 10,000 people, maybe that's partly a result of the extra data, the extra 
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effort that these [participatory online] groups provided or because they had more 
time, more effort, more data, better picture, we were better able to target our 
response and thus produce stuff…, save lives, these kinds of things…. It's 
difficult to then say yes with 100% certainty that [such extra efforts of 
participatory online groups] impacted the outcome of the emergency…. We 
believe so, but there's no sort of direct correlation that you can say, right.91 
To find further evidence, I analyzed reports submitted from the ground to 
QuakeMap of the Kathmandu Living Labs (KLL). QuakeMap consisting of over 2,000 
archived reports offers detailed information on disaster-affected people’s specific needs 
(e.g., food, medical assistance, rescue, shelter, or transportation), the verification status of 
the reports, and responding efforts for meeting these needs. As stated earlier, the disaster-
related information created by several participatory online groups across the globe was 
aggregated into QuakeMap and the aggregated information was shared with many formal 
organizations such as the Canadian DART, the Nepalese Army, the Nepalese government 
agencies and UNOCHA. Therefore, the content on QuakeMap is a good source to 
examine whether and how coordinated efforts between participatory online groups and 
formal organizations improved the effectiveness of emergency response.  
Particularly, I focused on approximately 200 reports categorized by the KLL 
volunteers as ‘action taken’ which means that all needs of the affected people were fully 
met. Among these 200 reports, approximately 20 reports indicate that formal 
organizations offered relief resources to disaster-affected people: 
                                                 
91 Author’s interview with an information management officer of UNOCHA, Participant 4 
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Nepal government has reached the area and given sufficient number of tents.92  
UNICEF provided a jar, water purifier and a tent to each household.93 
The wounded were air-lifted by Nepal Army.94 
Govt provided 200x30 kg of rice, 30 sacks of potato and other items.95 
The Nepalese army is providing assistance in removing the [dead] bodies.96 
[G]overnment has recently provided them an amount of 15000 for each family to 
buy zinc sheets and they are on the way to make temporary houses.97 
 Since QuakeMap was one of key sources of disaster-related information for the 
Nepalese Army, the Nepal government agencies, and some international formal 
responders in the aftermath of the Nepal earthquake, these formal organizations might 
use the information on QuakeMap (i.e. urgent requests for rescue and aid) to perform 
their response operations, thereby meeting the affected people’s needs in a timely 
manner. However, I note that the content on QuakeMap does not provide specific 
information regarding whether and how the content was used by formal organizations. As 
the participants of this study mentioned above, it seems that the findings from this Nepal 
case study do not provide enough evidence that inter-organizational alignment likely 
improves the effectiveness of emergency response. 
                                                 
92 http://quakemap.org/reports/view/1982 
 
93 http://quakemap.org/reports/view/1902 
 
94 http://quakemap.org/reports/view/1868 
 
95 http://quakemap.org/reports/view/1118 
 
96 http://quakemap.org/reports/view/218 
 
97 http://quakemap.org/reports/view/2309 
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Table 3.2 
Results from Hypothesis Tests and Related Evidence 
Hypothesis Result Evidence 
H1: Resource 
dependence 
Not 
supported 
Evidence that supports the hypothesis 
- The relationship between the Humanitarian  
OpenStreetMap Team (HOT) and first  
responders (interview data from participants 6  
and 11 and related secondary data) 
- The relationship between the Kathmandu  
Living Labs (KLL) and Humanity Road (HR)  
(interview data from participant 10 and related  
secondary data) 
Evidence that does not support the hypothesis 
- The relationship between the Standby Task  
Force (SBTF) and UNOCHA (interview data  
from participants 1 and 4) 
H2: Shared 
understanding of 
common problems 
Supported - Interview data from participants 2, 3, 4, and 6 
H3: Shared 
understanding of 
strategies 
Supported 
- The relationship between KLL and the U.N.  
cluster system (interview data from participant 
2) 
- The relationship between SBTF and UNOCHA 
(interview data from participant 1 and related  
secondary data) 
- The relationship between HOT and formal  
organizations (interview data from participant 
7) 
- The relationship between KLL and UNOCHA  
(interview data from participant 3) 
H4: Adoption of 
technologies 
Supported 
- Skype (interview data from participants 1, 3, 12 
and 14) 
- Google Docs (interview data from participants 
1, 3, and 10) 
- Humanitarian Data Exchange (interview data  
from participant 3 and related secondary data) 
- GIS mapping tools (interview data from  
participant 6) 
H5: Technical 
management 
capacity 
Supported 
- The capacity of HOT (interview data from  
participants 6 and 12 and related secondary data) 
- The capacity of KLL (interview data from  
participant 2 and related secondary data) 
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H6: Inter-
organizational 
alignment 
Supported 
- Coordinated response efforts in a network of  
participatory online groups and formal  
organizations (interview data from participants 
1, 2, 7 and 13 and related secondary data) 
H7: Effectiveness 
of coordinated 
emergency 
response 
Not 
supported 
Evidence that supports the hypothesis 
- Interview data from participants 2 and 8 
Insufficient evidence that supports the hypothesis 
- Interview data from participants 1, 4, and 9 
- The content on QuakeMap 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I empirically tested seven hypotheses developed in the second 
chapter by using the 2015 Nepal earthquake case. Importantly, based on the inter-
organizational relations (IOR) theory, I modified the hypotheses developed in the second 
chapter to consider the developmental phases of relationship between participatory online 
groups and formal organizations (formation, expansion and maturity, and decline and 
dissolution). To test these modified hypotheses, I employed the explanatory case study 
method. Specifically, I collected qualitative and quantitative data from individual 
interviews and multiple secondary sources. I used confirmatory or hypothesis-driven 
thematic analysis as a primary data analysis technique. As a result, I found empirical 
evidence that supports the hypotheses that shared understanding and information 
technology influence the level of inter-organizational relationship development, 
respectively. I also found out a positive relationship between the level of the relationship 
development and inter-organizational alignment from the Nepal earthquake case. 
However, for resource dependence as a determinant of relationships between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations, there were mixed results. In other 
words, there are inconsistencies in the Nepal case where some evidence supports the 
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hypothesis that resource dependence improves inter-organizational relationships, while 
other evidence does not support this hypothesis. As a result, this hypothesis was not 
supported in this study. Lastly, regarding the relationship between inter-organizational 
alignment and its outcomes (saving lives and meeting basic human needs), I was unable 
to find sufficient qualitative and quantitative evidence to support the relationship. Thus, 
this hypothesis was also not supported. In conclusion, the Nepal case study provides 
empirical evidence to support five hypotheses except two hypotheses regarding resource 
dependence and the effectiveness of coordinated emergency response. 
 I recognize the limitations of this study. This study relied primarily on qualitative 
data. Such qualitative data provided detailed, rich descriptions and explanations regarding 
the determinants and outcomes of the development of the relationship. Indeed, such 
descriptions and explanations are essential to deepen the understanding of a complex 
phenomenon related to the development of the relationship in crisis or disaster situations. 
However, qualitative research (particularly, the explanatory case study method employed 
for this study) would be unable to objectively verify whether and how the variables of 
interest are associated with each other as quantitative research would do. Another 
limitation pertains to generalizability. The findings from this study that focused on the 
Nepal earthquake case (i.e. a large-scale natural disaster in an undeveloped country in 
Asia) may not be generalizable to other crisis or disaster contexts (e.g., man-made crises 
such as terrorism in a developed country in Europe). 
 Despite such limitations, this study is expected to contribute to the literature (both 
emergency management and crisis informatics) by offering empirical findings regarding 
the determinants and outcomes of the development of the relationship between 
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participatory online groups and formal organizations. Such findings may be useful to 
deepen and extend the understanding of a mechanism in which resource dependence, 
shared understanding, and information technology determine the development of the 
relationship that influences inter-organizational alignment and the effectiveness of 
coordinated response efforts between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations.  
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CHAPTER 4 
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In the dissertation, I focused on a new social phenomenon in the digital era. It is 
the emergence and contribution of participatory online groups in crisis or disaster 
situations. Indeed, advances in information and communication technologies enabled 
individuals from both across the globe and the affected areas to work together and make a 
meaningful contribution to the effective emergency response in recent crises or disasters. 
Such emergence and contribution of participatory online groups require both scholars and 
practitioners to have a new lens to understand emergency response in the networked age, 
because current emergency response systems are much more complex and dynamic than 
the existing emergency management literature and disaster policies have understood. 
Therefore, in the first chapter of this dissertation, I developed a new conceptual 
framework called an event-driven lens on the basis of a comprehensive literature review. 
The event-driven lens integrates formal emergency response based on 
institutionalized formal organizations across the levels of government and the sectors and 
their established procedures and regulations and volunteer-based, participatory 
emergency response that amateurs and concerned publics perform by using information 
and communication technologies. Moreover, the event-driven lens takes into account the 
relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations in crisis or 
disaster situations. The event-driven lens ultimately suggests five propositions that help 
scholars and practitioners explain and understand emergency response systems in the 
digital era.  
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 In the second chapter of this dissertation, I focused on one aspect of the event-
driven lens. It is the formation of relationships between participatory online groups and 
formal organizations. More specifically, I aimed to explore key determinants to influence 
the formation of relationships between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations. I also intended to investigated the outcomes of forming relationships 
between participatory online groups and formal organizations. For these purposes, I 
employed the exploratory case study method and conducted four case studies including 
the 2007-2008 Kenya post-election violence, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the 2010 
Indonesia volcanic eruption, and the 2011 Japan earthquake and nuclear crisis. These four 
case studies resulted in the development of seven hypotheses on the three key 
determinants to form relationships between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations (i.e. resource dependence, shared understanding, and information 
technology) and two outcomes of forming the relationships in crisis or disaster situations 
(inter-organizational alignment and the effectiveness of coordinated emergency 
response).  
 Then in the third chapter of this dissertation, I aimed to empirically tested seven 
hypotheses developed in the second chapter of this dissertation regarding the 
determinants and outcomes of the development of relationships between participatory 
online groups and formal organizations in crisis or disaster situations. To test these 
hypotheses, I employed the explanatory case study method, focusing on the Nepal 
earthquake case. Findings from this study support that the development of the 
relationship between participatory online groups and formal organizations is likely to be 
influenced by a shared understanding of crisis or disaster situations and of how to 
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respond to these situations, the adoption of information technology, and technical 
management capacities for converting, integrating, and distributing crisis or disaster data. 
Moreover, I found empirical evidence that supports that the development of the 
relationship likely improves inter-organizational alignment in various responding tasks 
and activities that participatory online groups and formal organizations perform. 
 This dissertation has several limitations. The limitations pertain to research 
methods. This dissertation employed the case study method that relies primarily on 
qualitative data analysis. Such case study method provides in-depth information of a 
single case or cross-case comparisons and analysis, thus allowing the researcher to 
describe and understand in rich detail a complex phenomenon of interest and to identify 
key factors related to the phenomenon. However, findings from the case study research 
“may not generalize to other people or other settings (i.e. findings may be unique to the 
relatively few people included in the research study)” because the case study method is 
based on a limited number of people or cases (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 20). 
More importantly, it is not easy to empirically test hypotheses to examine the relationship 
between variables of interest because qualitative data analysis results are not objectively 
verifiable. To address these issues, I conducted multiple case studies (five cases in total) 
and employed data triangulation (multiple sources of evidence) in this dissertation.  
 Despite these limitations, this dissertation can contribute to the literature. 
Particularly, I note that there is a disconnect between the emergency management 
literature and the crisis informatics literature. The emergency management literature 
focuses on (networks of) formal organizations in response to crisis, while the crisis 
informatics literature stresses the importance of informal actors (individuals across the 
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globe and the affected people) connected through information technology. The event-
driven lens offers a plausible conceptual framework to integrate formal emergency 
response in the emergency management literature and volunteer-based, participatory 
emergency response in the crisis informatics literature. Moreover, five propositions 
drawn from the event-driven lens may help scholars focus on key concepts and develop 
and test hypotheses in their future research. 
 One of the most under-researched areas in the literature is relationships between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations in crisis or disaster situations. In 
other words, there are few studies on the determinants, processes, and outcomes of 
relationships between participatory online groups and formal organizations. As stated 
earlier, in the second and third chapters of this dissertation, I intended to develop and test 
the key determinants and outcomes of relationships between participatory online groups 
and formal organizations. Therefore, this research may make a theoretical contribution to 
the literature with evidence-based findings regarding the development of the relationship 
between participatory online groups and formal organizations.  
Furthermore, the relationship between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations is one type of inter-organizational relationship. In fact, I considered inter-
organizational relations (IOR) theory as a theoretical foundation to develop and test 
hypotheses on the relationship between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations in this dissertation. I note that the IOR theory stresses that building and 
developing inter-organizational relationships are time-consuming (Ansell & Gash, 2008). 
In other words, the IOR theory argues that inter-organizational relationships emerge and 
develop incrementally, and it takes a relatively long time for parties to reach the maturity 
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phase of inter-organizational relationships (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). However, this 
research indicates that participatory online groups and formal organizations may form 
and develop inter-organizational relationships, defined as the intensity of interaction, 
during a relatively short period in an urgent crisis or disaster situation. In addition, the 
IOR theory often times focuses on the formalization and institutionalization of inter-
organizational relationships (Azad & Wiggins, 1995; Oliver, 1990). However, this 
research indicates that in a loosely connected relationship between participatory online 
groups and formal organizations, both actors can work together and make a significant 
contribution to the effective emergency response. Information and communication 
technologies enabled such collaboration and coordination between participatory online 
groups and formal organizations in crisis or disaster situations. Therefore, this research 
may provide a new insight into new types of inter-organizational relationships in the 
digital era in the context of crises or disasters (i.e. a more dynamic, less formalized, and 
technology-driven relationship).  
 In addition to such potential theoretical contributions, this research can make a 
practical contribution. Particularly, the findings from this research (the event-driven lens 
and the results of hypothesis testing) can be useful for both participatory online groups 
and formal organizations to understand complex emergency response systems in the 
networked age and to build and manage partnerships and collaboration with each other to 
improve their capacities to address crises or disasters in a collective and coordinated 
manner. 
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Future Research Agenda 
First of all, I plan to conduct quantitative research to examine how resource 
dependence, shared understanding, and information technology influence the 
development of the relationship between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations in a more rigorous manner. Specifically, I propose to collect Likert scale 
survey data from volunteer members of participatory online groups and those who work 
for formal organizations. Then I will conduct quantitative statistical analysis (regression 
analysis, ordered logit/probit models, panel analysis, etc.). Finally, I will compare and 
contrast between the findings of quantitative analysis and those of the case study research 
(i.e. the third chapter of this dissertation) to determine hypothesized relationships 
between the variables of interest. 
Moreover, future research is needed to empirically assess the outcomes of 
coordinated emergency response between participatory online groups and formal 
organizations. Although there are many individual statements and anecdotes regarding 
the positive impacts of the coordination of responding efforts between participatory 
online groups and formal organizations, few studies were conducted to quantitatively 
evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of such coordination. Thus, I plan to conduct 
impact studies and cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis from the evaluation 
research perspective. Specifically, I am interested in whether and how crisis or disaster 
data created by participatory online groups increases the efficiency of emergency 
response (i.e. cost-saving) and ultimately impacts the final outcomes of emergency 
response (i.e. effectiveness regarding saving lives and meeting human basic needs).   
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Despite the potential contributions of participatory online groups, several 
challenges that need to be addressed remain. Specifically, some scholars and practitioners 
doubt the accuracy and credibility of the information gathered and analyzed by 
participatory online groups (Gao et al., 2011; Goolsby, 2010; B. R. Lindsay, 2011). 
Sometimes, unverified rumors and misinformation are submitted to crisis mapping 
platforms operated by participatory online groups. Recently, to deal with this issue, data 
verification and analysis tools were developed (e.g., SwiftRiver software98), but the 
effectiveness of these tools was not yet empirically examined. Moreover, crisis mapping 
platforms operated by participatory online groups may be vulnerable to privacy and 
security issues due to these platforms’ openness and transparency (Lindsay, 2011; Nelson 
et al., 2010). In other words, anyone can easily get access to such crisis mapping 
platforms, thus the information published on these platforms can be used for malicious 
purposes. Therefore, I plan to investigate technical and managerial solutions for 
addressing these challenges (i.e. data inaccuracy, privacy, and security issues). This 
interdisciplinary research will require collaboration with scholars and practitioners in the 
fields of emergency management, computer science, information management, and crisis 
informatics. 
Importantly, I note the absence of emergency information management systems 
integrating the information processed by participatory online groups and the information 
produced by formal emergency management agencies (Blanchard & Chapman, 2012; 
Gao et al. 2011). As a consequence, the duplication of efforts for data collection and 
                                                 
98 https://wiki.ushahidi.com/display/WIKI/SwiftRiver 
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analysis is likely to occur in urgent crisis or disaster situations. Therefore, I plan to 
develop policy solutions and technical strategies for building integrative emergency 
information management systems where participatory online groups and formal 
organizations communicate and collaborate with each other in real-time (e.g., the 
development of information infrastructure and common communication standards).  
Today participatory online groups and their crowdsourcing projects are being 
actively applied to increase community resilience in various crisis or disaster contexts 
(e.g., climate change, floods, hurricanes, etc.). These projects are highly related to 
collaborative governance and citizen engagement, because robust collaboration across the 
public, private, and nonprofit sectors may be a key factor to build resilient communities. 
Therefore, I plant to investigate how community-based participatory online groups can be 
leveraged to build cross-sectoral capacities for dealing with crises or disasters in the 
entire lifecycle of emergency management (i.e. mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery). 
Lastly, from an organizational theory and behavior perspective, participatory 
online groups are characterized by horizontal structures, decentralized decision-making, 
virtual communities, non-monetary motivations, shared leadership, and collaborative 
organizational learning. Currently, there is an opportunity to create intentional strategies 
to manage these kinds of new organization forms that emerge in the network age. I will 
study and develop effective leadership and management strategies for participatory online 
groups. Moreover, from a perspective of formal organizations (particularly, public 
emergency management agencies), I will investigate shared leadership and management 
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strategies for building and developing partnerships and collaboration between 
participatory online groups and formal organizations. 
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1. Tell me about your background briefly (e.g., education and occupation). 
2. Tell me about your organization’s tasks and activities during the Nepal earthquake 
response. What were your roles during the Nepal earthquake response? 
3. Tell me about the names of participatory online groups which your organization 
cooperated with during the Nepal earthquake response.  
3.1. How did your organization cooperate with them during the Nepal earthquake 
response? 
4. Relationships between your organization and participatory online groups would 
have different stages, including formation, maturation, or decline. Tell me about the level 
of maturity in relationships between your organization and participatory online groups 
that you mentioned above. 
5. Tell me about mutual dependence between your organization and participatory 
online groups during the Nepal earthquake response. For example, I would say your 
organization had a local office or contacts and shared this local knowledge and resources 
with participatory online groups. On the other hand, participatory online groups created 
real-time crisis information and shared this information with your organization. 
5.1. Tell me about how this kind of mutual dependence influenced the level of 
maturity in relationships between your organization and participatory online groups. Did 
mutual dependence lead to more mature relationships and why during the Nepal 
earthquake response? 
6. Tell me about shared understanding between your organization and participatory 
online groups regarding disaster conditions and how to respond to disasters. That is, did 
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your organization and participatory online groups reach consensus on disaster conditions 
and how to respond to disasters during the Nepal earthquake response and how? 
6.1. Tell me about how this kind of shared understanding influenced the level of 
maturity in relationships between your organization and participatory online groups 
during the Nepal earthquake response. 
7. Tell me about your organization’s information technology and management skills. 
How did your organization use information technology and management skills to 
cooperate with participatory online groups during the Nepal earthquake response? 
7.1. Tell me about how your organization’s information technology and management 
skills influenced the level of maturity in relationships between your organization and 
participatory online groups. 
8. Tell me about how the level of maturity in relationships between your 
organization and participatory online groups influenced the outcomes of the Nepal 
earthquake response. That is, did more mature relationships create better response 
outcomes and why? Response outcomes would include saving more lives and meeting 
basic needs more effectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
167 
 
 APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
FOR A MEMBER OF PARTICIPATORY ONLINE GROUPS 
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1. Tell me about your background briefly (e.g., education and occupation). 
2. Tell me about your participatory online group’s tasks and activities during the 
Nepal earthquake response. What were your roles during the Nepal earthquake response? 
3. Tell me about the names of formal organizations which your participatory online 
groups cooperated with during the Nepal earthquake response. How did your 
participatory online group cooperate with them during the Nepal earthquake response? 
4. Relationships between your participatory online group and formal organizations 
would have different stages, including formation, maturation, or decline. Tell me about 
the level of maturity in relationships between your online group and formal organizations 
that you mentioned above. 
5. Tell me about mutual dependence between your online group and formal 
organizations during the Nepal earthquake response. For example, I would say a formal 
organization had a local office or contacts and shared this local knowledge and resources 
with your online groups. On the other hand, your participatory online groups created real-
time crisis information and shared this information with formal organizations. 
5.1. Tell me about how this kind of mutual dependence influenced the level of 
maturity in relationships between your online group and formal organizations. Did 
mutual dependence lead to more mature relationships and why during the Nepal 
earthquake response? 
6. Tell me about shared understanding between your participatory online group and 
formal organizations regarding disaster conditions and how to respond to disasters. That 
169 
 
is, did your online group and formal organizations reach consensus on disaster conditions 
and how to respond to disasters during the Nepal earthquake response and how? 
6.1. Tell me about how this kind of shared understanding influenced the level of 
maturity in relationships between your participatory online group and formal 
organizations during the Nepal earthquake response. 
7. Tell me about your participatory online group’s information technology and 
management skills. How did your participatory online groups use information technology 
and management skills to cooperate with formal organizations during the Nepal 
earthquake response? 
7.1. Tell me about how your online group’s information technology and management 
skills influenced the level of maturity in relationships between your participatory online 
groups and formal organizations. 
8. Tell me about how the level of maturity in relationships between your 
participatory online group and formal organizations influenced the outcomes of the Nepal 
earthquake response. That is, did more mature relationships create better response 
outcomes and why? Response outcomes would include saving more lives and meeting the 
affected people’s needs more effectively.  
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1. How did resource dependence influence the intensity of interaction ** between 
your organization and participatory online groups during the Nepal earthquake response? 
(** A high level of interaction intensity means that there are dynamic communications 
and exchanges of information and resources) (For example, if your organization is reliant 
on participatory online groups’ real-time disaster information, your organization may 
have dynamic interactions and communications with participatory online groups to obtain 
the information.) 
2. How did shared understanding of common problems (i.e. disaster conditions and 
status) influence the intensity of interaction between your organization and participatory 
online groups during the Nepal earthquake response? (For example, if your organization 
and participatory online groups have a higher level of consensus on disaster conditions 
and status, your organization and participatory online groups may have more dynamic 
communications and interactions to collectively respond to a devastating disaster.) 
3. How did shared understanding of strategies (i.e. how to resolve common 
problems) influence the intensity of interaction between your organization and 
participatory online groups during the Nepal earthquake response? (For example, if your 
organization and participatory online groups have a higher level of consensus on how to 
deal with disaster conditions, your organization and participatory online groups may have 
more dynamic communications and interactions to collectively respond to a devastating 
disaster.) 
4. How did difference between your organization and participatory online groups in 
information technology adoption (e.g., Skype, Google Docs, Ushahidi platform, GIS 
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software etc.) influence the intensity of interaction between your organization and 
participatory online groups during the Nepal earthquake response? (For example, if your 
organization adopted Skype, but a participatory online groups did not use Skype, such 
difference in technology adoption would decrease communications and interactions 
between your organization and participatory online groups.) 
5. How did your organization’s technical management capacities (i.e. capacities for 
converting, integrating, and distributing disaster-related information) influence the 
intensity of interaction between your organization and participatory online groups during 
the Nepal earthquake response? (For example, if your organization has a higher level of 
technical management capacity, your organization may have more dynamic interactions 
with participatory online groups to transmit and integrate disaster-related data from your 
organization and participatory online groups.) 
6. How did the intensity of interaction between your organization and participatory 
online groups influence inter-organizational alignment in emergency response (i.e. 
coordination of a wide range of responding tasks and activities, such as crisis mapping, 
situation reports, 3W, onsite operations, and offsite strategic decision making and 
supports) during the Nepal earthquake response? (For example, if your organization and 
participatory online groups have rich, dynamic interactions and communications with 
each other, your organization and participatory online groups may coordinate diverse 
responding tasks and activities more effectively.) 
7. How did inter-organizational alignment (coordination) between your organization 
and participatory online groups influence the effectiveness of emergency response, 
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particularly regarding saving lives and meeting basic human needs during the Nepal 
earthquake response?  
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1. How did resource dependence influence the intensity of interaction ** between 
your participatory online group and formal response organizations during the Nepal 
earthquake response? (** A high level of interaction intensity means that there are 
dynamic communications and exchanges of information and resources) (For example, if 
your participatory online group is reliant on formal response organizations’ disaster-
related information or other resources, your participatory online group may have dynamic 
interactions and communications with formal response organizations to obtain the 
information or resources.) 
2. How did shared understanding of common problems (i.e. disaster conditions and 
status) influence the intensity of interaction between your participatory online group and 
formal response organizations during the Nepal earthquake response? (For example, if 
your participatory online group and formal response organizations have a higher level of 
consensus on disaster conditions and status, your participatory online group and formal 
response organizations may have more dynamic communications and interactions to 
collectively respond to a devastating disaster.) 
3. How did shared understanding of strategies (i.e. how to resolve common 
problems) influence the intensity of interaction between your participatory online group 
and formal response organizations during the Nepal earthquake response? (For example, 
if your participatory online group and formal response organizations have a higher level 
of consensus on how to deal with disaster conditions, your participatory online group and 
formal response organizations may have more dynamic communications and interactions 
to collectively respond to a devastating disaster.) 
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4. How did difference between your participatory online group and formal response 
organizations in information technology adoption (e.g., Skype, Google Docs, Ushahidi 
platform, GIS software etc.) influence the intensity of interaction between your 
participatory online group and formal response organizations during the Nepal 
earthquake response? (For example, if your participatory online group adopted Skype, 
but formal response organizations did not use Skype, such difference in technology 
adoption would decrease communications and interactions between your participatory 
online group and formal response organizations.) 
5. How did your participatory online group’s technical management capacities (i.e. 
capacities for converting, integrating, and distributing disaster-related information) 
influence the intensity of interaction between your participatory online group and formal 
response organizations during the Nepal earthquake response? (For example, if your 
participatory online group has a higher level of technical management capacity, your 
participatory online group may have more dynamic interactions with formal response 
organizations to transmit and integrate disaster-related data from your participatory 
online group and formal response organizations.)  
6. How did the intensity of interaction between your participatory online group and 
formal response organizations influence inter-organizational alignment in emergency 
response (i.e. coordination of a wide range of responding tasks and activities, such as 
crisis mapping, situation reports, 3W, onsite operations, and offsite strategic decision 
making and supports) during the Nepal earthquake response? (For example, if your 
participatory online group and formal response organizations have rich, dynamic 
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interactions and communications with each other, your participatory online group and 
formal response organizations may coordinate diverse responding tasks and activities 
more effectively.)  
7. How did inter-organizational alignment (coordination) between your participatory 
online group and formal response organizations influence the effectiveness of emergency 
response, particularly regarding saving lives and meeting basic human needs during the 
Nepal earthquake response. 
